

И. В. ПАВЛОВА

МЕХАНИЗМ ВЛАСТИ
И СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВО
СТАЛИНСКОГО
СОЦИАЛИЗМА

Abstract

This book is a corrected and expanded version of two previous books by the author, published in Russia in a tiny edition: "Stalinism: the formation of the mechanism of power" (Novosibirsk: Sibirsky Chronograph, 1993. 250 pp. Circulation 500 copies) and "The mechanism of power and the construction of Stalinist socialism" (Novosibirsk: publishing house SO RAN, 2001. 460 pp. Circulation 300

copies). A new version was prepared in 2002. The book examines the process of formation of the mechanism of Stalin's power along with the degeneration of the Bolshevik party and the formation of a party apparatus within it. This mechanism was fine-tuned as a result of the secret party-state reform of 1922–1923, which included the creation of a nomenklatura, the subordination of the Soviets to party committees, and the formalization of a system of secret office work. Particular attention is paid to the process of strengthening the Stalinist mechanism of power during the political campaigns of the 1920s. such as the removal of Lenin from the leadership of the party and the re-establishment of the empire, intra-party struggle and the suppression of the new economic policy.

Based on the analysis of the documents of the highest party bodies - the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP / VKP (b) - and their secret correspondence with local party and state bodies, the conspiratorial nature of Stalin's power is revealed. The book proves that it was the secret decision-making mechanism that made it possible to hide the real meaning of the cardinal socio-economic transformations of the 1930s. According to the author, this meaning was to create a system of state serfdom in the Soviet Union and militarize the country. A special chapter of the book is devoted to the aggressive designs of Stalin and his conspiracy in preparation for war. The book is sharply polemical and directed against

the modern apology of Stalin's great power and the historical justification of Soviet modernization in the 1930s.

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**The mechanism of Stalin's
power: formation and functioning. 1917
- 1941.**

INTRODUCTION

1. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SITUATION

The reforms of the 1990s, aimed at overcoming the communist legacy in the economy, entailed serious social consequences for a huge mass of the population, which in turn led to the discrediting of the idea of democracy in Russia. It is with democracy that, as a rule, all the modern problems in the country are associated - disorder, corruption, an increase in crime, mass impoverishment of the population, etc. As early as March 12, 1997, Literaturnaya Gazeta published the results of an all-

Russian public opinion poll on the current state of Russia. The key issue was the question of order: "What do you think Russia needs more now: order or democracy?" The answer looked like this: "order" - 79.4%; "democracy" - 8.9%; "Difficult to answer" - 11.7%.

The very posing of the question and the answers to it demonstrate that firstly, the extent to which the idea of democracy in Russia has been discredited in recent years, and secondly, neither the interviewers nor the respondents understand the most important circumstance that these two concepts - "order" and "democracy", as well as their phenomena, are not opposite, but inextricably linked. It turns out that at the end of the 20th century, the traditional Russian stereotype about order as a result of the actions of a strong government prevailed in the public mind. Moreover, in many strata of Russian society, order and strong power are associated with the period of the 1930s, when fundamental socio-economic transformations were also carried out, which went down in history under the name "building socialism". In conditions when the state of instability in

society is sharply increasing, the mass consciousness in Russia, to one degree or another, turns to the personality of Stalin. This was the case during the Brezhnev period, when drivers had portraits of Stalin on the windows of their cars - a spontaneous protest against the collapse of the country. Today this return is expressed in the growth of apologetic literature about Stalin. Doctor of Law B.P. Kurashvili is convinced that Stalin entered the public consciousness

"as a patriot and builder of the great new Russia, the great USSR, which made the greatest take-off in its history to the heights of power and world influence. The people will never forget that they made this take-off on the basis of a just social system called socialism, and its loss will be it is all the more bitter for the people that this system corresponds to its spirit and traditions and has come to it at the cost of great efforts and great suffering . The pro-Stalinist trend - at its core - is not just a return to Soviet historiography of the 1930s - 1950s, but a clearly expressed political position. However, in recent years, a new, more academic version of the apology for Stalinist socialism has emerged - the concept of modernization. To one degree or another, it is shared by most modern philosophers, political scientists and historians. In the general line of modernization processes, not only "industrialization" and "cultural revolution" are considered, but also "the policy of complete collectivization of the countryside." All these transformations, according to some historians, "in general, corresponded to the national-state interests of the country, which was also an important factor in their social support, making the Soviet period of national history a matter of special pride"[2] . Adherence to the concept of modernization in relation to the socio-economic transformations of the 1930s, as a rule, is inextricably linked with a positive assessment of Stalin's foreign policy activities, which can be explained by the "charm" of the Stalinist great power, the impact of which the authors of the democratic direction could not avoid[3] .

Now it is difficult to imagine the burning interest in its history that was in Soviet society ten years ago. The brutal truth about the Stalinist period - about collectivization, industrialization and mass repressions - spilled out. Then it seemed that historical memory had returned to the people, because practically everyone was united in condemning Stalin's crimes. Never before in the House of Scientists of the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok was there such unanimity as on December 1, 1988 at the evening in memory of the victims of Stalinism, when the hall, designed for more than a thousand people, could not accommodate everyone - people stood in the aisles. The same social strata, groups that remained in the soul as before

faithful to the memory of Stalin, "went underground" or took a wait-and-see attitude. Public appearances by his defenders were sporadic. Of the most notable are the article by N. Andreeva "I can not compromise my principles", published on March 13, 1988 in the newspaper "Soviet Russia", and the lawsuit to defend the name of Stalin, which was put forward by I. Shekhovtsov against the writer

A. Adamovich. However, this was only a brief moment of excitement of the social memory of the people. In subsequent years, neither the state nor the public assessment was given not only of Soviet history as a whole, but also of its Stalinist period, when mass repressions took place. The Constitutional Court in the summer of 1992 not only did not complete the exposure of the government's crimes, but also did not make the necessary legal conclusion on the activities of the Communist Party. Therefore, despite the decree of the President of Russia to ban the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, this party has revived again and is gaining an increasing number of supporters, and it is headed by an admirer of Stalin as a political figure. Democratic-minded people are surprised that "in today's Europe, only Russian people give such a huge number of votes to the party, during the reign of which in the past several tens of millions of completely innocent people were destroyed, national culture was distorted, and the moral decay of entire nations was unheard of in size" [4]. An indicative fact: on March 6, 1996, on the day of the 40th anniversary of the secret report of N.S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, when at a meeting of the State Duma deputy S. Yushenkov proposed to honor the memory of millions of those who died by standing up, no more than ten people —

responded[5]. Despite the fact that a huge number of documents on Soviet history have been published over the past decade, the conclusion of the historian M.Ya. Geftera looks too optimistic:

"Declassification has already driven a stake into any even the most sophisticated version of the explanation, compiled according to the recipe" on the one hand ... on the other hand. "The disclosure of crimes brought to its logical end calls all the facts into one - exhaustive - Crime.. "[6]. On the contrary, during the years of freedom of the press and information, a lack of understanding of the meaning of what was

happening in Russia under the slogan of building and strengthening socialism clea

in his notebook the following confession: "Still: my fault, our fault (even A.I. Solzhenitsyn) that I failed, we failed to bring to everyone else one thing: what happened to us over these 70 years: list, list. Both wholesale (least reach) and retail (most reach). The task remains unfulfilled"[7] .

However, it cannot be said that attempts at explanation were not made. Their main result was the realization that the originality of the historical process in Russia lies in the special socio-cultural role of power. The main engine of the country's development was not revolutions and reforms, as in the West, which latently ripened in society itself, but the actions of the authorities aimed at reshaping society. All reforms in Russia began "from above", at the initiative of the government, and it also curtailed them, thus opening the era of counter-reforms. In Russia, it was not economic processes that determined political ones, but, on the contrary, politics determined the development not only of the economy, but of all social life. This fundamental philosophical and historical position is currently shared by many Russian and foreign researchers. Theoretically, it is presented in the works of pre-revolutionary historians of the state school S.M. Solovieva, K.D. Kavelina, P.N. Milyukova, B.N. Chicherin, modern Russian historians and philosophers D.N. Alshits, N.Ya. Eidelman, L.S. Vasilyeva, A.S. Akhiezer, Yu.S. Pivovarov and A.I. Fursov, Western historians - R. Pipes, R. Tucker,

M. Malia, G. Simon and others. It is characteristic that the conclusion about the special role of power in Russia was also accepted by Soviet historians, who carried it out in the form of a fundamental thesis about the leading role of the Communist Party in the development of Soviet society. But since historical science was an organic, integral part of the Soviet socio-political system, it is quite natural that the problem of understanding what is Afanasiev, never [8] . The happening, as noted by Yu.N. explanation was replaced by an axiom, which was among the priorities, according to which the Communist Party was declared the vanguard of workers in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and represented the leading core of all organiza

The cardinal changes in the USSR, which began in the mid-1980s, led to a painful search for an answer to the question of the essence of the Soviet system and the real mechanism of power in the country, which became a characteristic feature of numerous discussions and publications of that time[10]. At first, these were timid attempts to abandon the concept of the existence of a system of Soviet power. It was widely believed that after 1917 the country definitely had democratic institutions, which since the late 1920s began to be replaced by the administrative-command control system that had developed by the mid-1930s. So, in the article by T.P. Korzhikhina "The Political System in the USSR in the 20-30s" it was said that in the 1930s. system "balanced between the bureaucratic state apparatus and the working masses, between emergency measures and popular enthusiasm. The system of the dictatorship of the proletariat gradually and consistently developed into

the regime of a dictator"[11]. It is characteristic that in the book by T.P. Korzhikhina "The Soviet state and its institutions (November 1917 - December 1991)", party bodies were not considered at all[12].

The answer to the question about the mechanism of power was not given in the largest work of the perestroika period - the book by D.A. Volkogonov "Triumph and tragedy: a political portrait of I.V. Stalin", published in 1989. It is therefore quite natural that during the discussion of this book, which took place in the editorial office of the journal "New and Contemporary History", V.P. Naumov made the following remark: "... It is also necessary to reveal the processes of establishing the omnipotence of the highest bodies of the party, especially the activities of the Secretariat and the Politburo, the role of Stalin in catalyzing this process. It would be desirable to consider in more detail the process of absorbing the functions and prerogatives of the power of the Soviets by the party apparatus"[13].

The recognition of the Deputy Director of the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR V.P. Dmitrenko, made by him at the end of 1990 at a round table meeting "Stalin's model of socialism: formation, development, collapse (20-80s)", that "for many years, the study of the problems of the development of the political system in the USSR was methodologically untenable, theoretically helpless, extremely one-sided and one-linear. The problem, as it is now absolutely clear, was studied only in one plane -

evidence of a consistent and increasingly deepening democracy as we approach today"[14] .

Awareness of the real nature of power in the USSR occurred simultaneously with the political processes in the country. Only when the rapid disintegration of the CPSU began was the question of its real essence finally raised in Soviet literature. In this sense, Yu. Burtin's article "What is the CPSU?" was significant for its time . However, how long it took to raise this question, given that the opponents of Bolshevism already in the first years of Soviet power caught the tendency of the party's transformation from a socio-political organization into a state mechanism. In 1924 St. Ivanovich wrote: "A party is always only a part of the political forces of a given country, more or less, but still only a part. Yes, and this very word - "party" - in all languages and in whatever sense it is used, always means only a part of what they say when they say this word. In the same place where all parties are destroyed, where only one group of people operates, burning out with fire and cutting down with a sword everyone, not only those who act differently, but also those who think differently, moreover, not only outside their circle, but also within it itself - there this dominant part turns into a whole . And having

turned into a whole, ceasing to be a part, it ceases to be a party..."[16] . Public awareness of the real mechanism of power began only after August 1991, when, simultaneously with the collapse of the political system that existed in the USSR, its structure, the Communist Party, also collapsed. This crash brought to light with merciless clarity a fact that had been hidden for many decades under a thick veil of lies and demagoguery and eventually lost its original meaning: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was not really a political party. The party, a real organization of like-minded people, which had its own political goals and tasks, was not the multimillion-strong CPSU, but its apparatus, which at the same time was an institution of power, the core of the entire political system. After this rod was taken out, the CPSU crumbled like a house of cards. At the same time, in August

telegrams sent from the apparatus of the Central Committee to local party organs. The next

step towards this realization was the sessions of the Constitutional Court in the summer of 1992, which considered the constitutionality of the decrees of the President of Russia on the ban on the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, as well as the legality of this organization itself. The court featured materials from the very "special folder" in which the most secret documents of the CPSU were stored. For the first time in the USSR, in the then published article by M. Fedotov, A. Makarov, S. Shakhrai "The Case of the CPSU, or What Organization We Lost", it was proved that the CPSU is not a socio-political organization (which was defended by opponents of the President's decrees), but "typical and at the same time unique" state mechanism. The change of power and the collapse of the USSR, simultaneously with the ^[17].

beginning of a large-scale declassification of documents of the CPSU, undoubtedly intensified the study of the mechanism of political power. Serious steps along this path in the last years of her life were made by T. P. Korzhikhina [18]. Quite naturally that attempts to understand the mechanism of communist power began with the study of the

first decade of Soviet power. Of great importance for understanding this mechanism was the secret correspondence of the highest party bodies - the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee with local party bodies, which was carried out secretly through the communication system of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and secret-directive parts of local party committees (since 1926, the Secret Department of the Central Committee and secret departments in the field). Unfortunately, the monograph by I.V. Pavlova "Stalinism: the formation of the mechanism of power", which for the first time, on the basis of this correspondence, considered the process of the formation of the mechanism of the party state with its special party apparatus within the Communist Party, the absorption of state structures by the party bodies and the principle of all-encompassing secrecy, did not affect the historiography of this topic in Russia. The publication of a number of documents on the conduct of secret party office work, prepared by V., was also left without due attention [19]

Lebedev based on the materials of the Presidential Archive — . So, in the works

specially dedicated to the problems of power in the first years after the October Revolution - G.A. Trukan, E.G. Gimpelson, V.A. Shishkina, S.V. Leonov, many different issues are considered, except for the main one - the mechanism of power[20]. Gradually, however, other historians began to realize the importance of the correspondence of the Central Committee with local party bodies for understanding the real mechanism of power in the USSR. A monograph by G.L. Olekh, based on the materials of the Voronezh and Tambov provincial

party committees - a book by V.V. Nikulin[21]. Following the books of M. Dzhilas and M. Voslensky, widely known in world historiography, in which the theory of the "new class", or the ruling bureaucracy, was developed in relation to the Soviet party-state nomenclature, this topic began to be developed in the works of Russian historians[22]. Particular attention in modern historiography is paid to the post-war period of the existence of communist power in the USSR.

It is quite natural that the 1930s were not left without attention. Here, the priority in the study of the mechanism of power belongs to the compilers of the collection of documents "Stalin's Politburo in the 30s." The most important provision for Russian historiography was the recognition of the Politburo of the Central Committee as the highest authority in the USSR. "It was the Politburo that predetermined all the main directions of the country's development (and also considered a lot of relatively minor and secondary problems), acted as the main arbiter key interdepartmental in case of contradictions, directly organized the execution of many of its decisions and tried to keep the entire system of power under careful control. A significant number of fundamental decisions and actions, formally coming from various state bodies (for example, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the STO of the USSR), in fact, was the result of the activities of the Politburo.

initiatives of the Komsomol, trade unions, etc. instances. The leaders of the Politburo could justifiably declare: "We are the state"[24]. At the same time, an article by the same authors was published in the West on office work in the highest bodies of the party leadership of the USSR[25].

One of the compilers of the collection of documents "Stalin's Politburo in the 30s" O.V. Khlevnyuk, some time later, published the book "The Politburo. The Mechanisms of Political Power in the 1930s." However, as the author himself emphasized, "a detailed study of the logic of Stalin's decisions, the influence of various factors on his activities - real socio-economic processes, departmental contradictions, the position of the Soviet nomenklatura, etc." was not part of the scope of his book. "It dealt mainly with one question - the role of the Politburo and its individual members (possibly, "fractions") in political decision-making"[26].

In the West, in comparison with the huge amount of literature about Stalin and Stalinism, attempts at a truly scientific analysis of Stalinism as a socio-political system, S. Cohen rightly noted [27], are relatively rare. A similar note about that the nature of communist power, "strange as it may seem, was not subjected to serious problematization", can be found in the article by F. Eidlin[28]. He also believes that "there was a tendency to consider power rather as something self-evident than requiring explanation." Touching on this side of Stalinism, researchers, as a rule, proceeded from the concept of totalitarianism - the concept of absolute and all-encompassing power, and further stated that in the countries that survived Stalinism, power took the form of "partocracies", or apparatus regimes in which the monopoly belonged to the ruling groups and the apparatus communist parties. This provision in the vast majority of cases was perceived as an axiom that did not require more detailed explanations and proofs. In addition, in all works that touched upon the question of the Stalinist system of power, it was said about its formation since the late 1920s, as a result of the

Stalinist "revolution from above". Nevertheless, considering the historiography of the mechanism of Stalinist power, one cannot fail to note the works of A.G. Avtorkhanov, R. Pipes, R. Tucker, M. Feinsod, L. Shapiro, G. Gill, J. Lowenhardt, N.E. Rosenfeldt [29]. The conclusions about the importance of taking into account Russian traditions when considering this mechanism deserve special attention. R. Tucker, speaking about the roots of Stalin's "re

emphasizes that "this Russian past could well have been used by a politician of the 20th century as a model for legitimizing a political course that essentially repeated the main features of this historical past"[30] . A comparative analysis of the history of pre-revolutionary and Soviet Russia allowed R. Pipes to notice the features of the illegitimacy of both communist and tsarist power[31] .

However, before the start of perestroika in the USSR, Western historians, as you know, did not have the opportunity to work in the Soviet archives, and even more so to study the secret documents of the CPSU. At their disposal were only individual materials from the Smolensk archive, taken out by the Germans from the USSR. The pages devoted to the illegal "Stalin's Cabinet" in A.G. Avtorkhanov's book "The Technology of Power"[32] are perceived all the more significantly . It is appropriate to note here that many modern authors unfairly classify his works as journalism and even memoirs, although it is difficult to name another author who would be able to reveal to the reader such a wide historical panorama of the emergence of partocracy and to the same extent capture the characteristic features of this type of government and its policies. Russian historians should learn from Avtorkhanov not only a high degree of consistency in scientific and historical analysis, but also the rigor of moral principles. Feeling the full power of the Stalinist terrorist machine in the late 1930s, he vowed to devote the rest of his life to the fight against communist tyranny with the means available to him[33] . All his books are evidence of this far from safe struggle (for the book "Stalin in power", published in 1951 in French under the pseudonym Alexander Uralov, the Soviet government sentenced him to death in absentia).

In recent years, Western historians specializing in the study of Soviet Russia have worked not only in central but also in local archives[34] . Rejecting the totalitarian approach to the reality of that time, which gave albeit primitive, but consistent conclusions, these historians found themselves inside the Russian semantic context, but with a European mentality. Approaching the study of Stalinist power with the general standards that are usually used in the characterization of bureaucratic systems, they concluded that it was weak. This position was expressed most clearly

Western historians J. Arch Getty and Gabor T. Rittesporn. According to Getty, "it was a weak, not a strong state... strong, stable regimes do not need massive violence to govern", "the Soviet state was just a creation of society." They focus on the chaos and inefficiency of the Stalinist power system, exaggerate the autonomy of the nomenklatura in the 1930s and the ability of local authorities to oppose the central leadership by distorting Moscow's directives and interpreting them for their own interests. Getty thinks that in the available literature Stalin's role in the events of the 1930s is exaggerated, while he, from his point of view, "was never omnipotent, but always acted surrounded by other groups and interests." Stalin and the nomenklatura elite, in his opinion, had no long-term plans and ideas - there was simply no time for this. The problem was everyday survival and the search for ways to overcome the chaos and disorder that was "unleashed" as a result of the Stalinist revolution of 1929–1932 [35]. R. Manning made a completely sentimental conclusion about Stalin's power: "... we see the government in fundamentally more human, more dependent on events beyond its control (such as a crop failure), and more vulnerable to the vagaries of public opinion than any of us could have imagined before." [36] Focusing mainly on questions of social history, these historians for a long time not only ignored the question of the mechanism of Stalinist power, but also referred it to the category of "hot air", as Gabor T. Rittesporn put it at the III International Congress in 1985, which discussed the problems of studying

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in response to N.E. Rosenfeldt about the apparatus of Stalin's power [37]. That's why every time you touch

the question of the Stalinist state in the already cited author's text in the book "The Road to Terror. Stalin and the Self-Extermination of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939", Getty writes about the party, the nomenklatura, but not about the party apparatus as such, which operated according to its own laws within the Communist Party.

At present, among Western historians, only N.E. Rosenfeldt explores this problem in relation to the pre-war

time through a comparative analysis of various sources, including unpublished memoirs unknown in Russia, and, more recently, declassified Soviet archival documents. (In 1998, Denmark hosted an international conference on the topic "Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union"[38]). If in his first book,

Knowledge and Power. The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government (Copenhagen, 1978), Rosenfeldt relied mainly on literary sources, then in subsequent works, and above all in the book "Stalin's Special Departments" ("Stalin's Special Departments". Copenhagen, 1989), he analyzed two extremely interesting sources. One of them is the unpublished manuscript of G.K. government, party, economic and public organizations in the USSR", found in the collection of B. Nikolaevsky (kept at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University), and another - under the title "Organization and Function of the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" (Library of Congress in Washington The authorship of the second manuscript has not been definitely established. Rosenfeldt does not agree with the point of view of the Library staff that it was written by the well-known in the West V.V. Pozdnyakov is the author of notes about the NKVD and about General Vlasov in the collection of B.I. Nikolaevsky.

New sources reinforced Rosenfeldt's main conclusion that "the real center of power in the Soviet system was the Special Sector of the Central Communist Apparatus. This sector, hidden from public opinion and rarely mentioned in the sources, functioned as the most important service organ of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat. It was in charge of affairs security and secret communications. He was also closely connected and almost identified with Stalin's personal secretariat. A characteristic expression of this symbiosis was the fact that for a long time Stalin's personal secretariat was headed by A. Poskrebyshv, who was also the head of the Special Sector "[39] . On the ground, according to Rosenfeldt, this role was played by secret departments. He emphasizes Georgievsky's statement about such a function of the secret departments as working on mobilization plans. Rosent

controversial and explains its appearance by the political goals of Georgievsky, which consisted in a strong desire "to convince the potential reader of the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union, perhaps in the hope that his message will be echoed in America in the 50s." [40] . The question of whether the secret departments dealt with the problems of military mobilization in the 1930s, and if they did, then to what extent, is a serious scientific problem, not only not yet solved, but also not fully comprehended. According to Georgievsky and in many respects Rosenfeldt himself, it was the secret departments that constituted the "real Soviet Union", which was hidden even from its own citizens, and that it was they who were the real "motor" not only of all party, but also state and public organizations [41] . The problems posed by Rosenfeldt have not been resolved either in Western or in Russian historiography, and the period of the 1930s stands out in this respect. An illustrative example of the lack of study of the issue of the mechanism of power are the characteristic remarks of O.V. Khlevnyuk, who had wide access to the materials of the highest party bodies in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). First, this is his remark about the Secret Department of the Central Committee: "According to the new Charter of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, adopted at the 17th Congress in early 1934, the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was transformed into a Special Sector of the Central Committee. The essence of this reorganization is still unclear. But, most likely, the Special Sector retained the functions of the secret department reorganized at the end of 1933, i.e. he was engaged only in office work of the Politburo and personally served Stalin. On March 10, 1934, the Politburo appointed A.N. Poskrebyshv" [42] . Secondly, this is Khlevnyuk's assessment of the results of Rosenfeldt's research as "wild assumptions" that appeared due to the lack of access to real information. In his opinion, in reality the Secret Department was responsible for servicing the daily work of the Central Committee [43] — .

The difficult historiographical situation with the question of the mechanism of Stalinist power is explained by the fact that not a single fact lies on the surface. Here it is appropriate to cite one more remark by Khlevnyuk, who is also a member of the editorial board of the Documents of Soviet History series: "The general processes of approval and develop

dictatorships is a major problem for historians. However, there are not many sources for its study and understanding. As a rule, we have documents that characterize not the system of dictatorship itself, but the results of its activities - all kinds of decisions, statistics, reports, reports, etc. Much less opportunity for the historian to study what can be called the sociology of power. Real decision-making mechanisms, the most important part of which were relationships in the ruling elite, determining the boundaries of the ruling layer and the degree of influence of its various groups, methods of building and maintaining the stability of the power hierarchy, etc. - all this is almost always difficult to reconstruct on the basis of historical sources. This statement is doubly true in relation to the Stalinist period, marked by extreme closeness"[44] . It was not by chance that Stalin, starting from 1922/1923, consistently created such a mechanism of power that was hidden not only from the people and the

party, but in many respects from members of the highest party bodies. That is why, when analyzing sources, especially on the history of the 1930s, the presence of a very definite secret is clearly felt, the purpose of which was to hide the real mechanism of power with a thick veil of secrecy, reticence and outright lies and direct future historians along the wrong path of studying official public authorities. The study of the place and role of state bodies in the system of Stalinist power is of great scientific importance, but subject to a clear understanding that those state bodies that were called the highest bodies of legislative and executive power in the USSR in the Constitution were in fact only a demonstrative screen of real political power. This fact was convincingly demonstrated by the collection of articles "Decision Making in the Stalinist Command Economy. 1932 - 1937, edited by the English historian E. Rees (Rees, EA, ed.

Decision-Making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932 – 1937. Studies in Russian and East European History and Society. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). The task of the authors of the collection was to clarify "the relationship between the commissariats for the economy, the State Planning Commission and party and state bodies." Dedicated to each commissariat

separate chapter. E. Rees and D. Watson examined the structure and relations between the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, R. Davis and O.V. Khlevnyuk - the activities of the State Planning Commission, S. Tsakunov - the People's Commissariat of Finance, O.V. Khlevnyuk - People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, M. Tauger - People's Commissariat of Agriculture, V. Barnet - People's Commissariat for Supply and Internal Trade, E. Rees - People's Commissariat of Railway and Water Transport. With all the unconditional importance of a detailed study of the activities of various people's commissariats, the conclusion of the authors of the collection was quite predictable, namely, that "the Politburo remained throughout the 30s. the ultimate arbiter and prime mover of economic policy." It is no coincidence that many of the most important issues are not reflected in the surviving archival documents. The reviewer of this collection, D. Shearer, quite rightly pointed out such moments, concluding that "access to the archives may not provide an answer to —

some of the most intricate questions of Stalin's economic policy"[45] . A characteristic feature of Russian historiography in recent years is increased attention to the history of society. Following Western authors, Russian historians began to widely use the concept of social history, which is currently considered not only as the main direction of the historiography of Soviet society, but also as a methodological basis for its study. In itself, the appeal to the study of social history is only to be welcomed. A deeper study of the Stalinist period showed the impossibility of a simple answer to the question of how to "separate Stalin from the people", to which all discussions during "perestroika" ultimately boiled down. Under these conditions, it is quite natural that one of the primary tasks of historiography was the study of the daily life of society, individual groups, families, and individuals. Such knowledge enriches our understanding of the past. However, one should especially note the

very disapproving attitude of historians who share the concept of social history to the concept of totalitarianism and political history in general. This was also manifested in the speeches of the majority of the participants of the round table "Soviet past: the search for understanding", which discussed the "Course of Soviet history", prepared by A.K. Sokolov and V.S.

Tyazhelnikova. T.A. Leontieva even expressed regret that they failed to implement the stated approach from the position of social history in full, i.e. "depoliticize the national history of the twentieth century." (highlighted by

me. - I.P.) [46] . Faced in the course of studying documents of the Stalin era with numerous facts of chaos and disorder that did not fit into their interpretation of totalitarianism as an organized social order and an uninterruptedly functioning economy, social historians find the reasons for such phenomena in the insufficient effectiveness and strength of the regime. Naturally, the Stalinist government turns out to be a weak government for them: "Professional incompetence and ineptitude sharply distinguished Soviet leaders from the administrative apparatus, which, in theory, should be inherent in totalitarian regimes." They see "the weakness of the center in resolving key issues, the instability of the "general line", shying from side to side in political practice", and also the fact that locally there were "continuous distortions in the chain of commands sent down from above and reaching the lower links in a very truncated and deformed", and thus "exacerbated chaos and disorganization". It turns out that society itself "fashioned new bizarre forms out of itself, consistent with the mentality and psychology of the majority of people, crushed and digested the "only scientific ideology", adapting for this a number of socialist ideas that found soil in it, created on this basis new —

social and state institutions..."[47] . As a result of this approach, society quite naturally acquires a self-contained significance, and power

and its crimes are relegated to the background. At the same time, there is a gap in the historiography of the history of Stalin's power in the 1920s-1930s. is filled either with numerous apologetic works, or with works sustained in the historiographical tradition "on the one hand ... on the other hand". One of the latest examples of this approach is the textbook for higher education "The History of the State and Law of Russia. 1929 – 1940." V.M. Kuritsyn. In his opinion, "the 30s were

collectivization, “depeasantization”, the horrific famine of 1932-1933, mass terror, which claimed the lives of millions of our compatriots. But it is also true that it was the time of the formation of the Russian state (at that time existing in the form of the USSR) as a great industrial power - the second superpower of the world (which it became after the victory in the Great Patriotic War), the main advantage of which was its military power . Thus, the urgent historical task of modernizing Russia, its entry into the industrial civilization of those [years was solved](#)”[48] . And although, unlike V.I. Ivkin, compiler of the historical and biographical reference book “State Power of the USSR. Supreme authorities and management and their leaders. 1923 – 1991.” (M., 1999), Kuritsyn understands under the state power in the USSR not only the state bodies themselves, but also the party bodies, the result of his consideration was the recognition that “in the 30s the party apparatus crushed under itself and actually merged with the state apparatus and apparatus of public organizations, as well as trade unions and the Komsomol, into a single party-state management system, built on a hierarchical principle, in the form of a kind of pyramid, where real power was concentrated at the very top in the hands of a narrow group of people [the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks], and then - one Stalin. This administrative system was completely controlled by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in whose apparatus there was a personnel department (it was headed by G.M. Malenkov) and in which there were 45 departments in all branches of state, economic and socio-political life”[49] . However, as this management system operated, so

remained unclear.

Thus, an analysis of the historiographical situation with the scientific study of the history of the formation and establishment of the mechanism of Stalinist power shows that this problem is far from being resolved and is still a key task of modern historiography, both Russian and Western. Stalin, however paradoxical

it may sound, not only did not attach importance to the formal side when it came to the priority directions of his policy, but also deliberately ignored it. Without unraveling this secret, it is impossible to understand the mechanism of its domination.

This statement can be illustrated with a specific example. M.M. Litvinov, as is known, in the 1930s. was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. However, he did not have any independence in actions - all his statements, firstly, were approved by the Politburo, and secondly, Stalin already in the early 1930s. did not trust Litvinov, and was not invited to Politburo meetings. He did not make a single decision on personnel issues without Stalin's visa. Many issues of foreign policy were generally decided without the participation of Litvinov. T.H.M. Gromsky, who was the editor of the Izvestiya newspaper in those years, spoke, in particular, about one such closed operational meeting in 1932 "without a protocol, without a transcript." Litvinov was not present and did not even know anything about him. At this meeting, it was decided to replace the political defense in the Far East with an active political offensive. The transition from one policy to another was formulated__

and substantiated in the editorial of Izvestia[50] . To understand this most important circumstance, or, to paraphrase the famous words of W. Churchill about Russia, to unravel "a secret wrapped in a mystery that hides a riddle" [51], it took the efforts of not only such astute contemporary historians of that era as A.G. . Avtorkhanov, but also such remarkable Soviet writers as V.S. Grossman. How difficult it was, is evidenced by at least the fact that at one time even such an outstanding person as V.I. Vernadsky, did not unravel Stalin's secret, as the following entries in his diary of 1938 unambiguously testify: "Two mutually inconsistent - or rather, four" higher authorities ": 1) Stalin and 2) the Central Committee of the Party, 3) the government of Molotov - the government of the Union , 4) Yezhov and the NKVD. To what extent does Stalin unite them?" "Two authorities - if not three: the Central —

Committee of the party, the government of the Union and the NKVD. It is not known who is actually stronger"[52] . The — mechanism of Stalinist power, by which the author understands, first of all, the method of making decisions and transferring them from the Center[53] to the localities, was such a secret system that it left practically no traces. In itself, this awareness is a historical fact, and

historians are struggling with the solution to the murder of Kirov: there are no documents confirming Stalin's participation in this case, which means there was no such participation either, many historians quite confidently assert[54]. There are no signatures of Stalin and Zhukov on this one, according to D.A. Volkogonov, a "striking" document, as "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941 (and not only on this, but also on other important

documents), - it means that the document was not adopted and no action followed[55]. Stalin was counting on such an effect when he called for "leaving no traces", "protecting the truth with battalions of lies." Acting in this way, Stalin counted on the naivete and gullibility of future historians, but, first of all, on the fact that only those of his deeds that were reflected in official documents published with his knowledge would remain in History. However, he miscalculated. Traces always remain, and when it became clear what to look for, it turned out to be quite likely to "uncover" the mechanism of Stalinist power. This is especially important in relation to the reality of the 1930s, because until now our understanding of that time does not correspond to what actually happened then. Thus, it is extremely important to study not only the actual cardinal socio-economic mechanism of power, but also its actions as a lever for the implementation of reforms in the country. Since they were carried out from above, by means of power headed by Stalin, they may well be called the construction of not just socialism, but Stalinist socialism. In these actions to remake society, many aspects of its mechanism of power were revealed, which are not directly reflected in the sur

2. THE PROBLEM OF SOURCES

In order to get an idea of the sources on the research topic, it is necessary first of all to characterize the objective and subjective obstacles that stand in the way of the historian. Such objective obstacles include the absence of many necessary documents destroyed in the course of various "purges", which in itself is the most important characteristic of the mechanism of communist power. The practice of destroying documents

was widespread [56] There is evidence of widespread use as S.M. Dubrovsky that back in 1924, early as the 1920s. historian after the death of Lenin, Stalin instructed his assistant I.P. Tovstukha to look through the archive of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and destroy everything "unnecessary". This instruction meant, first of all, the destruction of the documents that recorded the differences between Lenin and Stalin. Only for 1921 - 1922. more than 40 letters from Lenin to Stalin have not been found, although in most cases Stalin's receipts for receiving them have been preserved[57] . A large-scale —

"cleansing" of documents was carried out during the Great Terror, when documents, publications, portraits of repressed party and state leaders were destroyed. So, on August 21, 1937, the first secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks R.I. Eikhe personally ordered the Deputy Head of the Special Sector of the Territory Committee P. Kukshtel to destroy the transcripts of the speeches of the "enemies of the people"[58] . The same fate befell the transcripts of the speeches of Eikhe himself after his arrest in 1938. In the party archive of the Novosibirsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, far from all the materials related to the activities of the most active conductors of Stalin's directives in Siberia were preserved in this way - S.I. Syrtsova, R.I. Eikhe, L.M. Zakovsky, F.P. Gryadinsky, L.I. Kartvelishvili

The operation to destroy documents was carried out in the autumn of 1941, when the Nazi troops were expected to attack Moscow and the option of leaving it was not ruled out[59] .

Immediately after Stalin's death, documents that were directly stored in his office in the Kremlin and at the dacha in Kuntsevo were destroyed. One of the latest versions of how this happened is presented by the Medvedev brothers. Their version is based on the stories of A.V. Snegov and O.G. Shatunovskaya in the 1960s, who worked in the commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, created to investigate the assassination of Kirov and the political trials of the 1930s. They, in turn, proceeded from the confidential confessions of Khrushchev and Mikoyan. According to this version, the fate of Stalin's documents was decided at a joint meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which began at 8 pm on March 5, 1953, when Stalin was still alive. Then Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev were instructed to bring his documents and papers into proper order. Stalin died at 9:50 p.m., and already on the night of March 5-6, Beria, Khrushchev and Malenkov were busy with paperwork. Many folders caused them anxiety and even fear. "It seemed to them," write the authors of the article, "it is dangerous even to look through these folders and exchange opinions. It was therefore decided to burn these collections of Stalin's papers without reading and sorting them (emphasis mine - I.P.). In his office in the Kremlin, papers were burned in an old Dutch oven located there, and papers collected from Stalin's safes and desks in Kuntsevo were probably burned here in the oven or in the yard. There is a lot of oral and written evidence of the destruction of documents after the 20th Congress of the CPSU by order of Khrushchev himself and other leading figures of the party, not only in the central, but also in the

local party archives. Recently, evidence has been documented of the destruction, at the direction of Khrushchev, of 11 paper bags with documents containing Beria's papers, documents about Stalin and other party leaders[61]. There were rumors about a suitcase of Voroshilov's destroyed documents. Thoroughly cleaned their personal archives and other associates of Stalin. It is enough to get acquainted with the book "Letters from I.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936". These are the letters that, in December 1969, the 79-year-old Molotov handed over to the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, having previously

the compilers, "the content of the letters suggests that only the most 'safe' documents were selected for the archive, in which the most gloomy and criminal actions of Stalin and Molotov were not affected" [62] .

As for the murder of Kirov, then, according to O.G. Shatunovskaya, the commission interviewed thousands of people, studied thousands of documents. A thorough investigation of the most important circumstances of the assassination attempt, the testimony of people close to Kirov and other witnesses - all this led the commission to the conclusion that the assassination of Kirov was organized by Stalin. Shatunovskaya left the following testimony in 1990: "After 64 volumes of materials were archived, and I was forced to leave the CCP (1962), the CCP officers committed a forgery - they destroyed some of the main documents, and forged some. All this was done in order to hide the truth about the 17th Party Congress, as well as the real organizer of the murder of Kirov - Stalin. Shatunovskaya also calls the protocol published in the journal *Izvestia* of the Central Committee of the CPSU as fake. The minutes state that when summing up the voting results at the congress, a shortage of allegedly only 166 ballots was revealed, while at one time the commission established the absence of 289 ballots. Together with the three votes against Stalin announced at the congress, this amounted to 292 votes against Stalin. It was this figure that was called by the commission

in 1960 by V.M. Verkhoviykh, former deputy chairman of the counting commission of the 17th Party Congress[63] . Documents were also destroyed in subsequent years in the course of periodic archival "cleansings", the true goals and consequences of which are no longer possible to establish at present. Especially many documents, for obvious reasons, were destroyed in the August days of 1991 and later, during the so-called declassification, because it was carried out by the same nomenklatura workers of the party archives. From the press, data are known about the destruction of 25 million files in the party archives "in order to prevent their use by unauthorized persons for compromising purposes"[64] . Only in one party archive of the Kemerovo Regional Committee of the CPSU, out of 46 storage units marked "special folder" 45 (approximately 3,300 sheets) v

A special topic is the destruction of documents of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. What documents have been kept in this department since its foundation, what has been destroyed and what remains - all these are questions that are unlikely to ever be given an exhaustive answer. It is only obvious that the documents were destroyed. There is evidence that in 1954 - 1955. the then chairman of the KGB I.A. Serov, on the instructions of the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPSU, destroyed a large number of archival materials of state security. As early as November 21, 1953, in a memorandum to Malenkov and Khrushchev, it was reported that 26 million people were on operational records in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and more than 6 million files were stored in the central archive, including investigative and undercover files, while "located in the archives and card indexes materials since the organization of the Cheka were not subjected to verification and clearing. The leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposed measures

In 1954, when Serov headed the KGB, he received permission from the Central Committee of the CPSU to destroy documents. As V.E. Semichastny, who was appointed chairman of the KGB in 1961, by that time "many documents had already been destroyed or cleaned up ..." Reporting to the Central Committee in early 1956 about the "analysis of operational documents of past years", Serov seemed to pursue a good goal. He wrote that documents "for more than 6 million Soviet citizens" had been destroyed, and the stain of political distrust had been removed from them. It is easy to imagine, - writes further N.V. Petrov, who managed to discover these most interesting pieces of evidence - how many priceless historical documents perished in the fire of this "clearing". In the list of documents prepared in 1954, a norm was introduced for the temporary storage of some materials, after which they were subject to destruction ... Serov's successors in the KGB year after year narrowed the nomenclature of cases subject to permanent storage. This led to the destruction of many operational and even investigative cases. The archives of the state security organs of the district and city levels were completely destroyed[66] .

Speaking about the subjective obstacles in the search for documents necessary to study the mechanism of Stalinist power, it should be remembered that before the start of the so-called perestroika in the USSR, historians had access only to unclassified documentation of party and state bodies. However, according to the instructions

Secretariat of the Central Committee, and on individual non-secret documents that had a regulatory, reference, informational character, a mark "For official use" could be affixed. All documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that contained information related to state and party secrets were considered secret. State secrets were information classified by relevant legislative acts as secret. Party secrets were considered information relating to those aspects of the activities of the CPSU, its bodies and organizations, the disclosure of which, in the opinion of the compilers of this instruction, could harm the interests of the party[67] . The — vagueness of the definition of state and party secrets made it possible to classify all documents that revealed the mechanism of communist power as secret. Thus, there was an almost complete ban not only on the documentation of the highest party bodies - the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but also on their correspondence with local party bodies, which also went under the heading "secret", "strictly secret", "on the rights of a cipher" . There was a special "Regulations on the archive fund of the CPSU", which was periodically approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. It stated that "documents of a secret and strictly secret nature available in the party archives are not issued." The "Basic rules for the work of party archives of regional committees, regional party committees and branches of the IML under the Central Committee of the CPSU", approved by the IML under the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1970, said: "Members and candidate members of the CPSU, members of the Komsomol and in some cases, non-party citizens with referrals from relevant organizations and institutions ... Members of the Komsomol and non-party researchers (scientists, writers, archival workers), as a rule, were allowed to work only on documents from non-party funds ... Researchers are not issued unpublished documents of V.I. Lenin; decisions of the central (union) party and Soviet bodies; special folder documents; protocols of commissions for the purge of the party; cases on admission to the party and registration of personnel; personal files of communists; materials related to the defense of the country; documents revealing the methods and conspiracy of the underground work of party and Komsomol organizations duri

kept secret, the disclosure of information from which may harm the interests of the party and the state"[68] .

However, even today the so-called Presidential Archive remains closed to a wide range of historians. The Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, as you know, received only copy protocols of meetings of the highest party bodies, which were non-expanded protocols of decisions taken. All preparatory materials for these meetings were kept in the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and were not transferred to the Central Party Archive. Mainly ideological materials were sent there, and evidence of the daily work of the party apparatus - from the Politburo to the Central Committee sector, settled in the archives of the General and other departments of the Central Committee. The archive of the General Department of the Central Committee, primarily the archive of the VI sector, the former archive of the Politburo, which today forms the basis of the Presidential Archive, is the heir to the very secret archive that was formed from the beginning of the 1920s. in the structure of the Bureau of the Secretariat separately from the general archive of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In the "Regulations on a unified system of office work, registry and archive of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)" dated June 1, 1923, which provided for the periodic (from congress to congress) delivery of files that were in the archives of the departments of the Secretariat of the Central Committee to the Central Archive (later the Central Party archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU), there was a very important note: The Secret Archive does not surrender[69] . From 1926 it was the archive of the Secret Department of the Central Committee - the

successor to the Bureau of the Secretariat, and from 1934 until Stalin's death - the Special Sector of the Central Committee. It was in this archive, according to the head of the General Department of the Central Committee during perestroika, V.I. Boldin, "a separate compartment was occupied by documents of the so-called "special folder" and materials stored in packages closed back in the 30s"[70] . Among these packages was found a resolution of the Politburo of March 5, 1940 on the execution of Polish prisoners of war. It was here that the secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, carefully hidden until very recently, was found. Moreover, the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee knew ab

People's Deputies of the USSR and the adoption, following the results of the work of his commission, of a special resolution "On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939". An indicative fact characterizing the mechanism of communist power was reported by the same Boldin: some time after M.S. Gorbachev became aware of the found original of the secret additional protocol, he asked Boldin as if [71] by the way, whether the protocol was destroyed

It is necessary to pay special attention to Boldin's testimony that the materials were stored "in packages closed back in the 1930s", i.e. this packing work was carried out by the employees of the Special Sector of the Central Committee, headed by its permanent head A.N. Poskrebyshev. Certainly, the selection of material was carried out at the same time. It is known that the Stalin fund, which is kept in the Presidential Archive (it was only in 1999 that a very selective transfer of the files of this fund to the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History began), was also completed under the leadership of Stalin himself. Since he attached exceptional importance to his future name in History, he constantly controlled what exactly should be published, what should be left in the archive, and what should be destroyed. This is confirmed not only by individual materials that have been published until recently in the Bulletin of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (published since 1995 as a journal in the journal *Istochnik*), but also by special publications prepared based on materials from the Presidential Archive. Work in this archive forced historians who had access to it to admit that "the documentation contained in the personal archives of Stalin and Molotov is an exceptionally important, but not exhaustive source"[72] .

Until now, the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, and the Supreme Court of the USSR are practically inaccessible. Semi-open access to the archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the [USSR Ministry of Defense](#)[73] . A special topic is the current state of the KGB archives. Even during the archival "thaw" of the late 1980s - early 1990s. it was impossible to obtain documents revealing the connection between party and punitive organs throughout the entire Soviet period.

In recent years, a campaign has been gaining momentum for a new classification of documents under the guise of preserving state secrets (the term for it is set at 30 years) and personal secrets (the term is 75 years). The law "On State Secrets" of July 21, 1993 itself does not contain anything secret. However, in the age-old Russian traditions, when it comes to its implementation, the original plan is significantly distorted. The commissions that determine documents subject to new classification do not include independent experts, as is customary in civilized countries, but the same employees of state archives and interested departments (primarily the FSB - the Ministry of Internal Affairs), i.e. those very departments that not only failed to comply with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the transfer of the archives of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Russian archival service, but strive (and it is not clear who authorized this right of theirs) to classify even those rare evidence of their activities that have been preserved among the materials of the party and government agencies. In the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region, party documents are converted and ruthlessly stitched with harsh threads, thereby causing irreparable damage to them, since they are mostly in a dilapidated state, written by hand or printed on thin and poor paper. Documents are being actively converted from the OGPU - NKVD field communications fund that happened to be there, which was engaged in the transportation of secret and strictly secret documentation of party and Soviet bodies.

Nevertheless, after the decree of the President of Russia of August 24, 1991 on the transfer of the archives of the party and state security to the Russian archival service, real opportunities appeared for the scientific study of the mechanism of Stalin's power. A huge number of documents on Soviet history, including those on the Stalinist period, have been published. The sources used by the author can be grouped as follows: **1.**

Official party materials. - These

are transcripts of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as published decisions of its Central Committee. Not all items on the agenda of these meetings were equally shorthand. Thus, the first and main question "Yezhov's Message" was not taken down in shorthand at the June (23-29) plenum of the Central Committee of

played a decisive role in the preparation of the Great Terror, because it was after this plenum that a whole series of Politburo resolutions was adopted, giving the NKVD bodies carte blanche to carry out mass repressions. The first in this series is the Politburo resolution "On Anti-Soviet Elements", adopted on July 2, 1937, two days after the end of the plenum. In the information report about the plenum, published in the newspapers, this item was not. The plenum debated the first question for four days, but there is no transcript of the discussion. It was not conducted, which is clearly indicated in the surviving and currently declassified materials [74] work, but sometimes revealed the true motives of their actions and the secrets of their leadership, thus the most valuable historical evidence about the decision-making mechanism.

2. Paperwork materials of higher and local party and state bodies. - Of the documents of the highest

party bodies, the documentation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b), which was unconstitutional, but officially recognized as the supreme power in the USSR, deserves special attention. A general description of these documents (the agendas of Politburo meetings and their protocols, Politburo resolutions, preparatory materials for the protocols of the Politburo and its commissions available to researchers) is given by the compilers of the collections of documents "Stalin's Politburo in the 30s", "The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP(b): Meeting agendas. 1919 – 1952". Catalog. V. 1 - 3, as well as in the research works of Russian and foreign authors[75] . As—

an example of the source characterization of these documents, their analysis carried out by Academician N.N. Pokrovsky for the first half of the 1920s. As a result, the conclusion about the conspiratorial nature of communist power and the highest extralegal position of the Politburo in the system of this power is confirmed. All other branches of government - executive (SNK), representative (All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Central Executive Committee of the USSR), judicial (Supreme

Supreme Tribunal) - were equally guided by binding directives from the Politburo. The most interesting issue is the preparation of these directives, which are primarily related to the specific problem of working out in 1922-1925. politics towards the church and religion. Thus, before us appears "the main sacralized action of the highest organ of power, as a result of which the diversity of opinions and approaches of several people is transformed into the indisputable and infallible will of the party, the proletariat and all progressive

humanity"[76] . However, with the change in the composition of the Politburo in the second half of the 1920s and in the 1930s, especially the position in the power relationships between members and candidate members of this supreme body of communist power, the nature of its documents also changes - the procedure for informal decision-making is strengthened, as a result of which not all decisions are reflected in the minutes, and the preliminary work on their preparation is often not recorded at all. This conclusion is consistent with O. Ken's and A. Rupasov's observations of the changing ratio of Politburo meetings, the practice of questioning its members, and the decisions of this body. The researchers concluded that at least since the mid-1930s. "The essence of the resolution was developed and approved at an informal meeting of several leading figures, after which the PB apparatus gave them legality by conducting a survey of the remaining members of the Politburo, or formalizing them in the form of —

"decisions"[77] . As for the transcripts of Politburo meetings in the 1920s and 1930s, they were kept in exceptional cases. So, for the 1930s, according to O.V. Khlevnyuk, only a few transcripts were transferred from the Presidential Archive to RGASPI. These are meetings on the "Syrtsov-Lominadze case", on the "Eismont-Smirnov-Tolmachev case", discussions on the conduct of certain political and economic campaigns (harvesting, studying the "Short Course in the History of the A

At present, the "special" protocols of the Politburo, the so-called "special folders" , are open to researchers[79]. not all decisions were — . made by the country's leadership headed by Stalin. So, unsuccessful attempts will be

find traces of preparations for the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939 among these materials. All this not only additionally confirms the conclusion that decisions on many cardinal issues in the life of the country were taken orally and were not always formalized as decisions of the highest party bodies, but also reinforces the significance of the fact that the Politburo itself, which in the Stalin period was referred to in secret correspondence as an "instance", in reality did not always fulfill the role of the main organ in the Stalinist power system. A special place among the documents necessary for understanding the mechanism of Stalinist power is occupied by the documents of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and, above all, the Bureau of the Secretariat - the Secret Department - the Special Sector, which reveal the practice of secret office work and the secret infrastructure of power. It was through these structures in the center and the structures corresponding to them in the local party and state bodies that all correspondence was conducted between higher bodies and lower ones and vice versa. From the beginning of the 1930s in this way, not only all secret and strictly secret documents were transferred, but also correspondence was carried out on mobilization issues. The situation is more complicated with documents that reveal the actual activities of these structures - if some of them - the Bureau of the Secretariat and the Secret Department, transferred to the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, can now be found in RGASPI, then the question of materials of the Special Sector of the Central Committee is still open. There remains a faint hope that these materials, which were not subject to declassification (if they were not destroyed and were transferred at one time from the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU), became the subject of the "Temporary Regulations for the Use of Documents with Information Related to the Secret of the Private Life of Citizens", approved by order of the director of the RTSKhIDNI of December 7, 1994. This regulation also includes "documents of the structures of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Executive Committee of

the Comintern, institutions and organizations of the CPSU that were in charge of personnel and other branches of activity"[80]. A difficult situation with the relevant materials has also developed on the ground. So, in

bodies (including higher ones), which passed through a special sector of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the secret part of the West Siberian Regional Executive Committee of Soviets. However, the documents on the activity and structure of these subdivisions themselves, their connections with the corresponding structures of the higher party and state bodies are literally counted in units.

- These units were closely connected with the Special Department of the OGPU - NKVD, which oversaw the training of personnel for all secret departments - sectors - units and the organization of cipher production [81] K At the present time, we also have to confine ourselves to separate documents on the activities of this department, which were accidentally preserved among the materials of party and state bodies. - Paperwork materials of the

local level of the party and state leadership are represented by documents of regional, regional and district bodies. This is not only a variety of documentation of the Siberian, since 1930 the West Siberian regional, since 1937 the Novosibirsk regional committees of the party and the regional, and then the regional executive committee of the Soviets, but also various departments - from economic to punitive.

- The resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee, drawn up "in the Soviet order" as resolutions of state bodies - the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (CEC), the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), the Council of Labor and Defense (STO), were partially published in the open press. According to the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the SNK of the USSR of August 22, 1924, in the "Collection of Laws and Orders of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the USSR (SZ USSR), in addition to decisions of an administrative and economic-administrative nature, those decrees and resolutions of the Central Executive Committee, its Presidium, SNK and SRT of the USSR, regarding which there was a ban of these bodies [82] . As for the "Collection of Legalizations of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the RSFSR" (SU RSFSR), then, according to a special decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of September 6, 1922, it was allowed to print only those documents "regarding which there was a decree in the protocol of the —

government that they were

subject to publication" [83] . **3. Official correspondence.** - This is the correspondence of higher party and state bodies with lower ones, which was carried out th

directive parts - secret departments - special sectors of party organs, secret parts of the executive committees of the Soviets, as well as other state bodies. In the 1930s The extracts from the minutes of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee and cipher telegrams sent by the Secretariat of the Central Committee to the localities in the 1920s were replaced by the practice of sending out resolutions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, instructions and cipher telegrams of the "G" series. Letters and cipher telegrams from local party secretaries were sent to Stalin and other party leaders from the localities. Directives from the krai and oblast organs of the party to the appropriate organs of the district and then the district level were also sent in the form of joint resolutions of the krai (oblast) committee of the party and the krai (oblast) executive committee of the Soviets, instructions and telegrams. This correspondence between the higher authorities and the lower ones, which was of a secret and strictly secret nature, not only reveals the scale of the actions of the Stalinist

government, but also gives an answer to the question of where the main "nerve" of its mechanism was located. - Correspondence of party and government officials. This type of source, despite its deliberate incompleteness (self-censorship, the destruction of many letters, and the fact that it is completely absent for 1937-1941), gives an idea of both formal and informal relations between members of the Politburo, about the circumstances and motives making a number of key decisions. We can agree with the opinion of O.V. Khlevnyuk, one of the compilers of the published collections of this correspondence, that "due to the almost complete absence of such documents as the transcripts of the Orgburo, the Secretariat, the Council of the People's Commissars, various authorities, correspondence in many cases becomes the basis for reconstructing the decision-making process, clarifying the positions of various departments and individual Soviet leaders", and also that correspondence is "an indispensable source for studying the moral character of Soviet leaders at various levels, their world outlook and culture" [84] .

- The materials of the OGPU-NKVD courier communications fund, preserved in the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region, are not

only give an idea about the employees of the courier corps and methods of transporting secret and strictly secret documentation of party and state bodies, but also allow clarifying information known from other sources about their secret infrastructure. **4. Sources of personal origin.** - Materials of personal funds

of leading party and state leaders of the USSR (Stalin, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, etc.) stored in RGASPI. Despite the fact that these funds have been repeatedly "cleaned", they contain interesting evidence that helps to understand the mechanism of Stalin's power. Of particular importance in this regard are the letters with his resolutions preserved in the Stalin fund, his notes at meetings, the notes of Stalin, as well as those accompanying him (for example, brief notes of his assistant K. Sergeev, who traveled with him to Siberia), records of unofficial speeches Stalin.

- The writings of the founders of Marxism and the founders Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

- Diaries (V.I. Vernadsky, V.V. Vishnevsky, G.M. Dimitrov, A.G. Mankov, M.M. Prishvin, I.I. Schitz and others). This type of source conveys, first of all, the atmosphere of that time. Extremely important are the records of conversations with Stalin, which are available in the diary of G. M. Dimitrov. -

Memories are another theoretically possible and extremely important layer of sources. But who among those who were directly related to the operation of the mechanism of Stalinist power could leave such memories? Something about the operation of this mechanism in the 1920s. can be found in B. Bazhanov's book "Memoirs of the Former Secretary of Stalin"[85] . But no one wrote such memoirs about the 1930s. Potential authors were either destroyed during the Great Terror, or until the end of their lives they remained faithful to the subscription they were given when they entered the service, or they said so little that they actually said nothing.

Stalin's environment[86] . Among these revelations, the conversations of F. Chuev with Molotov turned out to be especially meaningful, although they

for the most part, they are of a general nature, bypass the most critical moments in the history of that time, or are simply false. The same characterization can be attributed to the published memoirs of members of the Stalinist Politburo[87] . L. Kaganovich's "Memorial Notes", on which great hopes were once pinned, not only do not touch on the key issues of the political history of the 1930s, but on the whole are extremely superficial and resemble the painfully familiar pages of the "Short Course in the History of the CPSU (b)".

Memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, for all their indisputable importance (this is especially true of their full version, published in 1989 - 1990 in the journal "Problems of History"), are remarkable primarily for illustrating how even Khrushchev, being from the late 1930s. a member of the Politburo, was far from the real mechanisms of power and therefore had a very vague idea of many things, which in no way corresponded to his place in the party hierarchy of that time. Perhaps there is another explanation that he deliberately avoided the issues of the mechanism of power, since in fact they remained unchanged during his tenure as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A.I. Mikoyan. In fact, his statement on this

subject: "We were all scoundrels then" remained undisclosed[88] . Moreover, due to the fault of either the compiler or the Vagrius publishing house, a fundamental distortion of O.G. Shatunovskaya about those who were repressed for 1934-1941, which she received from the KGB on behalf of the CPC. The text of the book says that during these years "about 1 million (and not 7!) people were shot, and more quantity than 18.5 million were repressed" [89] From the memoirs of people who often and informally communicated with Stalin, survivors, as an example, we can cite the memoirs of the former editor of Izvestia I.M. Gronskey, who, however, — .

also considered it possible to confine himself to a minimum of evidence about how power was actually exercised at that time. Of course, Poskrebyshev could tell a lot, who until 1952 (actually until Stalin's death) headed the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This person

survived both the 20th Congress and the reign of Khrushchev and died of natural causes in 1965. However, Poskrebyshev himself did not write his memoirs, and F. Chuev was not found on him. Even if he had, it is still unclear whether he would have agreed to tell anything, judging by the publication of L. Shkerin in the journal *Literary Kazakhstan*, which spoke of the episode when he directly asked a question to Stalin's former assistant: "Poskrebyshev. ..cautiously looked around and, lowering his voice, said: "As far as I know, old women were not shot. There was a rumor that poison was being used." He also looked around and —

added: "As for Maria Ilyinichna, I don't believe such a rumor. She, I think, suddenly, as it is written in the newspapers ""[90] Many people noted his secrecy. Here, for example, is the testimony of D.T. Shepilov: "Stalin did not like it at all when his words were written down." He also remembered the words of Stalin himself said on this occasion: "I also never I use a stenographer. I can't work when she's stuck here."[91] The subject of heightened secrecy in those years was military issues and questions of the deployment of mass terror. Here are some characteristic testimonies about the military meetings that were held at Stalin's, and the non-disclosure of information about which amounted to Stalin's assistant Colonel-General of Aviation AS Yakovlev: "There were no stenographers or secretaries at Stalin's meetings in a narrow circle, and no protocol records were kept." Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, People's Commissar for Armaments during the war years: "At the meetings and conferences that Stalin held, discussion and decision-making on them was often carried out without protocol records, and often without the corresponding formalization of decisions." Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, Deputy Supreme Commander during the war years: "Many political, military, national issues were discussed and resolved not only at official meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee and in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but also in the evening at dinner at the apartment or at the dacha of I.V. Stalin, who

the members of the Politburo closest to him were present. "General Colonel B.L. Vannikov, People's Commissar of Ammunition:" At meetings and meetings, Stalin had a practice - to discuss issues and make decisions on them often without protocol records ... It is clear from this that the coverage of many events only according to the documents it is insufficient and incomplete, and in some cases inaccurate

"[92] . I will add to this a lengthy, but very eloquent testimony of the Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army at that time, Major General A.M. Vasilevsky: "All the strategic decisions of the high military command, on which the operational plan was based, were believed by the employees of the Operations Directorate to have been approved by the Soviet government. Personally, I came to this idea because, together with another Deputy Head of the Operations Directorate, comrade. Anisov in 1940 twice accompanied, having with him the operational plan of the armed forces, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Comrade. Vatutin to the Kremlin, where this plan was to be reported by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff I.V. Stalin. Moreover, in both cases, we had to wait for several hours in the waiting room for the indicated persons in order to receive from them the plan handed over to them, for the safety of which we were responsible. As a result of its consideration, we did not receive any notes in the plan or instructions in the future on any amendments to it. There were no visas on the plan that would indicate that the plan was accepted or rejected, although the continued work on it indicated that, apparently, it received approval . firstly, how narrow a circle of people from the military was privy to Stalin's plans - only the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, and secondly, the fact that Stalin gave all instructions orally. For example, Stalin's secret meeting with district commanders, members military councils and commanders of the Air Force of the western border districts, which took place on May 24, 1941

[\[94\]](#)

Information meetings were not recorded in shorthand, through which Stalin maintained contact with the Comintern and representatives of foreign Communist Parties, providing them with information and instructions to the extent that, according to his ideas, this was required.

international movement[95] . Many instructions were transmitted orally and to lower levels. It was in this way that visitors to Stalin's office in the Kremlin received instructions at different times[96] . These visitors can—be identified by currently published journals with records of people who visited his office in 1924 - 1953. To the evidence of informal meetings years^[97] . with Stalin, one should also add his oral statements recorded and thus preserved for History.

5. Periodicals. In the context of this study this source is additional evidence of the secrecy of the Stalinist government. One of the main purposes of the periodical press of that time was to hide the truth not only about the authorities, but also about the real situation in the country and in the world. Both the all-encompassing censorship and the special taboo language of the Soviet press served this purpose. In

conclusion, it is necessary to pay attention to one more important point. Concepts that were used in official documents of the 1930s - "collectivization", "industrialization", "cultural revolution", "democratization", "speculation", and even more so such specific concepts of that time as "opportunism", "reborn", "disenfranchised", "podkulachnik" and others, were essentially pseudo-concepts, and they do not give an adequate understanding of what was happening in the country in those years. A historian studying Stalinist Russia finds himself shackled by the semiotic situation imposed on him by official documentation, and must either follow the document in covering events, or, in addition to the general methods of criticizing sources, carry out preliminary work on their interpretation, namely, dissect the ideocratic form of the document. , trying to see behind it the real meaning of the events reported by this document[98] . If, on the other hand, a historian is captured by the taboo language of Stalinist documents, he inevitably begins to reproduce events in the form in which it was envisaged by the official ideology. Quite seriously, for example, R. Manning writes about democratization, which "remained the official course of the Stalinist regime until the autumn of 1937 . "[99] The conclusion that a Western historian draws from studying documents from the 1930s is quite

agrees with Stalin's statement at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that "in the field of the socio-political development of the country, the most important achievement for the reporting period must be recognized ... the complete democratization of the country's political life ..."[100] . Thus, the situation is classically realized when "the dead grabs the living."

When working with documents from the Stalin era, it is necessary first of all to realize that the evidence contained in such sources is not yet historical facts. They have to be recreated by the historian as a result of the analysis of the totality of available evidence. The first necessary condition for understanding the meaning of events reported by a historical source is to take into account the historical context. The second is the verification of documents by other documents or evidence, and verification by evidence from the opposite side is of particular importance. And the third is

tracking all those moments, When source "let it slip"[101] . In Soviet source studies, such an approach was suppressed as falsification, "dispersion in trifles", "protrusion of minor details"[102] . In the case when the historian tries to overcome the official version of the event imposed by the source, he is obliged to record precisely such moments, because, as already noted in the literature, the general source rule, according to which "the most reliable information contained in the document, which contradicts the main direction of its tendentiousness, and the least reliable - coinciding with it,

works great for 20th- century texts as well.[103]

The problem of interpreting the sources of Stalin's time is inextricably linked with the general methodology of the study. The reconstructed historical reality is not just a collection of facts extracted from sources, i.e. there is no direct relationship between the statement that the more facts we know, the more complete and deeper our understanding of this reality. No set of facts can be considered complete, because additional evidence can always be found. That is why the empirical approach to history cannot give an explanation of historical reality, which is given to us not empirically, but transcendently. The basis of the transcendental approach is conceptuality, which is based on the facts considered in

the cultural-historical meanings. Therefore, only transcendental idea can lead to an understanding and explanation of historical phenomena, and therefore, it is this idea that is the initial methodological basis for the scientific study of certain social phenomena. In his work, the author followed M.K. Mamardashvili, who, based on the teachings of I. Kant, understood by transcending "the ability of a person to transform, that is, to go beyond the boundaries and boundaries of any culture, any ideology, any society and find the foundations of his being, which do not depend on what happens in time with a society, culture, ideology or social movement." The foundations of being are the so-called personal foundations, or morality, which is a generalized characteristic of the existence of a human phenomenon as such. Morality is inextricably linked with freedom, which is both its condition and its foundation[104]. This timeless nature of the existential basis of human existence was meant by M.M. Bakhtin, when he drew attention to the one-sidedness and incorrectness of the idea that "for a better understanding of a foreign culture, one must, as it were, move into it and, forgetting one's own, look at the world through the eyes of this foreign culture." According to Bakhtin, "the well-known getting used to a foreign culture, the opportunity to look at the world through its eyes, is a necessary moment in the process of understanding it; but if understanding were exhausted by this one moment, then it would be a mere duplication and would not carry anything new and enriching in itself. The great thing for understanding is the outsideness of the understander - in time, in space, in culture - in relation to what he wants to creatively understand. This is transcending, when a person tries to comprehend the historical reality under study, based on the principles of human individuality, morality and the desire for freedom inherent in him. He poses questions to her that she herself did not pose, and seeks answers to these questions. And then a foreign culture, according to Bakhtin, begins to respond to us, opening before us new sides of itself, new semantic depths[105]. "Foreign culture" in this context is any historical object for the historian, even if it is part of the history of his own country. The historian must do the same with historical

sources, working with them and asking them your questions, try to extract from them a set of facts, and then, interpreting them, give your own idea of historical reality. Thus, the scientific

approach requires the historian to understand the meaning of the events that the source tells about. And this is impossible both for a person with a taboo consciousness and for a historian who follows a document, since his consciousness is limited by this document. For scientific consciousness, reflection efforts are required, i.e. on the realization of the very process of understanding, which will mean the transition from tabooed consciousness to rational, rational consciousness, and, consequently, the transition to a scientific consideration of the issue. Rational consciousness involves considering the events reported by the source in the historical context of the experience of comprehension accumulated in the world, which again brings us back to the transcendental representation of reality.

Rational understanding of the events of Stalin's time is one pole of the problem. The other is the assessment of events from the standpoint of morality. No matter what the historian declares about his intentions, he cannot perceive the events of the recent past in a detached way, therefore the categorical moral imperative acquires fundamental significance in the historical analysis of ideocracy[106] . It will help ~~the~~ the historian not to succumb to the elements of the document and to resist the influence of the Stalinist ideocracy. The moral position of the historian should not be confused with moralizing, which, on the contrary, is characteristic of a taboo consciousness that replaces understanding and explanation with moralizing. The

rational understanding of the phenomenon and the categorical moral imperative in its assessment are, in the author's opinion, two poles of a single methodological approach to the historical consideration of the events of Russian history of the Stalin period, especially the 1930s. Polarity presupposes not only opposition, but also the inseparability of the rational and moral, their coexistence as a unity and struggle of opposites. In general, they represent the very scientific approach that is only possible today if one strives to penetrate into the true meaning of that radical break that was undertaken by the authorities and left its mark on Russian history for a long time.

CHAPTER I FORMATION OF THE PARTY APPLICATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

I'm not a European, but a Russified Georgian-Asian {1}

Stalin

1. THE PARTY APPARATUS UNDER LENIN

The formation of the mechanism of communist domination, the transformation of the Bolshevik party into an institution of power, took several years. This party was a socio-political organization until the end of 1917, but from the very beginning it had grounds for a subsequent rebirth. These are not only the features that made it a new type of party - secrecy, rigid centralization, ideological intolerance, and not only the signs of Asian revolutionaryism that were present in it along with the features of the social democratic movement. This is above all the goal formulated for the party by Lenin in April 1917: the seizure of state power. The Bolshevik Party seized this power as a result of the October Revolution - and since

then the process of turning the party itself into an institution of power has steadily developed. This turn was also facilitated by the fact that very soon the party refused to share power with anyone. Its tough and uncompromising policy led to the fact that it not only turned out to be the only party in power, but the Soviet government - the Council of People's Commissars - as a result developed as a one-party government. The attempts of individual Bolsheviks (L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinoviev, V.P. Milyutin, A.I. Rykov, D.B. Ryazanov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.A. Teodorovich, etc.) to convince the leadership of the party in the need to accept the requirements of the Vikzhel (All-Russian Executive Committee of the Trade Union of Railway Workers) and go for the creation of a homogeneous socialist government from the Bolsheviks to the People's Socialists were not crowned with success. On the contrary, organizational conclusions were drawn in relation to the Bolsheviks, who took such a position. On November 8 (21), 1917, L. B. Kamenev was replaced by Ya. Sverdlov. In November, V.P. Milyutin, V.P. Nogin, A.I. Rykov and were replaced respectively by A.G. Shlikhter, A.G. Shlyapnikov and G.I. Petrovsky.

The Central Committee (CC) of the party, headed by Lenin, though reluctantly, allowed after the coup a certain possibility of an agreement with the petty-bourgeois parties, but only on condition that they recognized all the decrees of the Soviet government and its political line. The non-recognition of these conditions of the new government led to the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918, although after seizing power, the Bolsheviks proclaimed that the Council of People's Commissars had temporary powers until the convocation of this particular Assembly, and their Decree on Land began with the words that the question of land "in its entirety can be resolved only by the national Constituent Assembly." All this led not only to growing tension in relations between the Bolsheviks and the petty-bourgeois parties, but also inexorably dragged the country into a civil war.

The only political force that agreed on the whole, but only for a while, to accept the conditions of the Bolsheviks, were the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. But such an agreement, which went down in history as a bloc of Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries, was reached a month and a half later. At the beginning of 1918, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary faction had 1/3 of the votes in the Soviet government. Left SRs were also in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) and other bodies of Soviet power. The bloc of the Bolsheviks with the Left SRs did not last long. After the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who did not agree with its terms, left the Soviet government on March 15, 1918. And after the Left SR rebellion in Moscow on July 6, 1918, and then in other cities, there was no longer any question of any cooperation. Most of the Left Social Revolutionaries of the delegates to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in Moscow on July 4, were arrested, including one of the leaders of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, M.A. Spiridonov. 13 of them, former employees of the Cheka, were shot. In the subsequent period until 1922-1923. Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties already existed, as it were

out of mercy.

The seizure of power in October 1917 turned out to be a much easier task for the Bolsheviks than the task that they had to solve in the next few years of the civil war. For the real establishment of the new power, it was necessary to subordinate the people to it. "We, the Bolshevik Party, convinced Russia," wrote Lenin in the spring of 1918.

We won Russia from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the working people. We must now govern Russia . "[107]

In the early years, the power of the Bolsheviks existed in the form of Soviets. It is significant that Lenin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), was the first person precisely in the system of Soviet power. He never tired of reminding that "Soviet power is the path to socialism, found by the masses of working people and therefore true, and therefore necessary"[108] . All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' deputies was the supreme legislative, administrative and controlling body of the republic - the RSFSR, which operated between the All-Russian Congresses of Soviets. This provision was enshrined in the first Soviet Constitution, approved on July 10, 1918 by the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The Council of People's Commissars, as the government, was supposed to carry out the decisions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Constitution emphasized that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "gives a general direction for the activities of the Workers' and Peasants' Government and all bodies of Soviet power in the country, unites and coordinates work on legislation and administration ..., considers and approves draft decrees and other proposals submitted by the Council of People's Commissars or individual departments, and also issues its own decrees and orders"[109] . It is important to note here that already the first Soviet Constitution did not recognize the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. "Each function of the government, as the English historian E. Carr rightly noted, was a single whole, and it had to be carried out for the sole purpose of a single, indivisible power"[110] .

The leadership of the Bolshevik Party consolidated this emerging power. The Bolsheviks occupied the bulk of the seats in all Soviets. Judging by the composition of their provincial congresses that took place in the spring of 1918, the Communists made up more than half of them (52.4%), almost a quarter (23%) were non-party, less than a fifth (16.8%) were Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and less one tenth (7.7%) to representatives of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and other petty-bourgeois parties. An even greater proportion of Communists were in the provincial and district executive committees of the Soviets. In 29 provinces of central Russia at the end of 1918, out of 874 members of the provincial executive committees, 724

were communists, out of 4,046 members of district executive committees - 2,625 [111]— .

Although the line of the Bolshevik party was usually carried out in the Soviets of all levels, its leadership was not satisfied with the role of the party only as a socio-political organization, and also with the fact that the process of state construction in 1918 proceeded at a much faster pace. Noticing a tendency for the best party cadres to leave for the Soviets and thus weakening party work, Lenin sounded the alarm. Particular attention to the issues of party building since the spring-summer of 1918 was also caused by the crisis situation that developed in the party in connection with the conclusion of the Brest Peace, when a group of so-called left communists (the core of the group was N.I. Bukharin, A.S. Bubnov, A. Lomov (G.I. Oppokov), N. Osinsky (V.V. Obolensky), E.A. Preobrazhensky, G.L. Pyatakov, K.B. Radek, V.N. Yakovleva and others.) sharply opposed the humiliating conditions of this world. This position was taken not only by the Moscow Party Organization, where the "Left Communists" enjoyed great influence, but also by a number of local Soviets and Party cells. For Lenin, such a turn in mood was simply unacceptable. The appeal of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to the communists, groups and members of the party (no later than May 29, 1918) stated that "the harmony and integrity of the party apparatus have been violated, there is no former unity of action. The discipline that has always been so strong in our Party has weakened. General decline in party work, unconditional disintegration in organizations. In this regard, a demand was put forward - "our party must again become integral, cast from a single piece"[112] . This appeal was preceded by a number of specific resolutions and circular letters. On May 18, 1918, the Central Committee adopted a resolution obliging all party members "regardless of the type of their work and functions performed, to take a direct part in party organizations and not deviate from party instructions given by the corresponding party centers"[113] . And in a circular letter of the Central Committee (no later than May 22, 1918) it was emphasized that "all members of the party, no matter what work they perform, should pay the most serious attention. Party building is necessary. raise discipline in the ranks of our party. The resolutions and decisions of the Party centers must be binding on all

on

must be unswervingly implemented by all members of the Party. Since the decision is made, discussions are a thing of the past, the moment of united action comes. Without the strictest coordination, without real discipline, all our constructions will remain on paper. On August 27,

1918, the Pravda newspaper called the creation of provincial party associations one of the urgent organizational tasks, and on September 19, it published another appeal of the Central Committee to party organizations, which spoke of the need to create such an organizational apparatus that could "cover the most blind corners Soviet Russia. Only with such an apparatus will we be able to gain confidence in the rapid and correct implementation of the measures emanating from the center. The provincial party committees had to deal with the formation of lower party organizations. All of them, in addition to being recognized by the provincial committees, had to be approved by the Central Committee of the RCP (b), and only after that they could acquire a seal and party tickets. The Central Committee had a special ledger for registering party organizations. By the end of 1918 there were obvious results in party building. If at the beginning of the year there were gubernia committees in 39 provinces of Russia, ukoms in 52 districts, volkoms in 16 volosts, then by the end of the year, according to incomplete data, there were 4 Central Committees of national communist parties, 50 gubernia committees, 350 ukoms and 4,139 volost committees.

The Communist factions of the congresses of Soviets and their executive committees took shape in the Soviets. Moreover, in the leading documents of the party, it was emphasized that all party organizations, factions, V Councils, led including communist ones, by the corresponding party committee. The decisions of the factions of the Soviets, congresses were subject to control, consideration and discussion and could be changed and even canceled by the party committee. Naturally, these factions were supposed to put into practice only the political line of their party. They acted in the same way not only in the Soviets, but also in trade unions and other emerging public organizations.

Decisive on the path of centralization of power at the top of the party was The VIII Congress of the RCP(b), held in Moscow on March 18-23, 1919. E. Carr correctly noted that "by that time the process had gone far"[116]. Indeed, N. Osinsky, for example, complained at the congress that all

party work is centered around the Central Committee. "Yes, and the Central Committee itself as a collegiate body, in essence, did not exist," since "TT. Lenin and Sverdlov solved the next questions by talking with each other and with those individual comrades who again stood at the head of some branch of Soviet work . Nevertheless, at the congress, for the first time, it was recognized that it was necessary to create a special apparatus of the Central Committee to resolve operational issues of the political life of the country and the party and to establish organizational links with the localities. On March 25, 1919, at the first plenum of the Central Committee, elected at the congress, according to the resolution of the congress

on the organizational issue, the permanent Political Bureau of 5 people was separated from the Central Committee. and the Organizational Bureau also of 5 people. [118] A necessary addition to them was the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which consisted of an executive secretary and 5 technical secretaries. According to the figurative expression of the same E. Carr, "it was a fatal step." But it became fatal not only because in the next three or four years these three organs of the party were to divide the functions of the Central Committee among themselves and usurp everything except the external attributes of power[119], but also because this step was, in fact, the beginning of the formation new party party apparatus. The centralized system of building party organizations with party committees at the head , inevitably led to the concentration of power in the most important party committee, which under Lenin was the Politburo. All the main questions were actually predetermined at the very top, however, they were approved so far

more congresses.

The Politburo, elected after the VIII Congress of the RCP(b), included V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky, I.V. Stalin, L.B. Kamenev and N.N. Krestinsky, as candidates - N.I. Bukharin, G.E. Zinoviev, M.I. Kalinin; in the Orgburo - I.V. Stalin, N.N. Krestinsky, L.P. Serebryakov, A.G. Beloborodov, E.D. Stasova and a candidate member of the party Murashov. E. Stasova became the executive secretary of the Central Committee. They could only be a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Orgburo.

Special attention should be paid to the role of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This body was created shortly after the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) in August 1917 to conduct office work and liaise the Central Committee with local party organizations[120] . To the first composition of the Secretariat of the Central Committee

included members of the Central Committee of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.K. Muranov, Ya.M. Sverdlov, candidates for members of the Central Committee A.A. Ioffe and E.D. Stasov. The actual head of the Secretariat was Sverdlov, who combined these duties with the duties of the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Sverdlov was Lenin's indispensable assistant in organizational and party work. His notebook became a legend. Stasova performed the duties of Sverdlov's technical assistant. It was she who signed the report on the activities of the Secretariat for the period from August 1917 to February 1918. Other technical employees of K.T. were also in the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Novgorodtseva, V.R. Menzhinskaya, B.Z. Stankina, S.A. Flaxerman and others. Perhaps it was the death of Sverdlov in March 1919 that made the members of the Central Committee think about creating a special apparatus for resolving organizational issues. On March 16, 1919, at a meeting of the Central Committee, during a discussion of the issue of the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, it was directly stated that "the replacement of Ya.M. Sverdlov is personally — impossible, since there are no such abilities in the sense of knowledge of people, organizational and tactical. Everywhere it will have to be replaced by collective work . After the VIII Congress of the RCP(b), the Secretariat of the Central Committee was still regarded as a purely technical body, with the help of which the Central Committee directs all time a party work and implements its decisions[122] . But at that quite definite step had already been taken towards formalizing it as a special one. It was envisaged that several people would be freed from all Soviet work in the apparatus and would devote themselves entirely to party work. So far, the secretary of the Central Committee, E. Stasova, has been such a freed worker. "To be a secretary at that time," she wrote, "was to be a man of all trades." My duties, firstly, included receiving comrades and answering their questions in all areas of party activity, supplying them with literature, secondly, keeping minutes of meetings of the Orgburo,

thirdly, reproducing and distributing all directives of the Central Committee, and fourthly, finance " [123] . While the civil war was going on, and the main task for the party was to maintain power and conquer Russia, the tasks of the current party building, with all the attention to them, especially

For peaceful construction, the issue of the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee and the establishment of a well-functioning system of interaction with the localities was already put forward as a priority, especially since by the time of the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) half of the county organizations had no direct connection with the Central Committee. Not only county, but also provincial party organizations were created in the absence of a single all-Russian plan and were distinguished by an extraordinary diversity of structure. By the end of 1919, there were not even two party committees in the whole republic, [124] built in the same way. After the Eighth

Congress, the regular appeal of the Central Committee to local party organizations with circular letters became the rule. In just eight months after the congress, 71 such letters were sent to the localities[125] . Even then, the task of recording and distributing party workers began to be considered as the main task. Gradually the Secretariat of the Central Committee also grew in numbers. During the VIII Congress, it was not yet divided into departments and consisted of only 15 employees. A few months later, it already consisted of eight people (general, financial, information, organizational and instructor, accounting and constantly distribution, inspectorate and traveling, departments for work in the countryside and among women). And more than 80 people worked in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In eight months, over 20,000 numbers of various papers were sent to his address, and 11,000 were issued by him. More than 7,000 personal visits were registered. Krestinsky, a member of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau, was transferred to the Secretariat of the Central Committee for a permanent job. However, according to his confession at the VIII All-Russian Party Conference in December 1919, there was no system in the work. "But we have been striving for this system and are striving, and we hope that in view of the political situation that has changed for the better, we will be able to achieve here

known results"[126] . The rigidly

centralized system of leadership of the Central Committee by local party organizations, which existed from the very beginning of the creation of the Bolshevik Party, now began to play a major role in the emerging system of government of the country. It also formed the appropriate practice of exercising power. This practice of governing localities by means of party directives was perceived by the communists as the only correct one and did not arouse protest.

Moreover, the local party organizations demanded precisely the directives of the Central Committee on various issues of domestic policy, moreover, "more precise political directives," as A.I. Mikoyan [127] Her VIII All-Russian Party Conference in December 1919, at the delegates unanimously adopted a charter that determined the structure of party organizations "from top to bottom" in accordance with the administrative-territorial division of the country that existed at that time. The Rules emphasized that "the strictest Party discipline is the first duty of all Party members and all Party organizations. The decisions of the party centers must be carried out quickly and accurately . "[128] In addition, a special section appeared in the statutes on factions in non-Party institutions and organizations, which stated that at all congresses, meetings (except Party ones), in organizations (Soviets, trade unions, etc.), where there are at least three Communists , factions are created, "the task of which is to comprehensively strengthen the influence of the party, carry out its policy in a non-party environment and party control over the work of all these institutions and organizations"[129] . In 1920, the —

strengthening of the party's central apparatus continued. At the plenum of the Central Committee, held on April 5, immediately after the IX Party Congress, N.N. Krestinsky, E.A. Preobrazhensky and L.P. Serebryakov. But even then the idea arose of the post of responsible secretary, and the members of the Secretariat were invited, without prejudging the question of a specific appointment for the time being, to submit a proposal on this matter to the Central Committee[130] . By the 9th Congress of the RCP(b) there were already 150 employees in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and by the 10th - 602 [131] . Gradually expanded the scope of its activities. After the IX Congress of the Party, on April 30, 1920, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, a decision was made to reorganize the departments of the Secretariat and take measures to improve their work. By a special decree, the provincial committees of central Russia and the Bureau of the Central Committee of the outskirts were obliged to send their representatives regularly to report on the most important circumstances of work in the province and region; to resume, as far as possible, business trips of representatives of the Central Committee with organizational assignments; to incre

organizational and instructor departments; to form under the latter a permanent commission for the preparation of circulars and instructions, entrusting their final editing to the members of the Central Committee who worked in the Secretariat; to increase the staff of the accounting and distribution department[132] . In addition, the Secretariat focused on issues related to the monetary expenditures of all organizations of the party, their subsidization and the strengthening of one or another branch of work by allocating the necessary material resources[133] . Established encrypted communication with local party organizations. During the years

of the civil war, such a practice of especially secret circulars already took place, mainly on military issues, which then spread to all others. A milestone in this sense was the meeting of the Politburo on November 8, 1919, at which the issue of leakage of information about the meetings of the Central Committee was discussed. The statement that some information about them, although in a very distorted form, somehow reaches the enemies, was made by Stalin. The Politburo adopted a special resolution on this issue: "Instruct Comrade. Krestinsky and Stasova to examine the procedure for reproduction, storage in the Secretariat and distribution to the members of the Central Committee of the minutes of the meeting, especially the Politburo, and introduce such a procedure that the minimum number of comrades would be familiar with the minutes. Instruct Comrade. Krestinsky to make a report on the measures taken at the next meeting of the Politburo. Propose to all members of the Central Committee to carefully keep the protocols they receive. The protocols of the Politburo should be stated as carefully and briefly as possible. Decisions on the most serious issues should not be recorded in the official minutes, but comrade. Krestinsky to mark them for himself for memory and personal fulfillment"[134] . The encrypted correspondence of the Secretariat of the Central Committee with the secretaries [135] of the provincial committees was put into practice from September 1920. It immediately became a well-established system. In the report of the Central Committee for the time elapsed from the IX

Congress of the RCP (b) (March 29 April 5, 1920) to September 15, 1920, it was that almost all provincial committees received a party cipher, and ^{said}, but far from a cipher department was established in the Secretariat itself[136]. In October 1920, the All-Russian meeting of representatives of provincial committees chaired by E.A. Preobrazhensky confirmed the need for a uniform structure of both the party committees themselves and their

secretariats. From that time on, party committees were to be built according to the instructions of the Central Committee "On the construction of committees of the RCP (b)", i.e., each of them assumed the existence of an agitation and propaganda department of agitation, propaganda, minorities), literary (subdivisions and publishing, national organizational and instructor (instructor, information, accounting subdivisions) and general (office, financial, administrative and economic subdivisions)[137].

The decisive event that influenced the change in the role of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and contributed to its transformation from a technical body, first into a body influencing policy, and then determining it, was the Tenth Party Congress (March 8-16, 1921). In the course of its preparation, the increased role of Stalin in the organizational policy of the Central Committee and his ability in terms of group politics. Such a policy of personal connections and dependencies with Stalin always prevailed over a principled policy. As

early as 1921, the term "Stalinists" was in circulation among the Communists. His appearance is far from accidental. Stalin was the only person in the central organs of the party who at the same time (since 1919) was a member of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee. As chairman of the Orgburo, he was directly involved in the appointment and dismissal of the highest cadres of the party and the state. Lenin, instead of recognizing the far-reaching goals of such a policy, not only sided with it at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), but also directly used Stalin's abilities. In the critical situation caused by the peasant uprisings, the Kronstadt rebellion and the discussion about trade unions, Lenin went to great lengths to maintain power and pursue his

political line. Impressions of the congress of one of its delegates, K.Kh. Danishevsky, expressed by him in a conversation with the chairman of Sibrevkom I.N. Smirnov. Danishevsky's assessments not only convey the atmosphere of the congress, but also note the increased role of Stalin's supporters: "The composition of the Central Committee was determined at a factional meeting of supporters of the platform of the 10th. Ilyich, at an open meeting, spoke out against the introduction to the Central Committee of its old members, supporters of Trots

the considerations of Bukharin, Trotsky, the Siberian Preobrazhensky and others were not taken into account. At the congress, the room system of factions is fully implemented. It seems that the arrival of Zinoviev exacerbated this situation. At the moment there is a meeting of adherents of the 10th, the impression is very unpleasant. Perhaps unity will be established by the end of the congress. Lenin assures of this. There was no talk of trade unions yet. In Kronstadt, an art battle is still going on. The rebels are trying to get in touch with Finland, etc. About the elections: there is a tendency among the Stalinists to give the Trotskyists only 3 seats out of 25 members of [the Central Committee](#)^[138] .

It must be said that Stalin managed to achieve his political goals already at the Tenth Congress. Such independent-minded communists as L.P. Serebryakov, I.N. Smirnov, E.A. Preobrazhensky, but obedient supporters of the platform of 10 were introduced, many of whom later became Stalin's faithful support. The Politburo, elected at the first plenum after the Tenth Congress, included Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev and their deputies Molotov, Kalinin, Bukharin. Molotov, Mikhailov, Yaroslavsky, Komarov, Stalin, Rykov, Tomsy and their deputies Dzerzhinsky, Rudzutak, Kalinin became members of the Organizing Bureau. Molotov was elected Executive Secretary of the Central Committee. In addition to him, the Secretariat included Yaroslavsky and Mikhailov.

Stalin, as chairman of the Orgburo, who oversaw the activities of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, quite purposefully expelled Trotsky's supporters from it. This policy and its results have already been sufficiently described by A. G. Avtorkhanov. Let us quote him: "Stalin appointed his protege, comrade-in-arms in the pre-revolutionary Pravda, Molotov, as the executive secretary of the Central Committee, and Tovstukh as his senior assistant to the head of his office in the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. The 11th Party Congress (March-April 1922) showed what Stalin's henchmen managed to do with the apparatus of the Central Committee during the period of Lenin's active work and a year before Stalin's appointment as General Secretary. Nogin, who made a report on behalf of the Central Revision Commission, stated that a kind of "mediation" had formed between the party and its Central Committee: "This is the party bureaucracy, party officials. removal of top cadres. Speaker on the report

Nogina Stukov declared that the Orgburo is the main bureaucratic mediation between the Central Committee and the

party. Molotov, like Stalin, was a virtuoso in the creation of the apparatus. He immediately placed emphasis on personnel policy and establishing close ties with the localities. The result of this policy was the formation of a new party of the apparatus party. In December 1921, a special meeting of the secretaries of the provincial committees was held, who decided to strengthen the accounting apparatus in the field. The competence of the Accounting and Distribution Department of the Central Committee (Uchraspred) was the accounting of workers on an all-Russian, regional and provincial scale. Their total number by this time was 7 thousand and people.[140] In total, according to incomplete data from the 1921 census, there were about 26 thousand responsible workers in the country[141]. For them, special rations and uniforms were allocated, and in the sanatoriums of the Crimea - special party beds. The organization of recreation abroad was also envisaged, for which a special currency.

Such isolation of the highest group of party workers, as long as there was a certain inner-party democracy, aroused open and unspoken protests on the part of rank-and-file communists. The archives have preserved a mass of letters from the localities about the abuses of responsible party workers. Under the pressure of widespread dissatisfaction "from below", the issue of the "tops" and "bottoms" became the subject of discussion at the provincial party conferences, the plenum of the Central Committee (July 1920) and the Politburo, which formed a special commission in early August to develop practical measures to smooth out the conflict that had arisen. . Based on the measures outlined by this commission, Evg. Preobrazhensky prepared a draft circular letter of the Central Committee "To all party organizations, to all members of the party." This letter, edited by Zinoviev, was published on September 4, 1920 in the journal Izvestia of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). It said: "The Central Committee considers it timely to draw the attention of the members of our Party to certain unhealthy phenomena in our Party organization, which of late have been making themselves felt more and more. In quite a few Party organizations, the question of the so-called "bottom" and "top" of the Party becomes a burning issue. Disunity makes itself felt more and more, pouring out sometimes, as it was on

some provincial conferences, into direct conflicts. With the normal development of party life in a party like ours, the very question of the so-called "tops" and "bottoms" should not exist at all. However, among the comrades who lay claim to the title of responsible workers there are those who in fact are completely detached from Party work, detached from the masses. Of enormous importance is also the material inequality among the Communists themselves, which is created by the conscious or unconscious abuse of their power on the part of this section of responsible workers, who do not disdain to establish great personal privileges for themselves and their loved ones. There is no need to simplify the question. To establish complete and absolute equality in the material sphere, even among only 700,000 members of our Party, is still impossible at the present time. Every class-conscious worker, rank and file member of the Party will agree that the interests of the Party and the labor movement require that those of our Party and Soviet workers who work for us not 6 or 8 hours a day, but 12 14 or more hours, comrades whose health had been especially undermined by previous imprisonments, exile, etc., were placed in slightly better material conditions. Every class-conscious worker who has been participating in our Party for more than a month knows at the same time that among our responsible workers there is a very large part of such people who deny themselves literally everything, sometimes go hungry more than the average worker at the plant and factory, give work with all his strength, not thinking about himself and not caring about his health. We should not forget about these responsible workers, who show us examples of selflessness and dedication. But when a part of our party members who claim to be responsible workers, treating their Soviet duties only formally, uses their high rank in order to ensure their personal privileges, this inevitably causes a just protest.

Here one can clearly see the desire to link the fundamentally contradictory sides, to settle the question of "bottom" and "top" in the party and to protect the special position of responsible party workers. This duality has given rise to

the demagogic nature of the letter, which was especially evident where the emphasis was on a certain part of the party members. Such a formulation of the question is quite understandable and explainable - it was their power, they won, and they were in no way going to give it up. One example is enough. On November 24, 1919, K. Chukovsky made a brief entry in his diary about Zinoviev, who, we recall, edited the draft circular letter of the Central Committee of September 4, 1920: "Yesterday at Gorky's, on Kronverksky. He has Zinoviev. At the entrance, I was struck by a magnificent car, on the sofa of which a luxurious bear cavity was casually thrown. Zinoviev, fat and short, answered in a hoarse and well-fed voice . —

However, the crisis situation in the party, which has developed in connection with the question of "tops" and "bottoms", forced the leadership of the party to raise this issue at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) in September 1920. A special resolution was adopted "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Building", which provided for a number of measures to eliminate this conflict. Among them: "... it is possible to convene general meetings of party members more often with the obligatory presence of all responsible employees of the organization ..., all responsible communists, without exception, regardless of their position, should be attached to factory, Red Army or rural cells, where they must bear party duties on an equal footing with all party members and not only participate in meetings, but give reports on their activities at them, ... participation in subbotniks must be made absolutely obligatory for all members of the party ..., create a Control Commission along with the Central Committee from comrades with the greatest party training, the most experienced, impartial and capable of exercising strict party control ... "[143] . For Moscow, the—

Central Committee approved, in addition, a special Kremlin control commission. "Since the inequality in living conditions between party members is especially acutely felt in Moscow, it was said in the report on the work of the Central Committee of the RCP for the period from September 15 to December 15, 1920, where the largest number of responsible communist workers are concentrated, and where at the same time the general conditions of life are especially difficult, then the question of Kremlin privileges was and is the most acute. The Ce

an impartial and authoritative commission examined the state of affairs of the Kremlin, established the true extent of existing privileges, introduced them, since it would be impossible to completely eliminate them, within the framework that would be understandable to every party comrade, and at the same time would refute rumors and talk about the Kremlin's order, something that does not correspond to reality "[144]. The creation of such a commission had a distracting character, especially since two years later its activities were canceled altogether. This was a natural result of the purposeful policy of the new party leadership to create a system of privileges for responsible party workers. But then, in 1920, it was not by chance that this was discussed. Let me

digress a little. After the government moved to Moscow, in the Kremlin, on the direct instructions of Lenin, a special dining room was organized, which could only be used by the inhabitants of the Kremlin and even a number of the highest-ranking officials who lived outside of it. This canteen so impressed one of the food workers who happened to be in it that he left his memories of it, making, however, a completely unexpected conclusion: "In April 1920, already a member of the collegium of the People's requirement for the release of products for the dining room of the Council of People's Commissars. Released the products. Having the right, as a member of the collegium, to dine in the canteen of the Council of People's Commissars, I noticed for the first time that as much bread as you like was given for lunch (lunch was soup with herring and a second potato). This surprised me. I think how is it? The workers are starving, receiving 1/8 pound of bread, and even then not every day, but what is being done here! Need to cut it down. I expressed these considerations to some comrades, and it reached Vladimir Ilyich. He calls me to him. I didn't know why. Asks for my opinion about the SNK canteen. I told him everything that seemed wrong to me. And Ilyich, who has the right to order me, does not order me, but explains that I will not feed the workers with this economy, but I will ruin the head of the revolution, undermining its strength. When he asked how many hours I worked,

I answered 16 (afraid to say that I worked 1820, lest he suspect me of exaggeration). Well, and some work 18 20; they must be fed, otherwise the

By this conversation, he completely convinced me of the correctness of the existence

of the dining room . In addition to the dining room, there was a closed food warehouse in the Kremlin, in which a certain group of people could receive the most exquisite and scarce products in unlimited quantities. "They paid nothing for apartments in the Kremlin, for heating, lighting, etc. The apartments were heated by huge old tiled stoves, the fireboxes of which opened onto a common corridor, and every morning a stoker in felt boots or soft shoes (so as not to wake up the tenants) quietly stoked all these stoves and left finely sawn and chopped firewood for the stoves in the kitchens . At the same time, the famous Kremlin Hospital was created, where not only the best doctors worked, but also there were medicines specially prescribed from abroad.

Let us return once again to the resolution of the IX Conference of the RCP(b) "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Building". Along with the above, it provided for some fundamental points:

"Recognizing in principle it is necessary in exceptional cases to appoint to elective posts, at the same time to propose to the Central Committee when distributing employees in general to replace appointments with recommendations"; "Responsible communist workers have no right to receive personal rates, as well as bonuses these overtime pay and [147] . However, literally two years later, "provisions were revised by the XII All-Russian Party Conference, because the logic of the policy of approving the party apparatus system of governing the country inevitably led precisely to the isolation of responsible party workers. Gradually,

a corresponding perception of the party committees precisely as organs of power and the alienation of ordinary members of the party from them took shape. Very characteristic in this regard is the letter of the Secretary of the Sibburo Central Committee I.I.

Khodorovsky, sent to the provincial and district committees of the party in the summer of 1922, in which he wondered why the district party committees "are not currently the centers where party members, as well as non-party people, would come, as was the case in the first two years of the revolution, with all needs and requests, or even just for the purpose of relaxing, getting the latest news, etc ."

A unified system of communication between local party bodies and the Secretariat of the Central Committee was also established. This connection was strengthened after the introduction into practice since February 1922 of periodic information, and since March of statistical reporting. In addition, local secretaries had to send personal letters with information for the past month directly to the secretary of the Central Committee no later than the fifth day of each month. The letters were strictly confidential.

The link between the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the local party committees was also responsible instructors who were supposed to control and direct the work of the party committees, to help them "firmly and unswervingly" carry out the directives of the central party organs. At the same time, special meetings of the Secretariat were introduced, which were usually held before a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee to consider smaller issues. The decisions taken by the Secretariat on them in the absence of a protest from the members of the Orgburo until its next meeting were automatically considered decisions of the Orgburo. This practice contributed to the strengthening of the role of the Secretariat of the

Central Committee in the system of the highest bodies of the party. Another extremely important circumstance that determined the process of bureaucratization of the Party was the adoption by the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) of the resolution "On the Unity of the Party." Often this resolution is taken as Lenin's initially far-reaching intention to expel all dissenters and create a completely obedient party. It seems that this is not entirely true. Indeed, the decision on unity turned out to be fatal for the fate of the party, especially after the 13th Conference of the RCP(b) in January 1924 made it the law of the internal life of the party by publishing clause seven, which gave the joint session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission the right to transfer two-thirds of the members as candidates or expel from the party any member of the Central Committee in case of violation of party discipline or admission of factionalism. But the very fact of making such a decision was due to the situation not only in the country, but also in the party that had developed by the spring of 1921. And the situation was threatening for the communist government. The desire by all means to maintain power at that critical moment was the essence of Lenin's actions. This explains both his aggressiveness at the congress and his policy of groupism, the organ

platforms 10. Speaking for the adoption of the resolution "On the Unity of the Party", which prohibited the freedom of factions and groupings, Lenin considered it as a temporary measure necessary to resolve the conflict within the party and stabilize the current situation. It is no coincidence that the same document provided for measures to develop internal party democracy, which were destined to remain on paper. In any case, the

characteristic features of Lenin as a politician appeared at this congress. This is exactly what he did in critical situations for him in relation to his political opponents, compromised, exposed, went to break, and all for the sake of asserting his political line. It is known that at the Second Congress of the RSDLP, opponents accused Lenin of establishing a "state of siege" in the party. What was his reaction? "I cannot but recall one of my conversations at the congress with one of the delegates of the 'centre'," wrote Lenin. "What a heavy atmosphere prevails at our congress!" he complained to me. "This fierce struggle, this agitation against each other, this sharp controversy, this uncomradely attitude!" "What a wonderful thing our congress is!" I answered him. "An open, free struggle. Opinions have been expressed. Shades have been outlined. Groups have been outlined. Hands are raised. The decision has been made. The stage has been passed. Forward! That's what I understand. This is life. This is not like endless, tedious intellectual disputes that end not because that people have solved the problem, but simply because they are tired of talking." A comrade from the "center" looked at me with perplexed eyes and shook

shoulders. We spoke different languages . "[149]

Almost twenty years have passed, the party has taken power, but the principles of Lenin's organizational policy have remained unchanged. Following these principles in 1921, in the changed conditions, which, on the contrary, required democratization not only in the party, but in the country as a whole, was already political short-sightedness. Nevertheless, Lenin's determination to achieve the unity of the party by prohibiting the freedom of all factions and groupings was not shaken then by any of the speeches of his former comrades-in-arms, Bolsheviks with pre-revolutionary party experience. A.G. Shlyapnikov spoke at the congress in the following way: "Vladimir Ilyich gave you a lecture on how unity cannot be achieved. Nothing more

demagogic and slanderous than this resolution, I have not seen and never heard in my life for 20 years of being in the party"[150] . Maksimovsky, a party member since 1903, speaking as a co-rapporteur at the Tenth Congress, noted that all power "is built on the principle of bureaucratic centralization. The bureaucratic system needs not a conscious communist, but an obedient executor, an official, [151] . Lenin also reacted sharply to who listens to orders from above" A.M.

Kollontai, who published her pamphlet "The Workers' Opposition" on the eve of the congress, in which she wrote: "The former type of ideological worker has disappeared from us, managers and ruled have appeared, standing alone at the top, others at the bottom." According to eyewitnesses, when Kollontai approached Lenin at the congress, he refused to shake her hand. "I don't shake hands with such a lady," he seemed to say and defiantly turned away.

Striking is not only the political short-sightedness of Lenin, but also the absence of protest from the majority of the congress delegates. After all, the resolution "On Party Unity" was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes. What is the reason? In the indisputable authority of Lenin or the strict discipline of subordination that existed in the party from the very beginning of its creation? The far-reaching consequences of this resolution, its incompatibility with the transition to the New Economic Policy approved at the same Tenth Congress, were felt by many delegates, among them those 46 Communists who made a statement against the policy of the Politburo on October 15, 1923. K. Radek spoke bluntly at the Congress: "When I heard comrades talking about the new right given to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, to decide at a certain moment the question of expulsion from the Central Committee, etc., I had the feeling that a rule was being established here, which, no one knows yet, could turn against . In voting for this resolution, I felt that it could also turn against us, and despite this, I stand for the resolution . Feeling the contradiction, Radek and other future

opposition members nevertheless voted in favor of the resolution. They gave some explanation for their inconsistency in the Statement of the 46: "Many of us consciously chose not to resist such a regime. The turn of 1921 [153] and then Comrade Lenin's illness demanded, in the opinion of some of us, as a temporary measure, a dictatorship within the party. Other comrades from the very beginning were skeptical or negative about it .

Another short-sighted step of Lenin and other members of the Central Committee was the election of Stalin to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the party. First of all, this step cost Lenin himself dearly. But was it just folly? After all, Lenin already then knew Stalin well, his intolerance, rudeness, criminal inclinations and predilection for group politics. The question of who proposed

Stalin's candidacy was discussed in the literature. The name of Kamenev was called, who knew Stalin not only through joint work, but also through exile. It is known that other Bolsheviks were also proposed for this post, in particular, the chairman of the Sibrevkom, I.N. Smirnov. Candidates of M.V. Frunze and Ya. E. Rudzutak. Trotsky, in his book *My Life*, wrote that Stalin was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee against the will of Lenin, who put up with this while he himself led the party. On the one hand, according to Trotsky, Lenin appreciated his qualities of firmness and practical mind, which consisted of 3/4 of cunning, and on the other hand, at every step he came across Stalin's ignorance, the extreme narrowness of his political outlook, exceptional moral rudeness and illegibility [155] . However, Trotsky later admitted that Lenin "promoted" Stalin, and his figure was already rising at the 6th Party Congress [156] . Lenin's statement is known that "this cook will cook only spicy dishes." There were cases of Stalin's rudeness towards Lenin

dating back to 1921. When the old communist G.L. Shklovsky asked for a foreign service, Lenin, remembering the joint work in exile, proposed his candidacy. The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee rejected this candidacy and accused Lenin of protectionism. Answering Shklovsky, Lenin wrote on June 4, 1921: "You will have to go first. There is prejudice, and stubborn opposition, and pure distrust of me in this matter. It really hurts me, but it's a fact. The "new" ones have come, they don't know the old ones. If you recommend, mistrust is aggravated, persistence is born: "But we don't want to." Nothing remains, as at first, with a fight to win the youth to their

do not trust. You repeat the recommendation

[157] — .

side" Nevertheless, Lenin supported Stalin's candidacy for the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of his party. Moreover, he gave a sharp

rebuken Evg. Preobrazhensky at the XI Congress of the RCP (b): "Here Preobrazhensky here easily threw that Stalin was in two commissariats. Who among us is not a sinner? Who hasn't taken on multiple responsibilities at once? And how else can you do it? What can we do now to ensure the existing situation in the People's Commissariat for National Affairs in order to deal with all Turkestan, Caucasian and other issues? After all, these are political issues! And it is necessary to resolve these issues, these are issues that have been occupied by European states for hundreds of years, which have been resolved in an insignificant proportion in democratic republics. We allow them, and we need to have a person to whom any of the representatives of the nations could go and tell in detail what the matter is. Where to find him? I think that Preobrazhensky could not have named another candidate other than Comrade Stalin. The same is true of the

Rabkrin. The case is gigantic. But in order to be able to handle verification, it is necessary that a person with authority be at the head, otherwise we will get bogged down, drown in petty intrigues"[158] .

And yet: why did Lenin support the candidacy of Stalin? It is unlikely that an exhaustive and rigorously documented answer to this question will ever be given. But I would like to dwell on two points of view available in the literature. In my opinion, the way to

truth.

On the one hand, this is the point of view of the historian V. L. Doroshenko, expressed by him in the article "Lenin against Stalin"[159] . In his opinion, the point is not that Stalin was the most suitable candidate from the top leadership of the party on his track record, in comparison with Frunze or Rudzutak. Stalin was indeed a member of the Central Committee since 1912, a permanent member of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee since 1919, a member of the Council of People's Commissars from the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets in October 1917. The main thing is that Lenin saw in him the most suitable candidate for organizational containment of Trotsky and the Trotskyists. Then, in 1921 and early 1922, he saw a threat to his personal power precisely from Trotsky and remembered Stalin's behind-the-scenes work against Trotsky during the Tenth Congress, which appealed to him. Doroshenko's point

is confirmed by the surviving testimony of the old Bolshevik, party historian V.I. Nevsky. It was handed over in our time to the editors of the journal "Questions of History" by the German professor N. Steinberger, who met Nevsky in 1937 in the cell of the special corps of the Butyrka prison. "The expansion of the powers of the Orgburo and the renaming of Stalin's functions associated with it occurred with the approval of Lenin and was associated with the line taken by Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress. Stalin outwitted Lenin by painting him an exaggerated picture of the imminent danger of a split in the party, which he based on rumors spread. Nevsky, in a conversation with Lenin, expressed his doubts, but Lenin assured him that all decisions to limit intra-party discussions were short-lived and that he was closely following the activities of the Secretariat. Later, Lenin deeply regretted that he had taken such a position at that time, and tried to correct the situation in his Testament. Too late! "You can no longer get rid of the spirits of those that you called on," Nevsky cited this quote from Goethe in support of what [he said](#).

On the other hand, in the form of a historical hypothesis in the literature there is the point of view of G. Nilov (A. Kravtsov)[161]. In his opinion, the election of Stalin to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party was an expression of Lenin's gratitude for the energetic and skillful support of Stalin in the story of German money. "This story with History, from which Lenin tried to hide German money, had far-reaching and sad consequences for the country, because, apparently, it was she who led to the unexpected and seemingly inexplicable rise of Stalin." On July 7, 1917, a decree of the Provisional Government was published to bring Lenin and Zinoviev to trial. Wide party circles and even the top leadership of the party did not know the true content of the German money case and considered Lenin's appearance in court not only possible, but also useful for exposing the Provisional Government as an accomplice of a deliberate falsification aimed against disinterested Bolshevik internationalists. Only Stalin and Ordzhonikidze from the very beginning strongly objected to Lenin's appearance in court. "The case of German money, declared by Lenin "simple and uncomplicated," G. Nilov believes, threatened him with the most serious consequences. Participation in the trial and disclosure of the fact of receiving money without the knowledge

parties meant not only the collapse of the longed-for historical greatness, but also the failure of many years of efforts to assert themselves as the leader of the party. An attempt to personally convince the Central Committee of the need to evade the court meant the need for direct and unambiguous assurances of the absolute falsity of the accusations, which threatened to expose and cut off the possibility of retreating into the field of international phraseology ... For Lenin, there was only one reasonable way out without being personally present at party meetings, to organize the decision of the Central Committee rejecting the possibility of the defendants appearing in court. The organization of such a decision in absentia required the help of an energetic, dexterous and not burdened by excessive adherence to principles, who, unfortunately, had to be acquainted with the secret background of the event. Lenin, according to G. Nilov, settled on Stalin. It seems that it is not accidental. Let us recall Trotsky's remark: "Based on the experience of the Caucasian expropriations, he (Lenin I.P.) apparently appreciated Koba as a person capable of going or leading others to the end. He decided that the "wonderful Georgian" ~~would~~ come in handy"[162] . By the way, Lenin was seen off to the Finland Station not only by S.Ya. Alliluyev, in whose house he lived for the last few days, but also Stalin. It is no coincidence that it was Stalin who made a report on the political activities of the Central Committee at the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) (August 1917) and proposed to address the population with a manifesto about persecution, issue an appeal to the workers and soldiers of Western Europe and adopt a certain decision to evade Lenin and Zinoviev from appearing to the authorities. The decision "to evade" proposed by Stalin was accepted by the majority votes.

Further, G. Nilov draws a conclusion that deserves close attention, especially since there are many unsolved mysteries in Soviet history and many events have not only a double, but even a triple background. "So, the maneuver was a success. The main danger of exposure to the party had passed, and it was possible to continue the struggle for power and the erection of their own incorruptible monument in History. But in maneuvering, Lenin made a fatal mistake, common for ambitious politicians who believe that their ends justify any means. Using immoral methods, they are often forced to seek help from absolutely

immoral people with absolutely immoral goals. Outwardly, the unexpected rise of Stalin may well be explained by Lenin's expression of gratitude for his energetic and skillful support at a difficult moment for him. The strangely timid attempt by Lenin to curb the General Secretary, who had already shown his indomitable imperiousness, made in the famous "Testament", probably withered as a result of his pressure, but, most likely, simply

blackmail.

It was not the post of general secretary that gave Stalin "immense power," as stated in the "Testament," but the power he had taken from Lenin received its legal form in this appointment. The establishment of a new post was necessary only because it did not fit a "faithful student" during the life of a "great teacher" to occupy his post. On that, apparently, they agreed: for Lenin a pass into History, for Stalin "immense power". Be that as it may, the fact, as they say, took place. At the

plenum of the Central Committee on April 3, 1922, which elected Stalin to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the party, V.I. Lenin, A.A. Andreev, K.E. Voroshilov, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, G.E. Zinoviev, M.I. Kalinin, L.B. Kamenev, I.I. Korotkov, V.V. Kuibyshev, V.M. Molotov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, G.I. Petrovsky, A.I. Rykov, I.N. Smirnov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, M.P. Tomsy, L.D. Trotsky, M.V. Frunze, V.Ya. Chubar and candidate members of the Central Committee A.S. Badaev, A.S. Bubnov, S.M. Kirov, A.S. Kiselev, G.S. Krivov, D.Z. Manuilsky, S.N. Sulimov, G.L. Pyatakov, member of the Central Control Commission A.A. Solts. The Plenum heard the question about the Secretariat of the Central Committee and decided: 1. To establish the positions of the General

Secretary and two secretaries. To appoint I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and V.V. Kuibyshev. 2. Accept by the secretaries the following proposal of Comrade strictly Lenin: The Central Committee instructs the Secretariat to determine and observe the distribution of hours of official receptions and publish it. At the same time, it should be accepted as a rule that secretaries should not undertake any work other than really fundamentally leading, personally, delegating such work to their assistants and technical secretaries. Tov. Stalin is instructed to immediately look for deputies and assistants who will save

him from work (with the exception of principal leadership) in Soviet institutions.

The Central Committee also instructed the Orgburo and the Politburo to submit a list of candidates for members of the collegium and deputies of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate within two days, so that Comrade Stalin could be completely released from work in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection within a month. The plenum discussed the question of the composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee, determining the number of its members at 7 people Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Tomsy, Rykov; candidates Bukharin, Kalinin, Molotov. In the Organizing — .

Bureau of the Central Committee, the plenum elected Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Dzerzhinsky, Andreev, Rykov, Tomsy and candidates Kalinin, Zelensky, Rudzutak [163] . The system of power in Soviet Russia initially had nothing to do with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was constantly repeated by communist propaganda. Since October 1917, the leadership of the party ruled, which, despite the Marxist training and the years spent in exile, remained intellectually Russian in its political mentality. Therefore, she could build a new state, no matter how it was called, only according to the recipe traditional for Russia. Moreover, the system of such management "from top to bottom" tended to deepen. One of the visible manifestations of this trend was the convergence of the functions of the party and state bodies, which was of particular concern to some members of the party. So, P.A. Zalutsky at the XI Party Conference in December 1921 said: "We have entered the state apparatus more than the masses." And in the report of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) for the period from March 1921 to March 1922, it was directly stated that "the growing of the party organization into the Soviet apparatus and the absorption of party work by the Soviet"[164] . It must be said that Lenin, too, foresaw the disastrous consequences of such a policy when he wrote that "our policy and administration are based on the fact that the entire vanguard is connected with the entire proletarian mass, with the entire peasant mass. If someone forgets about these wheels, if he gets carried away with administration alone, then there will

be trouble . The problem was clearly identified by L.D. Trotsky in his letter to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee dated March 10

RCP(b). "One of the most important questions, both for the party itself and for Soviet work," he wrote, "is the relationship between the party and the state apparatus... Without the liberation of the party as a party from the functions of direct control and management, it is impossible to rid the party of bureaucracy, and economy from dissoluteness. This is the main question. Such a "policy", when at meetings of the provincial committee the questions of the sowing campaign of the province, of the lease or non-lease of the plant, are resolved in passing, is pernicious. And she is not getting any better in the county committee or the central one..."[166] .

Trotsky's letter was ~~take~~ taken into account. On March 23, 1922, in a letter to the Secretary of the Central Committee Molotov, and then at the congress itself, Lenin pointed out the urgency of measures to restore the operation of the Soviet Constitution, which was also discussed by the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, M.I. Kalinin and Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee A.S. Yenukidze. The need to raise the authority of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was emphasized. Sessions of the latter were supposed to be convened not from case to case, but not less often than every three months and lasting up to two weeks "to—

develop the main issues of legislation and to systematically monitor the work of the people's commissariats and the SNKom"[167] . Taking into account these proposals, the 11th Party Congress specifically noted that "Party organizations should in no case interfere in the daily current work of economic agencies and are obliged to refrain from administrative orders in the field of Soviet work in general. Party organizations should direct the activities of economic agencies, but in no case try to replace or depersonalize them. The absence of a strict delimitation of functions and incompetent interference lead to the absence of strict and precise responsibility of each for the business entrusted to him, increase bureaucracy in the organizations themselves, doing everything and nothing, hinder the serious specialization of economic workers - the study of the issue in all details, the acquisition of real business experience, in a word , hinder the correct organization of work... The Party organizations themselves resolve economic issues only in those cases and to the extent that—

the issues really require a decision in principle by the Party . "[168]

By this time, the autocratic type of power, traditional for Russia, was clearly revealed i

that even within the party there were protests against the dictatorial role of the Central Committee. At the IX Congress of the RCP(b) in 1920, T. Sapronov, the leader of the "democratic centralism" group, called the Central Committee "a small handful of party oligarchy." At that time, Lenin did not attach any importance to these protests and did not listen to them in any way. He answered them in the following way: "Soviet socialist democracy does not in the least contradict unity of command and dictatorship; the will of a class is sometimes carried out by a dictator who sometimes does more alone and is often more necessary"[169] . "Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand on it and cannot leave this ground, because this is the party that over the course of decades won the position of the vanguard of the entire factory and industrial proletariat .

Lenin, of course, was a dictator, but the dictatorship of the party as a system, although he spoke about it more than once, did not yet exist under him. During the Leninist period, the dictatorship of the party was carried out personally. It is difficult to imagine at that time anyone else in the place of Lenin in the Council of People's Commissars, Dzerzhinsky in the Cheka, Trotsky in the Revolutionary Military Council, and others. Later, under the conditions of the "party dictatorship" system, the individual no longer had such significance. Everything determined the place in the party-apparatus hierarchy. The place exalted the person, and not vice versa. "Indispensable among us Stalin liked to say. There is no such system to create," it took a purposeful policy of the post-Leninist leadership of the party, the daily work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee headed by Stalin, his special personnel policy, all of Stalin's desire for sole power, which he received as a result through intrigues, group politics, blackmail and direct repression . The main result of such a policy was the birth within the party of a special "party of the apparatus", such as he initially imagined it to be: "The Communist Party as a kind of order of swordsmen within the Soviet state, directing the bodies of the latter and inspiring their activities." Impressed by the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) in July 1921, Stalin expressed his idea of the place and role of the party in the system of Soviet power in a draft plan for the pamphlet On the Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists, published only 25 years later[171] .

2. SECRET STATE PARTY REFORM 1922 - 1923 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The decisive factor in the transition to the policy of "party dictatorship" was the change that took place in the leadership of the party. The main place in the so-called collective leadership, which began to take shape after the first attack of Lenin's illness on May 25, 27, 1922, was occupied by the "troika": Zinoviev - Stalin Kamenev. She was supported by the majority of the Politburo. This "troika" began to press Trotsky, in every possible way limiting his participation in the leadership of the country. Moreover, if Lenin in 1921 was concerned about the organizational containment of Trotsky, then the new leadership of the party sought to politically contain Trotsky and, ultimately, remove him from power. All major

issues were actually resolved by the "troika". Only formally they were approved by the Politburo in the presence of Trotsky. The Troika was most concerned not with the rational solution of problems, but with the retention of power by any means. It is natural, therefore, that Zinoviev - Stalin Kamenev needed authoritarian methods of leadership and consolidation of the policy of "party dictatorship".

Strictly speaking, such a policy was, in fact, a real party-state reform carried out in secret in 1922-1923. A.M. left his perception of what was happening. Nazaretyan, who at that time was one of Stalin's secretaries. In a letter to G.K. Ordzhonikidze (not later than August 9, 1922), he wrote: "Now the work of the Central Committee has changed significantly. What we found here is indescribably bad. And what were our views on the apparatus of the Central Committee in the localities? Now everything has been shaken up..."[172] . The main goal of this reform was to establish the dictatorship of a narrow circle of the party leadership, relying on the apparatus and through it transmitting directives to party committees, which acted in the same way in relation to party organizations. Thus, the former model of the domination of leaders was finally eliminated -

tribunes - the masses and pushed aside from the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. Power, organized according to this type, really turned out to be the dictatorship of the party, but the fullness of power was concentrated in the hands of

a few at the very top. This party-state reform, firstly, included a special personnel policy, the essence of which Stalin later formulated in an expression that became winged: "Cadres decide everything." From that time on, the entire personnel policy was in the competence of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. A practical step towards the implementation of personnel policy in the party, and then in the country, was the new provisions in the party charter, which was adopted by the XII All-Russian Party Conference (August 4-7, 1922). The charter was prepared by a commission chaired by Molotov. The addition, insignificant at first glance, that a mandatory party experience was established for secretaries of provincial committees until 1917 and the approval of a higher party authority (only with its sanction was an exception in the amount of experience allowed), was of fundamental importance for the formation of the entire personnel policy in the party. This approval of the secretaries meant their actual appointment, the removal of those who were objectionable and the promotion of those who were pleasing. In the Secretariat of the Central Committee, such a system of accounting for leading party workers and their distribution was very quickly adjusted - in connection with this, the Accounting and Distribution Department (Uchraspred) began to play a special role. M. S. Voslensky in his book cited the story that "from the first half of the 1920s, Stalin himself kept a file on the people most interested in him for one reason or another, ~~not~~ even allowing his secretary to access it"[173]2. Since that time, the expression "walks under Stalin" appeared, which referred to the communists who were at the disposal of ~~the~~ Central Committee, but ha

Stalin expressed the credo of his personnel policy in the organizational report of the Central Committee at the XII Congress of the RCP (b): "After the correct political line has been given, it is necessary to select workers so that people who can carry out directives, who can understand these directives, who can accept directives, as if they were their own, and who know how to implement them. Otherwise, politics loses its meaning, turns into waving ~~hands~~"[175]4.

Of fundamental importance were also the points of the new party statute on the appointment by the Central Committee of the party of the editorial offices of the central bodies that worked under its control (thus, the mass media were placed under strict ideological control), and that it distributes the forces and means of the party and manages the central cash desk [176]5. —

The implementation of the policy of "party dictatorship" provided not only for the selection of leading workers and their placement in the appropriate places. This alone would not have been enough to "create the necessary symphony"[177]6, as M. Voslensky figuratively put it. These cadres still needed to be "tied up" with various benefits and privileges. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the same XII Conference of the RCP(b) provided for a number of measures to improve the financial situation of active party workers. A special resolution was adopted on this issue. The circle of such party workers ("commanding staff of the party") was initially defined as 15,235 people, including employees of central and regional institutions, workers of provincial committees and provincial committees, ukoms (or district committees) and ukomsomol, secretaries of volost cells and cells available at large enterprises. All of them were to be provided with rates of 17-18 grades, housing, medical care and assistance in raising children. Moreover, it was specifically noted that these events would be carried out by the Central Committee at the expense of the party. Members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (CCC) of the RCP(b), heads of departments of the Central Committee, members of the regional bureaus of the Central Committee, and secretaries of the regional and provincial committees of the party were paid at the highest level. In addition, "personal pay increases were allowed"[178]7. Here it is

appropriate to recall the corresponding paragraph of the resolution of the IX Party Conference "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Building": "Responsible communist workers have no right (I.P. emphasized) to receive personal rates, as well as bonuses and overtime pay" [179]8 . This point has been forgotten, as —

the very discussion of the "bottom" and "top" of the party.

As early as July 1922, before the XII Party Conference, the Orgburo of the Central Committee adopted a special resolution "On Improving the Life of Active Party Workers"[180]9. It had a clear hierarchy

salaries of party workers at all levels. Thus, the minimum salary of a party worker for secretaries of cells at enterprises and rural cells was set at 300 rubles, for members of the Central Committee, Central Control Commission and secretaries of provincial committees 430 rubles. per month. Approximately the same were the salaries of responsible workers - communists in the relevant Soviet and economic bodies. At the same time, for party workers with a family of three, an increase in salaries by 50% and another 50% for off-duty work was provided. Deductions from high salaries were purely symbolic and began with a rate of 645 rubles. It is appropriate to note that the average wage in industry in the summer of 1922 was about 10 rubles. per month.

In addition to salaries, active party workers and members of their families received food rations and were provided with free housing, clothing, medical care, and sometimes personal transport. Thus, in the summer of 1922, members of the RCP (b), responsible employees of the central Soviet bodies, received 12 kg of meat, 1.2 kg of sugar, 4.8 kg of rice, etc. per month in addition to their salaries. For workers on a provincial scale, this ration was poorer 4.6 kg of meat or fish, 1 kg of fat, 400 g of sugar, 162 cigarettes, 3 boxes of matches, etc. The network of sanatoriums intended for

the rest of workers was expanding. Head of the Administrative Department responsible of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee A.D. Metelev, preparing a report for 1924, calculated that the maintenance of all country estates intended for the rest of the responsible workers cost almost 600 thousand rubles. "This figure," he wrote, is for me the subject of the greatest reflection. It seems to me, of course, if the government finds it necessary to spend such a figure next year as well, it will be our business to spend it as economically as possible, but it seems to me that in view of our poverty, in view of the difficulties in paying the food tax by the peasant, from whom our revenue budget is compiled, it is the indispensable duty of the Communist is to think about how to reduce these same costs. They represent an outrageous number" [181]10. It should be added that the most "responsible workers", as before, periodically spent vacations (from one to three months) in holiday homes

abroad. They also went there to improve their health, often accompanied by family members and attending physicians.

also at the expense of the party budget. So, according to the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of May 5, 1922 (in each specific case, it was his permission that was required), 100 rubles were allocated for travel to a place of rest or treatment. gold, for the first month of stay in a sanatorium - 100 rubles. gold, "for the device and small expenses" another 100 rubles. and then 100 rubles. gold for each subsequent month. According to the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of September 27, 1922, adopted after the XII Party Conference, the number of responsible employees of all ranks has already increased to 20 thousand people, and the number of employees of the party apparatus (including technical ones), who received in addition to their salaries a natural ration, to 40 thousand. From December 6, 1922, vacated party positions were introduced in cells with more than 25 members. and in enterprises with more than 1,000 workers, even if the members of the RCP(b) were less than 25[182]11.

In an effort to prevent dissatisfaction of the party "lower classes" with such a policy of purposeful isolation of responsible workers and the growth of their privileges, the party leadership from time to time issued demagogic circulars that were read out at party meetings, such as, for example, the circular of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of October 19, 1923 "On the struggle with excesses and with the criminal use of official position by party members"[183]12, or in every possible way—exaggerated specific facts of abuse. In 1925-1928 the facts of the moral decay of the party-Soviet elite in a number of provincial and district centers - the "Chubarovsky scandal" in Leningrad, the "Smolensk affair", etc. Directing the anger of the masses to specific objects, the Stalinist leadership also pursued another goal - shaking up the local party-Soviet activists [184]13. Wherein

it did not allow any encroachment on the highest organs of the party and on the system as a

whole. In the 1920s party leaders, including future members of the opposition, enjoyed their undivided power. There was a mass renaming of cities on the Soviet map, there were already the cities of Trotsk, Zinovievgrad, Stalin, Stalingrad, etc. A real cult of Zinoviev developed in Leningrad. Let me give you one more characteristic touch to his portrait:

academicians. Before the end of S.F. Oldenburg, the door at the stage, where two sentries stand, swings open and two maidens in golden dresses with golden hair flutter out. Silently they sit down at the table in front of the pulpit, arousing general bewilderment. A few minutes later the door swings open again, Zinoviev "himself" in a scarf enters, nods to Oldenburg as he walks, and sits down in the prepared chair. After waiting for the end of the story, S.F. makes a long speech, which is recorded by the "golden" maidens, who turned out to be stenographers (this is how the multi-volume collected works of Zinoviev are born). After a standing ovation, first one comes out, a minute later the stenographers. He sits downstairs in the former personal car of Nicholas II"[185]14. At the end of December 1922, the

Secretariat of the Central Committee (secretaries V. Molotov and V. Kuibyshev played a particularly active role in it at that time, apart from Stalin; the organizational and instructor department was headed by L. Kaganovich, the accounting and distribution department S. Syrtsov) held a meeting of secretaries and heads of departments of provincial committees and regional party committees who came to Moscow for the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The meeting supported and approved the provision that the Central Committee takes into account and distributes party workers on an all-Russian, regional and provincial scale and that all more or less major appointments are made by the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee [186]15. From April 1922 to March 1923 alone, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee made 4,750 appointments to responsible posts[187]16. After the December meeting of 1922, the Central Committee's Regional Distribution Office had a direct bearing on the accounting and distribution of responsible district employees in cases where it was a question of broad planned transfers, control over the use of them by provincial committees, or the promotion of district employees to more responsible work. It was assumed that ordinary local workers would be registered and distributed by those party bodies with which they are closely connected, district committees and uyezds committees. Prior to this meeting, ordinary workers also came for approval to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The task of the administrative distribution departments also included the collection of characteristics, opinions, etc. about responsible party workers in one or another institution or party committee. The totality of these materials made it possible for the Central Committee Department of Distribution to have an exhaustive dossier on each candidate, which practically excluded t

The Decree of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of March 16, 1923, adopted on the basis of the report of Kaganovich and Krylenko, also provided for a special procedure for bringing the secretaries of provincial and regional committees to justice, namely: the provincial prosecutor was obliged to send materials and his conclusion before giving the case a legal course. to the prosecutor of the republic for order and for agreement with [the Central Committee](#)^[188]¹⁷.

Now only the secretaries of the provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics had maximum local information about the state of affairs in the party and the country, and only with their permission the information was partially published. This practice was consolidated by the resolution of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of February 2, 1923 "On the relationship between party committees and editorial offices of newspapers", according to which all critical material about the activities of the party committee and the executive committee as a whole, the provincial department of the GPU and the provincial prosecutor, could go to the local press only with the knowledge and consent party committee. Party committees were given the right, if necessary, to introduce such a restriction for certain periods and on other publications, at the same time notifying the Agitprop department of the Central Committee about this. Data on all other departments of the gubernia executive committee and other institutions were printed in the general manner, in accordance with the decision of the VIII Congress of the RCP (b). For the material printed on the pages of the newspaper, the editorial board was responsible on the Soviet line to the court, and on the party ~~line~~ -

to the party committee ^[189]¹⁸. Thus, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the local secretaries appointed by it turned out to be bound by a single mutual responsibility. In 1923, the appointment took on a particularly wide scope and became a system. Moreover, people who were strictly selected on a "political" basis, who were ready to go to the end in carrying out the general line of the party, got into the party apparatus. The Decree of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) of November 8, 1923 directly obligated the Uchraspredred to engage in a "systematic revision of the leadership", doing this primarily in relation to the posts indicated in the nomenclature, which was approved by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee on October 12, 1923 ^[190] ~~19~~ As A. Zimin rightly noted, here for the first time, and, moreover, in a published document of the Central Committee, the term "nomenclature" is encountered, which has acquired such scandalous fame in Soviet ~~history~~^[191]²⁰.

“At the most cruel moment of war communism, the appointment Trotsky wrote in his letter to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission dated October 8, 1923, that within the party it did not have 1/10 of the distribution that it now has. The appointment of secretaries of provincial committees has now become the rule. This gives the secretary an essentially independent position from the local organization. The regime that had basically taken shape already before the Twelfth Congress, and after it was finally consolidated and formalized, is much further from workers' democracy than the regime of the most cruel periods of war communism.[192]21 This statement by Trotsky correctly reflected the prevailing practice. Indeed, all political affairs on behalf of the Politburo, Orgburo, or simply the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee handled, referring to the secretaries of the provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics, and was always sure that the local party committees would fulfill these instructions, since they were strictly prescriptive. “Gubernia committees,” Stalin said at the 12th Congress of the RCP(b), are the main pillar of our party, and without them, without the gubernatorial committees, without their work to guide both Soviet and party work, the party would have been left without

Having sent a secret letter to the provincial committees on January 27, 1923, which actually disavowed Lenin's article “How we should reorganize the Rabkrin” published on January 25 in Pravda as an article of a sick person, Stalin was confident that the local secretaries would follow the instructions of the Central Committee. “The Central Committee has no doubts, it was said in the letter, that if the alarming conclusions mentioned at the beginning of this letter were made locally from Comrade Lenin's article, the provincial committees would not hesitate to correctly orient the party organizations”[194]23 (emphasis added by I.P.) . In the same way, having sent cipher telegrams about Lenin's illness to the secretaries of the provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics on March 12 and 13, 1923 (Stalin acted “on behalf of the Politburo of the Central Committee,” as stated in the document), he was sure that local secretaries will closely monitor the mood of the masses, and malicious spreaders of rumors about a possible split or changes in the policy of the party will be speedy court[195]24. —

There was now no question of any independence of the local bodies of the party in making political decisions. She

was sharply limited back in November 1922 by a Central Committee circular signed by Molotov and Kaganovich. According to this circular, the regional bureaus and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics, if necessary, under the conditions of local work, were given the right to issue only explanatory additions to the circulars of the Central Committee, but at the same time they were not allowed to change their essence. All additions that make fundamental changes to this circular, the relevant party committees had to coordinate with the Central Committee. In cases where the circular of the Central Committee changed or canceled their circulars, the circular of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)[196]25 was subject to execution. —

The selection of delegates to party congresses and conferences became the rule. The 12th Congress of the RCP(b) was a milestone in this case. "Over the past six years, Stalin admitted, the Central Committee has never prepared a congress in such a way as at the present moment. Immediately after the February plenum, members and candidates of the Central Committee dispersed to all corners of our federation and made reports on the work of the Central Committee.

It is known that the elections of delegates to this congress, which took place before the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, were declared invalid. New elections were held at party conferences with the participation of representatives of the Central Committee. In this regard, the date of the congress was also postponed from March 30 to April 17, 1923 [198]27 As a result, 55% of the congress delegates turned out to be employees of the party apparatus, and if we take into account those who worked part-time in it, then 84

%[199]28. Zinoviev let slip about the selection of delegates to the XII Congress of the RCP(b) in the midst of an intra-party discussion in the autumn of 1923: "We could be told: the Central Committee of the party, just before the congress, at which it will be criticized, re-elected, selects delegates for itself, curtails the electoral rights of members. From the point of view of abstract workers' democracy, this is a mockery of "democracy." But we needed this from the point of view of the fundamental interests of the revolution, from the point of view of the usefulness of the revolution, to allow only those who are real party guards to be elected. It was this "party—

guard", or proteges of the party apparatus, that determined the fate of the country at all subsequent congresses and conferences, that is, they actually supported the political line and those decisions that were set from above. Curious documents have been preserved on this score. "Stalin often wrote to the secretaries of the provincial committees

notes of approximately the following content: "Kabakov, I beg you, support at the congress. Stalin will not forget you." I didn't forget – I shot"[201]30. Not only that, starting from 1923, the delegates to party congresses were proteges of the apparatus. Gifts were also provided for them during the congress for "correct" behavior. In subsequent years, this practice became widespread. A curious evidence of gifts to the participants of the 16th Party Congress has been preserved. It was a one-time receipt, giving the right to purchase the following goods at reasonable prices in a special department of the GPU store: a cut for a good Boston suit, 3 m at 18 rubles. - 54 rubles, 10 m of paper, a rubber coat, 2 pairs of underwear, 1 overshirt, 2 spools of thread, 2 pieces of plain soap, 1 piece of toiletry, 1 jacket of woolen knitwear, 1 pair of shoes. In addition, the congress gave out: 800 g of butter, 800 g of cheese, 1 kg of smoked sausage, 10 boxes of canned food, 80 g of sugar, 100 g of tea, 125 cigarettes. I.I. Schitz, an intelligent, observant and very insightful person, at the same time as describing this receipt, made an absolutely correct conclusion in his diary, which is also worth quoting: "This, of course, is an obvious bribery. And at the same time, what squalor! It would seem that with their own money every visitor, not only a deputy, could freely buy not only things if they were in circulation, but the trouble is that we are shouting about a "rapid growth in production", and yet two reels and a bar of soap is a privilege!!!"[202]31. The left opposition in the party was the first to sound

the alarm on the question of the party apparatus and the "fundamentally wrong and unhealthy intra-party regime." On October 8, 1923, Trotsky spoke with a letter to members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and on October 15, a group of prominent party figures issued the "Statement of the 46th". In the course of the inner-party discussion in the autumn of 1923, sanctioned from above, much was said and written about the fading of party life, about how all questions go from top to bottom predetermined, that the apparatus suppresses all thought under the guise of factionalism, that the consequence of such a course is, as Evg. Preobrazhensky (his signature is the first under the "Statement of the 46th"), "the growth of careerism and servility in the party, the official attitude to business, the growth of the irresponsibility of the apparatus in re

self-confidence and self-satisfaction of persons appointed to party positions that were previously elected, etc ."[203]32. —

In order to ward off the discontent of the party masses and in many respects in order to shame the opposition, the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on December 5, 1923, at a joint meeting, developed and unanimously adopted a resolution on party building [204]33. This resolution was purely declarative, although it spoke of the need for "a serious change in the party's course in the sense of a real and systematic implementation of the principles of workers' democracy." Its essence was not so much in minor concessions as in maintaining the basic principles of the former internal party policy. This is evident from the following passage: "The Party can by no means be regarded as an institution or department, but it also cannot be regarded as a debating club for all and sundry trends. The Tenth Congress established the principles of workers' democracy, but the same Tenth Congress, and then the XI and XII Congresses, approved a number of restrictions on the application of the principles of workers' democracy: the prohibition of factions (see the resolution of the Tenth Congress "On the Unity of the Party" and the corresponding resolution of the XI party, limiting admission to party membership for non-proletarian elements, establishing party seniority for certain categories of party officials, approval of secretaries by a higher party station (see party charter). Considering it unavoidable under the conditions of the New Economic Policy (NEP) that the well-known restrictions continue to be preserved, at the same time, it is necessary, on the basis of existing experience, especially of grassroots organizations, to check the expediency of some of these restrictions, for example, the right to approve secretaries by higher authorities. In any case, we must not allow the transformation of the right to approve secretaries into their actual appointment. But

even these minor concessions were immediately disavowed by the real politics of the top party leadership. In this regard, speaking at the XI Moscow Provincial Party Conference, Evg. Preobrazhensky suggested writing in her resolution that after the December 5 resolution, "instead of the most energetic implementation of the belated new course, immediately after its announcement, a number of violations o

biased and distorting information in the central organ of the party Pravda about the course of the discussion, the exclusion from publication of a number of articles by comrades who criticized the majority of the Politburo, elections to the conference with the indiscriminate removal of comrades from the opposition, and, finally, the demagogic accusation of the so-called opposition of factionalism". Preobrazhensky's resolution at this conference received only 61 votes against 325 cast in favor of Kamenev's resolution.

[205]34. Most clearly, the political aspirations of the top leadership of the party - the "troika" were demonstrated by the XIII Party Conference (January 16-18, 1924), at which there was not a single representative of the opposition as a delegate with a decisive vote. E.A. Preobrazhensky, G.L. Pyatakov and other supporters of the opposition were only able to attend as members of the Central Committee. As a result, the nomenklatura delegates of the conference rejected the resolution proposed by Preobrazhensky on intra-party democracy (only three people voted for it) and adopted a resolution of the Central Committee condemning the opposition as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Preobrazhensky correctly understood that the conference's decision to publish paragraph seven of the resolution "On the Unity of the Party", announcing the ban on all factions and groupings, was directed "not only against the opposition, but in essence against the resolution of December 5, against all real efforts to turn to a new course and to intra-Party democracy... We are once again driving the Party into an atmosphere of silence. Because then every speaker can be regarded as an oppositionist"[206]35. However, just as in 1921

those communists who felt the far-reaching consequences of the resolution "On the unity of the party" and its contradiction with the declared policy of the NEP, nevertheless voted for this resolution, so in 1923, speaking against the course of the "troika", they did not allow the thought of replacing it. The same Preobrazhensky, answering Kamenev, said literally the following: "Kamenev obviously does not understand how one can criticize the Central Committee in such a way without raising the question of its composition. Excuse me, there is a fundamental difference between our party, which elects the Central Committee, controls it, replaces and renews it when necessary, and between parliament, which overthrows a government that has not received a major

the leaders of our party, who have taken shape over the course of 20 years, and we must not dismiss them, and if there are mistakes, we must criticize and correct the [line](#)"[207]36 (emphasis added by I.P.).

Astonishing political short-sightedness and the fetishization of their own party led the members of the opposition in the autumn of 1923 to miss the last chance to prevent the process of isolation of the party apparatus and the final degeneration of the entire party.

The party of the apparatus was the main support of the Stalinist clique in carrying out all the so-called socialist transformations, primarily forced collectivization and forced industrialization. Speaking at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 3, 1937, Stalin stated with satisfaction: "In our party, if we mean its leading strata, there are about 3-4 thousand top leaders. This, I would say, is the generals of our party. Next come 30-40 thousand middle managers. This is our party officers. Next come about 100-150 thousand of the lower party commanding staff. This, so to speak, is our party non-commissioned officers"[208]37. The creation of a party apparatus

was only the first direction of the policy of the "dictatorship of the party", that party-state reform that had been carried out in the country since mid-1922. The second was the course towards the merging of the functions of party and state bodies: the executive committees of all local Soviets fell under the direct supervision of the relevant party committees , or rather, their secretaries and the apparatuses led by them.

At the already mentioned meeting of secretaries and heads of organizational departments of provincial committees and regional party committees, who arrived in Moscow in December 1922 for the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it was decided not only to approve the provision that the Central Committee takes into account and distributes party workers of the All-Russian, regional and provincial scale and that all more or less major appointments are made by the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but it was also supposed to expand the accounting of responsible Soviet and trade union workers and begin accounting of all economic workers up to members of plant management and senior workers of large factories and factories and thus approach the practical solution of the problem selection and use

business executives. It was emphasized that "in modern economic conditions, very often the correct and successful appointment of a suitable plant manager is no less important than the chairman of the [State Tax Service](#)"[209]38.

The first issue of the journal "Izvestia of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)" for 1923 opened with an article by S. Syrtsov, head of the Central Committee's Department of Distribution at that time, in which the immediate tasks in the field of accounting and distribution of responsible workers were formulated. In addition to the selection of leaders of party bodies, the following measures were envisaged: 1) the selection of workers in charge of party education and propaganda; 2) strengthening of economic bodies, for which it was necessary to review the leaders of industry and trade in order to eliminate elements that proved to be unfit or of little use for workers, and to replenish economic bodies with efficient, according to Syrtsov, organizers; 3) reinforcement of the countryside by party workers; 4) strengthening the financial apparatus in an appropriate way, as well as consolidating party influence in those areas of cooperation where it has not yet been achieved; 5) selection of employees for judicial-punitive and investigative bodies. The decisions of the December 1922 meeting of the

secretaries and heads of the organizational departments of the provincial committees and regional committees of the party and Syrtsov's article, especially since they were followed by the relevant circulars, became the guide in the entire subsequent personnel policy of the party and state bodies. The purpose of this policy was expressed by Stalin in a report on the organizational activities of the Central Committee at the XII Congress of the RCP (b): "Earlier, the Uchraspredred was limited to the framework of provincial committees and ukoms, now that work has gone deeper, when construction work has unfolded everywhere, it is impossible to lock yourself into the framework of ukoms and provincial committees. It is necessary to cover all branches of administration without exception and the entire industrial command staff, with the help of which the Party controls our economic apparatus and exercises its leadership. In this sense, it was decided by the Central Committee to expand the apparatus of the Uchraspredred, both in the center and in the localities, so that the head would have deputies for the economic and Soviet part, and so that they would have

commanders for enterprises and trusts, for local economic agencies and in the centre, in the soviets and in the—

party.”[210]39 According to the type of accounting and distribution departments in the party committees, the same departments were created (initially organizational departments, and then administrative distribution departments) in all state bodies and accounting for responsible workers was established. Thus, in the organizational department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a questionnaire-personal record of all members and candidate members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Central Executive Committees of the autonomous republics, committee departments and their instructors, chairmen and deputy chairmen of regional, regional and provincial executive committees, heads of organizational departments, as well as non-party workers and peasants nominated for responsible (provincial, regional and regional) work not lower than the position of the head of the department and his deputies. The same account was provided for members of the councils of people's commissars of the autonomous republics and for members of the boards of people's commissariats. A general statistical record of all members of the Soviets and their executive committees was also supposed. On the ground, in the organizational departments of the gubernia executive committees, the following was provided for: 1) personal registration of all members and candidates of the gubernia executive committees; 2) personal list accounting of chairmen and deputy chairmen of executive committees, heads of organizational units and their instructors, as well as nominees from workers and peasants for provincial and district work (not lower than heads or deputy heads of departments). The same accounting was supposed in all district and volost executive

The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved the members of the lower executive committees of the Soviets. The accounting and distribution of responsible employees in all other government departments were organized according to the same type. Since 1924, the Executive Committee of responsible workers acted in the Supreme Council of National Economy. Gradually, the practice of accounting and selecting workers spread up to the head of a shop, workshop, etc., which was prescribed by a special circular of the Central Committee of January 5, 1925. This circular set the task of studying the personnel of state and economic institutions and it was proposed to pay special attention to the selection of higher and middle command staff of industry[212]41.

Not a single state department was now independent in the conduct of personnel policy from party bodies and the OGPU. The practice of coordinating all personnel appointments and relocations with them has become the rule. The type of such relationships can be illustrated by a specific example of the circular of the Central Committee signed by Molotov on the relationship of the Prosecutor's Office with party bodies: "All appointments, transfers and recalls of provincial prosecutors were made by the prosecutor of the republic in agreement with the Central Committee of the RCP, and the provincial committees had to report on the candidates they nominated or about their motives their recall and movement. Appointments, transfers and recalls of assistant prosecutors were made by the prosecutor of the republic. In the event of an objection from the provincial committee, the issue was resolved in the Central Committee of the RCP. In order to exercise party control over the activities of the prosecutor's office, the provincial committees had to hear reports from the provincial prosecutor at their meetings every month. In case of disagreement with the prosecutor, the provincial committees, without interfering in the actions of the prosecutor, directly applied to the Central Committee to resolve disputed issues. The Central Committee proposed to accept this circular for guidance and precise, unswerving execution"[213]42.

If the coordination practice was violated, the Secretariat of the Central Committee strictly pointed this out to the head of one or another department and demanded correction. So, the same Molotov, in a letter to the Supreme Council of National Economy to Pyatakov and Bogdanov dated July 21, 1923, reproached them for the fact that in a number of cases the appointment of workers to responsible positions in economic organizations of a central scale is carried out without the participation of the Central Committee, and qualified this as a failure to comply with the decisions of the latter plenums, the Orgburo of the Central Committee of April 2, 1923 and resolutions of the XII Congress of the RCP (b). The secretariat instructed the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council not to make any further appointments without the approval of the Central Committee. Since 1923, regular reporting of all lower state departments to higher ones has become a practice. The decision of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 5, 1923 [214]43 provided for: 1) regular submission to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (organizing department) by the Central Executive Committee and the SNK of the republics, regions and gubernia executive committees of all reporting materials, as well as protocols and resolutions of their congresses and written reports every three month; 2) regular tours of the provinces by employees of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and people's commissariats as authoriz

places with obligatory submission of reports to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee; 3) the systematic summoning of the chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the autonomous republics and the chairmen of the regional and provincial executive committees for oral reports to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the state of the republics, regions and provinces. Regular reports of people's commissariats were also put into practice. Naturally, communists were appointed to all these party, state and, as a rule, economic positions. At the same time, the circle of persons who were allowed to get acquainted with this or that documentation was sharply limited. Characteristic is the resolution of the Central Committee of February 22, 1924, which prescribed that all non-partisan personal secretaries of the people's commissariats and the boards of central economic bodies (trusts, syndicates, banks, etc.) be replaced by members of the RCP. The secret circular that followed this decision, signed by the secretary of the Central Control Commission Yem. Yaroslavsky of June 12, 1924, ordered "to implement the decision of the Central Committee unconditionally in the shortest possible time" and warned that "failure to comply with this decision, for which the heads of Soviet and economic bodies are personally responsible, will entail bringing the latter to party respons

The policy of raising party committees above state bodies was not an empty declaration, but a whole system of measures that was carried out in secret from the party and society. Nevertheless, in the resolution of the XII Congress of the RCP(b), according to the report of the Central Committee, the policy of the "dictatorship of the party" was fixed in a very peculiar way. On the one hand, the congress confirmed the resolutions of previous congresses on the need for a precise division of functions between Party and Soviet organizations, in particular, the 11th Congress that "the Party organizations themselves resolve economic issues only in those cases and to the extent that these issues really require a fundamental Party decisions. But at the same time, the congress warned (!) "against an overly broad interpretation of the above-mentioned decisions, which could create political dangers for the party. During the period we are experiencing, the RCP directs and must direct all the political and cultural work of state authorities, directs and must direct the activities of all economic bodies of the republic. The Party's task is not only to distribute its workers correctly among individual

branches of state work, but also in determining and verifying the very course of this work in all essentials. In no case can the Party now confine itself to general propaganda and agitation. (Highlighted by me I.P.). The dictatorship of the working class cannot be ensured otherwise than in the form of the dictatorship of its advanced vanguard, i.e., the Communist Party. While systematically enlisting everything of value among the non-Party workers and peasants in economic and state work, the Party, at the same time, cannot forget for a moment that the main responsibility for the work of economic and state bodies rests with the RCP, for it alone is historically called upon to be the real conductor of dictatorship of the working class. Even closer to the economy, even more attention, leadership, strength to economic agencies—such is the party's slogan for the coming period"[216]45. However, if the resolution of the Congress, although declaratively, confirmed the decision of the 11th Congress on the need to separate the functions of party and Soviet bodies, then

Zinoviev's report on the political activities of the Central Committee contained nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he called paradoxical the point of view on this issue, which was set out in the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress and, at the insistence of Lenin, confirmed by the XI Congress: "We, the old Bolshevik-Leninists, we insist that the Party work, into economic work, said Zinoviev. For us, the experience that has elapsed from the 11th to the 12th Congress teaches us this: closer to the economy. And further: "One cannot agree with the paradoxical point of view that the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee should be for the Soviets what the Central Committee is for the Party. This is completely false. The Central Committee is the Central Committee for the fact that it is the Central Committee for the Soviets, and for the trade unions, and for the cooperatives, and for the provincial executive committees, and for the entire working class. This is its leading role, this is the expression of the dictatorship of the party.

This sounds sometimes as if soft: let the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee be what the Central Committee is for the party. It can't be. At that moment, when the chairmen of the provincial executive committees will not be selected by the Central Committee of the party, at that moment everything will go upside down for us. This cannot be and should not be." "Without provincial committees," he declared frankly, we can neither conduct a tax in kind, nor regulate wages, nor manage the economy"[217]46.

Real politics was even more outspoken. By the end of 1923, state bodies in the center and in the localities had largely lost their independence and were now completely dependent on the respective party committees. According to Kamenev, by this time apparatus was already in control of industry the party for 3/4 of the time[218]47.

After Lenin's death, in a speech at a meeting of the communist faction of the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, Zinoviev returned to substantiating the policy of the "dictatorship of the party": "In this matter, we stand unshakably on the soil of the proletarian dictatorship, the iron dictatorship. No one can think of weakening it. And if this is so, then the relationship between the party and the state should remain the same in the sense that the party leads, the party is the soul of everything, the party is engaged not only in agitation and propaganda, as they wanted to slip it on us, but the party organizes, the party directs, the party leads the Soviet government, party her head. In this matter, we must first of all scrape out all the remnants of non-Bolshevik ideas with a knife, so that not the slightest doubt remains in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party regarding the basic question of the relationship between the party and the state. This statement left no doubt about the

political intentions of the new leadership of the party. As a result of the policy of "dictatorship of the party", the duality of the political system, which had been preserved under Lenin, disappeared. It was no longer a party-state, but a party state, since the party apparatus "swallowed" the state and itself became a power structure. The new political system also had a rigidly centralized structure, the framework of which was a hierarchy of party committees. The hierarchical structures of the Soviet, economic, trade union, Komsomol, punitive and other bodies built on the same type everywhere copied the hierarchy of party committees and were under their direct supervision. The rise of party committees over the Soviets meant the emasculation and actual liquidation of Soviet power. Management in the Soviets passed first to their executive committees, then to the presidiums of the executive committees, and, finally, the presidiums of the executive com

committees have actually become their shadow. "Not a single important political or organizational issue, Stalin said, is resolved in our Soviet and other mass organizations without the guiding instructions [of the Party](#)"[220]49. Many members of the party came to realize this fundamental change in the system of political power only towards the end of the 1920s, when their very presence in the party became problematic. I.V. Vardin, a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1907, sent material to G. Zinoviev on July 27, 1928, in which he wrote about the complete victory of "the tendency to transfer the decision of all affairs exclusively to the executive committees. During 1921-1925. The Soviets are in fact completely dying down, management is entirely concentrated in the hands of the executive committees, or rather their presidiums. These presidiums are gradually losing contact with the masses...". At the end of the letter was a statement: "We are strongly opposed to turning the Soviets into a decoration. As in all other questions, here, too, we entirely support Lenin's point of view, on the basis of our Party program. We believe that socialist construction is a false, hypocritical phrase if the Soviets do not work according to Lenin. We believe that the practical instructions of our program on the question of Soviets, the directives [of the Eighth Party Congress](#) and the Seventh Congress of Soviets on the question of local Soviets must be put into effect without fail. But what could Zinoviev do in 1928, especially since he himself was one of the initiators and ideologists of this reform, which strengthened his leadership (albeit for a short time) in Petrograd and throughout the Northwestern Region?! The opposition leaders themselves felt [the](#)

full power of the political machine they had built. "The party and the state have merged, that's the trouble," Bukharin exclaimed naively in one of his repentant conversations in the summer of 1928. [222]51 levels, the history of various people's commissariats, trade unions, Komsomol and other public organizations, but it should be remembered that neither state nor economic bodies, much less public organizations, not a single congress or even a plenum of the Central Committee could make an

systems were set in motion by those decisions that were made in the very center of Stalin's power, and then descended down the party-apparatus hierarchy, which, in turn, correlated at different levels with all other hierarchical structures that made up this system - Soviet, punitive, economic and others. These elements of the system could only concretize, supplement, adapt the decisions received to their departments or local conditions, i.e. carry out the general line of the party. All elements of the Soviet political system in their

activities clearly embodied consent as the principle of functioning of the system of relations of domination and subordination. In Stalin's time, not only the highest party and state bodies, but also the plenums of the Central Committee of the party, its congresses, etc. acted on the principle of consent. Their actions were so regulated, especially since the establishment and consolidation of Stalinist power, that they are perceived as a ritual, an empty transformed form from which real power has disappeared. This principle of organizing relations in the political system operates, as a rule, in those states in which there are no legal relations. In Russia, this principle coexisted along with the principle of omnipotence - as an example, we can cite the relationship between the Boyar Duma and the sovereign, which "were established by practice, custom, and not by law" (V.O. Klyuchevsky). The principle of consent replaced the missing principles of legality and moral

norms and represented the liberum veto in reverse. Even under conditions when there was a threat of arrest, the members of the Central Committee agreed with the general line of the party, which Stalin embodied for them. They finally "agreed" to Stalin after his victory in the inner-party struggle, the outcome of which was actually predetermined after the XIII Conference of the RCP (b) in January 1924 made the resolution of the Tenth Congress "On the Unity of the Party" the supreme law of the internal life of the party, publishing her seventh point. At the same time, the principle of consent cannot be reduced to a simple ritual; it was a mechanism that concealed and at the same time confirmed the actions of the real power in the country.

This power did not formalize itself legally - the Constitution of the USSR did not in any way define the legal framework for the state activities of party bodies. As a result, the illusion of the existence of the party as a socio-political organization, but not as a power structure, was maintained. It is no coincidence that the sixth article of the Constitution, which declared the leading and guiding role of the party in the political system of Soviet society, not only did not clarify the picture, but, on the contrary, clouded it, carefully hiding the power functions of the CPSU apparatus.

References to the existence of a Bolshevik party were generally absent in the Constitutions of 1918 and 1924. The earliest mention of it in constitutional documents, as the American Sovietologist R. Pipes correctly noted, is found in the so-called Stalinist Constitution of 1936, the 126th article of which declared the party "the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system" and "the guiding core of all workers' organizations, both public and state." He also correctly noted that the absence of the most important realities of state life in the legislative acts was in full accordance with the Russian tradition. The first and rather accidental definition of tsarist autocracy appeared only in the "Military Regulations" of Peter I, more than two hundred years after it became the main political factor in the country. And serfdom, which formed the social basis of the Russian Empire, never received official recognition at all. Until 1936, the ruling apparatus of the Communist Party preferred to modestly present the party as a kind of vague force that does not rule at all, but only leads the country by its inspiring example. Thus, the party program adopted in March 1919 defined the role of the RCP(b) as the "organizer" and "leader" of the proletariat, "explaining" to the latter the nature of the class struggle, never mentioning that the party also controls this very "proletariat", as well as everyone else. According to R. Pipes, "for everyone who was outside the party ranks, the actions of the Bolsheviks, their decisions, their personnel were absolutely impenetrable (I.P. highlighted by me). 600,000 communists who, in the words of Kamenev, uttered in 1919, "ruled" Russia, "and ...

huge non-communist masses" resembled not so much a political party as a ruling caste or an elite order. "[223]52 its apparatus and knew about the current state

of affairs not ordinary communists, but employees of the apparatus, and the competence and the right to make decisions were the wider, the higher the place of the party body in the party-apparatus hierarchy. To be fair, it should be said that the ideologists of the policy of the "dictatorship of the party" at the very beginning of its implementation were more frank than their followers, when they directly wrote that "the

backbone of the Soviet party has turned into statehood", and that "the machine of the proletarian dictatorship cannot be properly studied without a proper understanding of the structure of this apparatus that plays a central "for a state sociologist v role in it. ". They directly stated that who seeks to understand the causal relationships, statics and dynamics of the development of the proletarian dictatorship, the structure and functions of the party apparatus is a topic that they cannot pass by without making it one of the main objects of their study"[224]53.

It is quite natural that such a power, which, according to the Soviet Constitution, did not seem to exist at all, required real conspiracy. Therefore, the mechanism of communication between the highest Party organs and local Party apparatuses had a secret, conspiratorial character. All correspondence was absolutely confidential. The creation of a system of secret office work was the third direction of the party-state reform of 1922-1923. Decisions of the highest party bodies, formalized as "secret" and "strictly secret" documents, began their movement from the Secretariat of the Central Committee down the hierarchical ladder through the channels of the secret infrastructure of power. In the Secretariat of the Central Committee itself, at first it was a secret directive part, which existed since 1920 and whose competence included not only the registration of all secret papers received by the Central Committee, but also the conduct of office work on the implementation of the decisions of the Politburo, the Orgburo and plenums of the Central Committee, communications with the foreign underground parties, as well as all encryption work -

production and distribution of party ciphers, encryption and decryption of telegrams[225]54.

By the Decree of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of September 12, 1921, the secret directive part was allocated to an independent department - the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, in which from that time the secret office work of the highest organs of the party was concentrated and which received all secret information from local party organs. The Bureau of the Secretariat consisted of: 1) assistant secretaries of the Central Committee; 2) Secretariat of the Politburo of the Central Committee; 3) Secretariat of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee; 4) Cipher Bureau; 5) Office of the Bureau of the Secretariat; 6) archive. At the end of 1922, ~~the~~ staff of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee consisted of 68 people[226]55. The most important in it were the assistant secretaries of the Central Committee, and in the "Regulations" on the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Bureau itself was called precisely the first assistant secretaries of the Central Committee, and the rest of the staff was

called its technical apparatus. The Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee was headed by Stalin's first assistant. In 1922, the Central Committee secretaries Stalin, Molotov and Kuibyshev each had four assistants. Stalin soon had five (A.M. Nazaretyan, I.P. Tovstukha, G.I. Kanner, L.Z. Mekhlis, D.I. Graskin). The assistant secretaries of the Central Committee were to receive, open, systematize the material received for the report to the secretaries, monitor the implementation of all resolutions on the reports, control the implementation of the decisions of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat, and also carry out individual instructions from the secretaries of the Central Committee. Specifically, the duties of Stalin's

assistants, for example, were distributed as follows: 1. A.M. Nazarethyan. Supervising the work of assistants and the apparatus of the Bureau of the Secretariat, direct supervision of the technical Secretariat of the Politburo of the Central Committee (preparation of the agenda, materials, control of execution, etc.). General monitoring of the execution of all decisions of the Central Committee, direct supervision of the work of the Cipher Bureau. Conducting especially important

2. I.P. Tovstuha. Deputy of Nazarethyan. Parsing and distribution of mail. Preparation of materials for closed letters of the Central Committee, distribution and monitoring of receipt and return in the field. Processing closed letters from secretaries of provincial committees (regions: Siberia,

Caucasus, outskirts). Issues of nationalities and affairs of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. Viewing the central and local party press. 3.

G.I. Kanner and L.Z. Mehlis. Technical management of the apparatus of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Familiarization, development, summaries and reports on issues of Soviet and trade union work based on the materials of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, SNK, STO, All-Russian Supreme Economic Council, NKPS, NKZ, NKpoda, NKF, Gosbank, Tsentrosoyuz, NKVT, Komvnutorg, obIEKOSO, Gosplan, Kontsesskom, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, H Kyu, Verkhtpiba, NKVD, GPU, CSB, Glavarchiva, NKTruda, NKPiT, NKVoyen, NKZdrav, NKSobesa, NKPros, NKRKI. Constant viewing of the Soviet periodica print.

4. D.I. Graskin. Processing of closed letters from secretaries of provincial committees. Reports of the GPU, MGO, PUR, etc. Processing of materials from the Comintern, Profintern, and Kim. Review of the party and Soviet provincial—

[press\[227\]56](#). From the moment Stalin assumed the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, an unshakable rule was established in the Bureau of the Secretariat: secret mail received by him was opened only by Stalin's first assistant. All cipher correspondence was controlled by the head of the Shifrburo and was also reported to [Stalin's first assistant\[228\]57](#). The used materials were handed over to the archives of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Stalin's

first assistants were consistently carefully selected and tested by him people - A.M. Nazaretyan (headed the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in 1922–1923), I.P. Tovstukh (replaced A.M. Nazaretyan as head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and from 1926 headed the Secret Department of the Central Committee - the successor to the Bureau of the Secretariat), A.N. Poskrebyshchev. The latter headed the Special Sector of the Central Committee, organized in 1934 on the basis of the Secret Department by decision of the 17th Congress of the CPSU (b), and held this position until he was removed in 1952.

One thing is certainly clear that, having established total control over information and protecting himself with loyal people, Stalin thus turned the Secretariat of the Central Committee from a technical body that served the Politburo and the Orgburo into his personal office. The increased status of the Secretariat is visible from many documents that recorded the structural and personnel changes that took place in it. Yes, on

At the meeting of the Politburo on January 28, 1926, the following procedure for the distribution of duties between the secretaries of the Central Committee was approved: "1. To Comrade Stalin to entrust the preparation of questions for the meeting of the Politburo and the general management of the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee as a whole; 2. Comrade Molotov to be entrusted with the preparation of questions and chairmanship of the Orgburo, chairmanship of the conference on work in the countryside under the Central Committee and general leadership of the Press Department, the Information Department and the Eastpart of the Central Committee; 3. Comrade Kosior to entrust the preparation of questions and chairmanship of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the general leadership of the Orgraspred, the Statistical Department, the Administration of Affairs, the Financial Department of the Central Committee and the RLKSM; 4. Comrade Evdokimov will be entrusted with the overall leadership of the Agitprop, the Department of Women Workers of the Central

Committee, the PUR and the chairmanship of the cooperative meeting of the Central Committee"[229]58. In the Bureau of the Secretariat, the Secret Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee[230]59, not only the main issues that were submitted to the meetings of the Politburo and the Orgburo were predetermined (already in February 1923, the plenum of the Central Committee established, as a rule, that a unanimously adopted decision of the Secretariat, which was not protested by any member of the Central Committee within 48 hours from the moment the minutes of the meeting were handed over, was considered the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee[231]60), but all communications with local party bodies passed through this department. This is what that "immense power" of the general secretary meant in practice, which at the end of 1922 Lenin felt on himself and about which he warned the party in his "Letter to the Congress".

The strengthening of the influence of the Stalinist office on political decisions made in the highest bodies of the party was felt by some communists as early as 1923. V.P. Nogin, speaking on behalf of the Audit Commission at the XII Congress of the Party, emphasized that the Bureau of the Secretariat is the most important in the apparatus of the Central Committee. Calling the work of the Secretariat exemplary, he at the same time expressed a fear that turned out to be prophetic: "In its present formulation, the party center will develop in the direction of party bureaucracy, when the most important issues are actually decided by persons not elected by the congress and not responsible to it"[232]61. Characteristic is a letter from Zinoviev to Kamenev from Kislovodsk dated July 30, 1923: "If the party is destined to go through a period (probably very short) of Stalin's united power, so be it. But cover up these disgusting things

I, at least, do not intend to. In all platforms they talk about the "troika", believing that I also have not the last value in it. In fact, there is no troika, but there is Stalin's dictatorship. Ilyich was a thousand times right. Either a serious way out will be found, or a period of struggle is inevitable"[233]62. It was this increased role of the Secretariat of the Central Committee that worried the participants in the well-known "cave" meeting near Kislovodsk. In August

1923, in one of the caves (hence the "cave" meeting), Zinoviev gathered party leaders who were on vacation in Kislovodsk and proposed to them a plan to "politicize" the Secretariat of the Central Committee in order to limit its increased role in the system of higher party bodies. Specifically, it was supposed, as Zinoviev said at the XIV Party Congress, to introduce three members of the Politburo into the Secretariat, "so that it would be something like a small Politburo, since the Secretariat receives such enormous decisive importance, it may be better that it includes two or three members of the Politburo. Among these three they named Stalin, Trotsky, me or Kamenev or Bukharin. This plan was discussed in the "cave", where the late Frunze, Lashevich, Evdokimov, Voroshilov were, where there were a number of comrades of completely different moods, completely different connections, etc. As far as I remember, no decision was made and could not be taken " [234]63. And what do these "oppositionists" do next? Instead of —

removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, they summon him to Kislovodsk as an arbitrator! "After some time," Zinoviev continued in his story, he arrived, and then I don't remember, in the "cave" or in another place, we had several conversations. In the end, it was decided that we would not touch the Secretariat, but in order to link organizational work with political work, we would introduce three members of the Politburo into the Organizing Bureau. Comrade Stalin made this not particularly practical proposal, and we agreed to it. We introduced three members of the Politburo into the Orgburo: Comrade Trotsky, Bukharin and myself. I attended meetings of the Orgburo, I think, once or twice, vols. Bukharin and Trotsky seemed to have never been. Nothing came of it. And this attempt turned out to be useless" [235]64.

By 1925, the authority of the Secretariat of the Central Committee became apparent. The sharply changed position of this party organ and its

The general secretary was evoked by Kamenev's emotional speech at the 14th Congress: "We are against creating the theory of a 'leader', we are against making a 'leader'. We are opposed to the fact that the Secretariat, in fact, uniting both politics and organization, stands above the political body. We are for our elite to be organized inside in such a way that there would be a truly sovereign Politburo, uniting all the politicians of our party, and at the same time, that there would be a Secretariat subordinate to it and technically carrying out its decisions. We cannot consider it normal and we think that it is harmful for the party if such a situation continues when the Secretariat unites both politics and organization and actually precludes politics" [236]65. The response of the congress delegates to such an assessment of the Secretariat was an indignant and long-lasting noise: representatives of a different party were sitting in the hall, not the one that operated during the years of the revolution and the civil war. This new party needed exactly Stalin, and it easily abandoned its former leaders. Her mood and lack of understanding of the emerging political situation was expressed by member of the Central Control Commission S.I. Gusev, far from a newcomer to the party (since 1896): "Now about the "immense" power of the Secretariat and the general secretary. The question is posed in the same abstract way (this is about Lenin's "Letter to the Congress"! I.P.) as it was posed about two years ago, when we first heard these words about "immense" power. Experience must be taken into account. Let's see what experience says about this. Have there been abuses of this power or not? Show at least one fact of abuse of this power. Who cited such a fact of abuse? We, the members of the Central Control Commission, are systematically present at meetings of the Politburo, we observe the work of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and, in particular, the work of the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Have we seen the abuse of this very "immense" power? No, we have not seen such abuses, because if we saw this, Not a single fact about the abuse of "immense" power was given, not a single [fact](#)"[237]66. It is difficult to

say whether Gusev was sincere in making such a statement at the XIV Party Congress, but in any case, this suggests that Stalin already managed to make his power, not

controlled by neither party nor society. By analogy with the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, secret-directive parts were allocated in local party apparatuses, where directive instructions from higher party bodies were received. Immediately after the XII Conference of the RCP(b) on August 30, 1922, the Secretariat of the Central Committee approved the "Instruction on the Procedure for the Storage and Movement of Secret Documents", which obligated all central and local institutions to concentrate secret office work "in secret units specially allocated for this purpose, consisting of one or several persons - exclusively members of the RCP. At the same time, the control and supervision of the procedure and conditions for the execution of the transfer and storage of secret correspondence was assigned to [the OGPU\[238\]67](#). In 1926, in accordance with changes in the system of higher party bodies, the secret-directive parts were transformed into secret departments, and since 1934 into special [sectors\[239\]68](#). The head of the special sector of the regional committee, regional committee and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the national republic was directly subordinate to the head of the Special Sector of the Central Committee and at the same time served as

a secret informant assigned to the local leadership. All this activity, of course, was strictly classified. Absolute, total secrecy, - as noted by the former employee of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.A. Onikov, was the initial principle of the Stalinist construction of the work of the party apparatus. Secrecy in all three dimensions - "top-down" (from the district committee to the entire party mass), "bottom-up" (from the executive party body to a higher-leading one) and "horizontally" (from equal to equal). Such a system of secrecy made it possible to hide ~~man~~ many aspects of the operation of the apparatus even from the "apparatchiks" themselves[240]69. Onikov rightly emphasized that it was a system that, like any other, was an integral combination of elements, each of which was orderly connected with each other. This system was distinguished by hypercentralization, unity of command, rigid command subordination of all links from top to bottom, supported, on the

one hand, by conviction, and on the other, by fear. But Onikov was wrong both in 1990 and in 1996, believing that Stalin carried out his perestroika only at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

embraced not only party apparatuses, but also the entire apparatus of state bodies, beginning with the executive committees of the Soviets. Industrial enterprises were no exception - each board of the trust also had its own secret-directive part.

Whereas before 1917 only a few state documents were classified as secret, in the Soviet period of Russian history conspiracy became the general rule. Until its end, the communist government acted in the strictest secrecy, pursuing its policy in secret not only from the people, but also from its own party. Elements of secret office work existed in the practice of relations between the Central Committee and local party bodies already in the first years of Soviet power, but only after Stalin took office as General Secretary of the Central Committee and a number of targeted measures were taken, all-encompassing secrecy took on the form of a well-functioning system, became the main principle of the existence of communist power. Immediately after the XII Conference of the RCP(b) on August 30, 1922, the Secretariat of the Central Committee approved the "Instruction on the Procedure for the Storage and Movement of Secret Documents", which

obligated all central and local institutions to concentrate secret clerical work "in secret units specially allocated for this purpose, composed exclusively of members RCP". one or more persons

At the same time, the control and supervision of the procedure and conditions for the execution of the transfer and storage of secret correspondence was assigned to [the GPU\[241\]70.](#) —

On November 30, 1922, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee approved the procedure for keeping secret documents. The circle of persons who were sent extracts from the protocols of the highest party bodies - the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, individual orders of the secretaries of the Central Committee and party committees, was determined by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee or secretaries of party committees. These extracts were addressed to them personally. Those guilty of violating this order were brought to the strictest party responsibility. The text of the Decree of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of November 30, 1922 was printed from that time on the reverse side of every document issued from the highest organs of the party, to remind the obligatory execution.

The list of issues, the correspondence on which was declared secret, was very wide and included issues of a military, economic and political nature. The last block was:

1. Correspondence regarding the conclusion of contracts and amendments existing agreements with foreign states.

2. Preparation of contracts and agreements with foreign states. 3. Exchange of arrested persons (hostages). 4. Departure abroad and entry into the USSR (individuals and business travelers) until the moment of their registration. 5. Information and materials on the activities of non-communist parties and organizations and the fight against them. 6. Conflicts and unrest among workers and other strata

population.

7. Correspondence with party organs (Central Committee, Central Control Commission, etc.) directive issues.

8. Illegal work of the Comintern, Profintern and foreign communist parties. 9. Materials and extracts from

resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, Central Control Commission, etc. 10. Correspondence containing references to the resolutions of the

Russian Communist Party (I.P. highlighted by me). 11. Friction with party, professional and SO organizations.

12. Reports, reports, summaries, etc. on the political and economic state of the regions of the republic, information reports of the OGPU.

13. Reports and reports that determine the political state of the communist organizations, conflicts within the organizations of the RCP and RKSM.

14. Non-communist actions of members of communist organizations, abuses of responsible Soviet workers, the results of this (desertion, discrediting the authorities and the Communist Party, etc.). 15. Initiation of an investigation and prosecution of members of the Central Election

Commission, Council of People's Commissars, STO, decisions to terminate them.

16. Correspondence bearing the nature of a preliminary investigation of malfeasance.

17. The work of the Political

Control. 18. Correspondence about former white officers.

General questions: 1. Correspondence about ciphers, cipher correspondence and cipher work. 2. Correspondence on the establishment of a secret

correspondence in the departments of the USSR. 3. Correspondence on the relations of other

departments received as secret. 4. Conclusions on draft resolutions of legislative bodies concerning issues of the State Defense, the State Budget, certain activities of the Military

Veterinary Department, etc. 5. Characteristics of —

responsible employees[242]71. On August 19, 1924, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) approved the "Rules for the Handling of Secret Documents of the Central Committee of the RCP", sent out in the form of a secret circular dated September 5 signed by Stalin to all members of the Central Committee and candidates, members of the Central Control Commission, members of the Central-Audit Commission, national Central Committees, regional committees, provincial committees and regional party committees[243]72. These "Rules" directly stated that "secret (I.P. highlighted by me) documents of the Central Committee are considered to be the minutes of the plenums, the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, as well as all other materials and documents (extracts from resolutions, etc.) coming from the Central Committee with the inscription "Top Secret". The list of persons to whom these documents were sent was established by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The "Rules" emphasized that "a comrade who receives secret documents cannot either transfer or acquaint anyone with them, unless there is a special reservation for this by the

Secretariat of the Central Committee. Copying of these documents and extracts from them is strictly prohibited. Without exception, all the above materials and documents marked "to be returned" were returned to the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in secret packages and within the specified time. For those living in Moscow, such a period was set at two weeks, for those living in the provinces one month, for workers in Central Asia, the

the same period was determined for the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee. In case of failure to return more than three protocols within the established time limits, their further sending was temporarily stopped. Secret materials and documents returned to the Secretariat of the Central Committee were burned every two weeks by a special Commission approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee; appropriate acts were drawn up for the burnt documents. The document in question prescribed, in order to ensure the strictest secrecy, to be guided in the most precise way by these "Rules" and warned that "all cases where secret data go beyond the limits of the Central Committee, and cases of violation of these rules will be subjected to a thorough investigation to bring the perpetrators to the most severe responsibility with transfer of the case to [the Central Control Commission](#)"[244]73. After August 1924, on the back of all —

documents emanating from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, where the "Procedure for using secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)" was printed, the basis was now not only the above-mentioned Orgburo resolution of November 30, 1922, but also the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated August 19, 1924. In subsequent years, these "Rules" were periodically updated, sometimes individual changes were made to them, in particular, the period for returning secret documents was reduced. According to the decision of the Politburo of May 5, 1927, the protocols of the Politburo and the plenums of the Central Committee were to be returned no more than three days from the date of receipt; extracts from the protocols of the Politburo no later than within seven days [245]74. —

To this it must be added that the urgent correspondence of the Secretariat of the Central Committee with local party bodies and vice versa was carried out through the so-called cipher telegrams, which were deciphered by employees of the Cipher Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in Moscow and in the secret directive parts of the party and state bodies in the field.

During the years of the civil war, many instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, mainly on military issues, were transmitted by means of ciphers. Party cipher correspondence (for this purpose the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee was created), which also covered other issues, was put into practice from September 1920 [246]75, but did not immediately take on the form of a system. On March 29, 1921, the head of the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee, M. Chugunov, informed the secretary of the Central Committee, Molotov:

"The establishment of cipher correspondence in the relations between the provincial committees and the Central Committee is now below all criticism and, due to the seriousness of the nature of the correspondence, threatens with very sad consequences. Since the introduction of party cipher correspondence, the cipher has been entrusted only to the secretaries of the provincial committees, but in reality, the latter, due to lack of time and the appropriate apparatus or persons knowledgeable in cipher correspondence, pass it on to random reliable comrades. Summing up his report, Chugunov proposed "to establish a post of technical assistant under the secretary of the provincial committee for conducting secret correspondence"[247]76.

In the same year, on August 2, on the basis of an order by the Administration of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, a special Regulation on the Cipher Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee was approved, which provided for such correspondence: a) with subordinate organizations and individual employees of the RCP, b) with the Central Committee of communist organizations of other countries, c) with the Executive Committee of the Comintern, d) with all departments of the RSFSR and their local bodies that have encrypted communication[248]77.

The system of cipher correspondence was truly debugged in 1923, when not only secret-directive units, but also cipher departments were created in all party and state apparatuses in the field. A special circular of the Central Committee of February 8, 1923 introduced a single "Code" for encrypting telegrams. This step was motivated as follows: "The Central Committee of the RCP, the Central Control Commission and the Central Committee of the RKSM enter into correspondence with the Bureau of the Central Committee, regional committees and provincial committees "Code" in order to reduce telegraph costs and reduce the operation of the telegraph wire, while corresponding with the "Code" the possibility of using telegram texts is also achieved , more complete and exhaustive"[249]78. On March 15, 1923, a cipher-

telegram from the department of the Prosecutor's Office of the People's Commissariat of Justice was sent to all local prosecutors about the strict observance of instructions by the cipher agencies. She deserves to be quoted: "No conversation about the cipher with anyone, without exception, is unacceptable. Those guilty of violating this will be held accountable, up to and including being brought to justice." In addition, all employees who were related to cipher organs were forbidden to visit foreign missions, representative offices, trade consulates and Pomgol organizations, and also to have

acquaintance with the employees of these institutions. In the case of the presence of acquaintances or relatives in foreign missions and representations, the employees of the cipher agencies were obliged to report this to the cipher department. Those who did not comply with this circular or divulged it, in addition to their official duties, were held accountable "to the fullest extent of revolutionary [laws](#)"[250]79. The—

situation changed dramatically - in 1922, for example, such severe sanctions were not yet applied in this regard as in subsequent years. He experienced many unrest at the beginning of July 1922. Em. Yaroslavsky at that time was one of the secretaries of the Sibburo of the Central Committee, when a briefcase was stolen from him, in which were the party cipher "Luch" and a notebook of a member of the Central Committee and the Sibburo. He promised a reward of 100 million rubles. whoever finds the portfolio. The briefcase was found, however, without contents [251]80.

Despite this, Yaroslavsky escaped with a slight fright. Since 1923, each such case was considered at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau or the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). So, on January 29, 1926, the Orgburo put in front of the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Education ~~TT~~ Lunacharsky, Yakovleva and Khodorovsky for negligent storage of secret documents [of the Central Committee](#)[252]81. Much more serious sanctions were applied to people who were directly related to the work of cipher organs. This was initiated by a circular signed by Secretary of the Central Committee Kuibyshev dated March 22, 1923, sent to all secretaries of provincial committees, regional bureaus and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics. The circular sharply suppressed cases of dissemination of information from encrypted documents and qualified them as criminal. Those guilty of violating instructions were immediately ~~suspended~~ from work and brought to the strictest responsibility, up to and including criminal[253]82. And on December 7, 1923, a secret circular ~~signed by~~ [Stalin](#)[254]83 was sent to all senders and recipients of encrypted messages. It contained the following instructions: "In order to maximize the secrecy of ciphers and cipher correspondence, establish a strictly defined circle of persons through whose hands cipher telegrams received and sent through the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee can pass, as well as the

1. All incoming decrypted telegrams are handed over to the addressees only at the direction of the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee or his

deputies. 2. The transmission of cipher telegrams for execution may be allowed under the responsibility of the recipient to persons not lower than secretaries of departments of the Central Committee ... and personally responsible heads of other departments.

3. Persons who have received a cipher telegram against receipt undertake to return it back to the archive of the Cipher Bureau within two weeks upon

execution. 4. Do not make copies of cipher telegrams, but, if needed, get them from the Cipher

Bureau. 5. When referring to the text of cipher telegrams in correspondence, as well as in telephone conversations, do not indicate that the quoted text was received in cipher,

and do not indicate the encryption number. 6. The transfer of encryption to other departments and institutions

(generally to other persons) should be carried out only through the Cipher Bureau. 7. Encryptions, both

received and sent, should be delivered to the Cipher Bureau sealed in an envelope. 8. The answer to the encryption is sent only in the cipher. The answer is

written in one copy and, if reprinted, the drafts must be destroyed. ... Encrypted correspondence should always be stored in secure storage (fireproof cabinets,

etc.), from where it is taken only as needed." Employees of the secret departments could only be members of the RCP (b) or non-party loyal to the Soviet government, for whom at least two responsible party members were vouched for. Questionnaires of persons conducting secret office work, and guarantees for them, were sent to the Special Department of the GPU through

the secret-directive part in a secret manner. Here are examples of documents iss

"Guarantee of the
Comrade _____

(Full Name)

I know well from our joint work (where,
When) _____

_____ on
positions _____
_____ who showed myself How worker
(what) _____ named
Recommend a friend
for secret encryption work in the encryption room
department.
I am member RCP(b) With
19 _____ month
city organizations _____
district _____
Membership card No. _____
Working: Where And V quality
whom _____
Accurate address services And
position _____
_____ apartments _____

Signature:
Handwritten RCP (b) signature member

certify.
Members
cells: _____
_____. "

"Subscription
I,
undersigned _____

former

cipher officer _____, I hereby give a
real undertaking that, leaving the area of cryptographic and secret work, all cipher
systems known to me as a cipher officer, their purpose, meaning, the procedure
for using them in general, as well as all state and military operational secrets
known to me, I undertake keep in the strictest confidence and within one year
after leaving the secret encryption work, I undertake to notify the cipher authorities
_____ and the Special Department of the GPU about my new places
of residence or temporary stay, remembering that otherwise I will be subject to
the strictest responsibility under the laws of revolutionary times, in which and I
give a real subscription. " _____ " _____ 192____ Former

employee _____

Residence _____

Handwritten

signature

t. _____

certify"[255]84. _____

Characteristically, decades later, the former employees of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (survivors) were faithful to the subscription given by them then and kept silent. In a conversation with journalist Yu. Markhashov, A.P. Balashov, in the 1920s. an employee of the Secretariat (I happened to meet in the archives the cover letters signed by him to the documents of the Central Committee, which were sent to local party bodies), did not report a single fundamental fact about the content of the activities of his department. To the question: "Why do you keep some old secrets today, say that the time has not yet come for them. Is it a fear or a habit? Balashov replied: "No, I have no fear today. It's just that once I took on certain obligations and must fulfill them. And all these documents are stored in the archives of the Politburo and,

I think the party itself should publish them. No one authorized me to do this.”[256]85 During the

All-Union census of 1926, employees of the secret departments, fulfilling, in particular, the circular of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of December 3, 1926, did not have to indicate their real positions, and instead of the records “clerk of the secret part”, “cipher clerk”, “head of the secret department”, etc. they should indicate the name of the department, which included the secret-directive part or the cipher department (for example, the Secretariat, the organizational department, etc.) and the position, according to the billing, equal to the actual position occupied[257]86 .

The party apparatus acted like a real underground party in a hostile environment with the same methods and techniques. But here a significant addition is needed: this party of the apparatus had all state funds at its disposal and all state departments were subordinate to it. This is what the policy of "party dictatorship" meant in practice. The OGPU became the secret police of the

party apparatus. As you know, from the very beginning of the creation of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) declared that the bodies of the “VChK were created, exist and work only as direct organs of the party, according to its directives and under its control”[258]87. Since 1923, the OGPU has been working only on the directives of the party organs and controlled the selection of persons conducting secret office work. The secretariat of the Central Committee entrusted the Special Department of the OGPU with instructing party and state bodies on the issues of cipher work[259]88. From now on, all their secret correspondence was to be sent only through the OGPU courier corps. This corps was created in 1921 and at first transported mainly the correspondence of the Cheka[260]89. Its maintenance was very expensive for sending each messenger in 1923, 100 rubles were charged. in gold currency[261]90. This is several times more than the average worker was then receiving per month[262]91, which in itself is indicative of the essence of communist power.

The secret correspondence was divided into several series. Particularly important - the "K" series included orders, correspondence and reports

completely confidential. This applied primarily to the materials of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Correspondence of the "K" series should have been transferred only to the addressee himself, who at the same time was obliged to leave a receipt on the package shell. In the absence of the addressee, they returned back to the field communication unit that sent them. Exceptions were allowed only in relation to the deputies of these persons, their personal secretaries or other persons, if they had a written power of attorney directly from the addressee. It was forbidden to address the correspondence of the "K" series to the institution without indicating the name of the addressee. Envelopes with receipts after delivery to the addressee were handed over for return to the messenger of the OGPU field communications. In no case was the addressee allowed to delay the envelopes for more than a day, not to mention the failure to return them[263]92. Moreover, by Stalin's cipher telegram dated June 21, 1922, it was ordered to return them necessarily stitched, sealed with wax seals

and hand them over directly to the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee against a personal receipt [264]93. The speech of the head of the OGPU courier corps V.N. Zhukov at a meeting of the heads of the field departments of the OGPU on March 17, 1929: "If you have lost 50 or 100 thousand rubles, then this is bad, but if you have lost five packets of the K series, then this is many times worse. For people who lose from 5,000 to 15,000 rubles, the Collegium gives 3-5 years, and for people who lose

two secret packages, they give 10 years, and sometimes capital punishment"[265]94. The letter correspondence of series "A" (urgent - secret) and series "B" (secret, but not urgent) was strictly secret and

secret correspondence of state bodies that used the OGPU field communications. As you can see, the real power in the country has protected itself with an impenetrable veil of secrecy. Few (except those who had a direct relationship with secret documents) guessed the real state of affairs and even more so imagined how and in the name of what real politics is being done and what is a

"power of the people", about which official propaganda constantly repeated. The circle closed already in 1925, when the Special Department of the OGPU, guided by a party directive, sent out a circular to all the people's commissariats and central institutions, and then to the localities, according to which from that time "the sending of their secret publications to the Central Book Chamber was canceled under the department of Political Control of the OGPU organized a central repository for all secret publications. From now on, it was proposed to send to this department a copy of all publications that are top secret, secret and not subject to disclosure"[266]95.

On July 8, 1926, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a special resolution "On the procedure for supplying state book depositories with secret publications", which is also worth quoting:

“Not to be sent to book depositories:
materials relating to encryption and secret office work,
such as: ciphers, codes, etc.;
materials stored on a par with the cipher; separate and
in
collections secret orders, circulars, instructions, regulations
and other guidance materials published by departments;

verbatim secret reports and protocols
congresses, meetings, commissions,
etc.; review of the work and reports of state institutions
in terms of their performance of certain secret [functions](#)”[267]96.

In the late 1920s the country was already living in an environment of pervasive and all-encompassing lies. All the information that was offered to the people was strictly selected and falsified. At the end of 1926, on behalf of the Central Committee, a decree was sent to all party, Soviet and other organizations, prohibiting independent subscription to the White émigré press, from which thinking people could receive at least some truthful information about the state of affairs in their country. Since that time, only summaries of materials from the foreign press, prepared in

Secretariat of [the Central Committee](#)^[268]⁹⁷. And on January 7, 1927, the Secretariat adopted a resolution "On the management of radio broadcasting", approved three days later by the Organizing Bureau of [the Central Committee](#)^[269]⁹⁸. This decree is very significant, since it concerned the daily life of every Soviet person who received information mainly through the radio. The resolution stated:

"To propose to all party committees on whose territory there are radio-telephone stations to take direct control of the operation of these stations, using them to the maximum for propaganda and educational purposes. In order to ensure the political consistency of materials transmitted by radio and the systematic party leadership of the work of the radio station, the party committees must: 1. Select a responsible party comrade as the head of radio broadcasting, responsible for organizing the case and the content of all materials transmitted by radio directly to the corresponding party committee. 2. Establish obligatory and preliminary viewing by party committees of plans and programs for all radio broadcasts.

3. Carefully select speakers and lecturers participating in the radio campaign, ensuring a politically literate and seasoned composition. 4. Take measures to ensure the protection of microphones so that any transmission by radio takes place only with the knowledge and consent of the responsible leader ...".

Only in such an atmosphere of impenetrable secrecy and lies could communist power exist and operate. The core of this power was hidden under several strata. There are at least three of them. The first layer is the outer form of power. In the USSR, the country of classical Stalinism, as in a normal state of law with a civil society, there was a political party and a kind of parliament - the Supreme Council,

there were Soviets at all levels (from the republic to the village), elections were held, congresses of Soviets and party congresses were convened, numerous meetings of party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations were held. But all this was just a sham, creating the illusion of participation in political life among the population, and in the world - the image of a country building socialism. Stalinism, being an ideocratic party-state dictatorship, covered itself with socialism as a religion - everything in the USSR was done for the sake of socialism, in the name of socialism and for the good of the working masses. The disguise of real power under the ideocratic shell of socialism in this way not only gave rise to lies and doublethink in the state policy of the country, but also imbued the way of life of its population

with them. In fact, already in the 1920s. there was no independence in decision-making, not only by the party, but also by any other congresses and conferences. All of them were previously coordinated with the Central Committee of the party [270]99. However, the illusion of the active participation of the working people in the political life of the country by massive propaganda of an ideocratic nature. This propaganda was carried out not only through the mass media, which were under the strict control of the party leadership, but also through the school, the army, the Komsomol, and the university.

The second layer of power is the power of the party-state bureaucracy, which, in its own name, put into practice the directives of the highest party bodies. In this regard, neither the provincial committee nor the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the national republic had any independence. All of them were equally dependent on the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party. Guided by the rule introduced by the November 1922 circular of the Central Committee signed by Molotov and Kaganovich, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the national republic, the regional committee or the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having received a party directive from the Center, similarly acted in relation to lower party committees. Here is one of the typical examples of a later time: on October 2, 1937, a cipher telegram signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Molotov and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Stalin on holding "in each republic, territory, region from 3 to 6 open show trials with the involvement of the peasant masses and wide coverage of the process in the press, sentencing those convicted to capital punishment in connection with sabotage and bacteriological sabotage in animal husbandry, which led to a massive loss of livestock"[271]100. Following this directive, on October 5, 1937, the Bureau of the Zapsibkraikom, having agreed on specific issues with the head of the regional NKVD Directorate G.F. Gorbach and the prosecutor of the West Siberian Territory I.I. Barkov, adopted a corresponding resolution, which was then sent to the local district party committees: "In pursuance of the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of October 2, to accept the proposal of Gorbach and Barkov to hold open trials in Oyashinsky, Iskitimsky, Kuibyshevsky, Kupinsky, Vengerovsky and Chanovsky

districts over the enemies of the people, pests in the development of animal husbandry. Establish a deadline for these trials of 15–20 days..."[272]101. An unshakable procedure for the execution of party directives by state bodies was also established. The party directive - the decision of the higher party committee - entered the secret part of the state body, which occupied a place corresponding in level in the hierarchy to the place of the party committee that transmitted the directive. The head of the secret part introduced it to the head of his department, who, based on the directive received, adopted the corresponding resolution already on his own behalf and then acted as the highest authority in the system of state bodies, lowering his resolution to lower instances. From the mid 1920s. The Politburo not only supervised the work of all central institutions (SNK, STO, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Gosplan, etc.), but also approved their decisions, and forced them "in the Soviet order", i.e. on behalf of the

Soviets to carry out party decisions. This was enshrined in a Politburo resolution of October 15, 1925. [273]102 Not a single official protocol or order of state bodies should contain a reference to a decision of higher party bodies. The party apparatus sought to preserve the anony

political organization. Therefore, all correspondence with party bodies on questions of a directive nature, resolutions and extracts from resolutions of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, as well as correspondence containing indications of directive resolutions of the party, was classified as "secret". These materials should not be carried out according to the journals of incoming and outgoing papers, and they could not be opened by anyone except the head of the institution. They should also be kept in a secret department. Only in those cases when the party bodies turned to Soviet institutions for assistance or to send the necessary information simply as a public organization, did the documentation go through in an official manner. Thus, no traces of the directive activity of the party should have remained in the general office.

This order had to be strictly followed. Those guilty of violating it were brought to party responsibility. Big trouble in 1923 was with the Deputy People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade M.I. Frumkin, who violated this order and handed over a copy of the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee on the monopoly of foreign trade to the commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade of Ukraine with reference to this resolution in a telegram to the trade representatives. The Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee sternly warned Frumkin and once again pointed out to him that "Decrees of the Central Committee are drawn up in the Soviet order (emphasis mine. - I.P.) in the form of legislative acts or orders. Therefore, the questions themselves are often not essentially secret, but, on the contrary, are brought to the attention of broad sections of the population in the Soviet order. The secret is the procedure for passing questions through the party organization, the decisions of which are the directive of the party to one or another member. Therefore, each member of the party, having received a directive from the party organ, puts it into practice in his own name accord

Following the example of party directives, almost all decisions of state bodies that passed through the corresponding secret part were also classified as "secret" or "strictly secret". The shell of secrecy hid the real authors of this or that decision, covered their incompetence, made them uncontrollable and irresponsible.

The party-state controlled the gigantic sphere of the country's economic and social life, had numerous privileges that distinguished it already in the 1920s–1930s. into a special social stratum of Soviet society. At the same time, all of them, as subjects of power, were not free. Suffice it to recall the odious figure of the chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR M.I. Kalinin - "the all-Union headman Kalinich from papier-mâché", as L.M. aptly described him. [Batkin\[275\]104](#). The bureaucracy in the system of Stalinist power was assigned a dual role - the executor of the directives of real power and at the same time its cover. It, as Western Sovietologists S. Cohen and R. Tucker rightly noted, most of all resembled the class of tsarist officials - an officially privileged class that served the state, but did not control it [\[276\]105](#). Unconstitutional, but officially recognized as the supreme power in the USSR were the—

highest bodies of the party apparatus - the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The decisions of the Politburo were recorded in the minutes, extracts from which were then sent to those officials who were supposed to execute these decisions. Resolutions of a higher level of secrecy (this concerned, first of all, issues of international politics, the development of the military industry and the conduct of repressions) did not fit into the minutes of the Politburo meeting at all and went under the heading "special folder". Already in the appendix to the protocol of the Politburo of the Central Committee of February 3-8, 1922, there was a very significant point, which soon began to play a fundamental role in the secret office work of the party apparatus. This paragraph read: "Especially secret proposals and decisions of the Politburo are entered into the minutes in the shortest form, while the decision itself is entered on a special sheet. Necessary messages to interested persons are made on a special sheet under their receipt, and, unconditionally and immediately after reading, are returned to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. All relevant correspondence is conducted only through comrade Molotov (or comrade Smirnov - then head of the Bureau of the Secretariat. - [I.P.](#)) [\[277\]106](#). Since 1923, in the minutes of the Politburo of the Central Committee, instead of a decision, an entry has been—constantly found - "see. special folder. The same system for storing the most secret documents under the heading "special folder"

acted not only in the system of party organs, but also in all state structures and not only in the Center, but also in the field.

A characteristic feature of communist power was that it did not reveal the real motives for making its main decisions. This was done quite deliberately, since the employees of the party and state bodies were guided by the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of April 12, 1923, the essence of which was that "the people's commissariats (NKID, NKVOYEN, GPU, etc.) when introducing especially secret questions to the Politburo must were not to motivate them in writing, but to introduce them by prior agreement (emphasis added by me. - I.P.) with the Secretariat of the [Central Committee](#)"[278]107. In most cases, however, such decisions were made not at meetings of the Politburo, but at private meetings with Stalin, which were not taken down in shorthand and were not recorded. The adopted decisions were transmitted orally, and in some cases they were formalized as decisions of the highest party bodies and carried out on behalf of the Politburo or simply the Central Committee of the party. The very fact of making such decisions can be restored only by the results of subsequent policies.

The actions of this real power, hidden inside the highest party structures, were carefully hidden, but any traces tend to remain. As already noted, for the first time after Lenin's departure from active political life, all the main issues were decided by the "troika" - Zinoviev - Stalin - Kamenev. At the October 1923 plenum of the Central Committee, in his concluding speech, Trotsky assessed the situation as follows: "There is another Politburo in the Politburo and there is another Central Committee in the Central Committee "[279]108.

From August 1924, this group turned into the "seven", which included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy and the chairman of the Central Control Commission, Kuibyshev. Before the official plenum of the Central Committee, the "seven" previously met at a factional plenum, had its own "constitution" - at the request of one member, it met immediately and at the request of one, any issue could be removed from the agenda. Most often, such a person turned out to be Stalin. According to Zinoviev, this "seven played the role of a secret Central Committee for almost two years, discussing all issues of domestic and foreign policy." "Seven" had its own code and pseudonym "leading team". After they went into opposition and were removed

from the cases of Zinoviev and Kamenev, a "nine" appeared, which was made up of Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Dzerzhinsky, Frunze, Tomsy. After Frunze's death, Rudzutak took his place for some time. It was to the "nine" that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya and Sokolnikov addressed before the XIV Party Congress with their "Faction Platform of the Four". In a tense atmosphere at the joint July 1926 plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Zinoviev, shaking a whole folder of documents of the "seven", somewhat lifted the veil over its activities, declaring that "Kuibyshev's resolutions on behalf of the Central Control Commission regarding Lashevich and others are being made in the office Stalin" that "vapourers should be invited in order to "understand" these "cases""[280]109.

The practice of factional resolution of major issues was especially strengthened during the intra-party struggle of the 1920s. Since that time, not only "at the top", but also at the local level, decisions began to be made at fractional meetings. But these were not meetings of the opposition, but of the ruling factional group in the party, which had its numerous followers in the lower party and state structures. An extremely interesting letter from N. Semenov, a party member since 1917, to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission dated July 29, 1927, has been preserved (a copy of the letter was also sent to Zinoviev and Trotsky). Here are the main excerpts from this letter: "In our district there existed a clearly factional center, unknown to the broad masses of the district organization, which in fact (already from 1923) was the governing body of the district. The most important questions before they were raised in the district were put beforehand for discussion by this center. These decisions were carried out by us, the leading group of the Republic of Kazakhstan, through the apparatus of the district committee, despite the fact that this body is not provided for either by the charter of the party, or by decisions of party congresses. The author of the letter reports that things went so far as to work out instructions for behavior at the congress: "... when the list of the honorary presidium is announced, then tt. Stalin, Bukharin, Molotov, Rykov should be applauded properly, and when the names are announced, comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya from applause, they say, we must refrain ... Such meetings, - adds the author of the letter, - were also convened after the Fourteenth Congress. Reliable people were inv

cells, several directors and professionals, then instructors of the RK and heads of departments. The main thing is that the minutes of these meetings were not kept. And there were about 10–12[281]110 of them in

that region from December 1925 to March 1927 . Such conspiratorial power is an essential feature of Stalinism. The USSR provided a classic example of its organization and action. There could be no question of any legality in this case. L. Kaganovich bluntly expressed the credo of Stalinism in his speech at the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law on November 4, 1929: “We reject the concept of a state governed by the rule of law. If a person who claims to be a Marxist speaks seriously about the rule of law, and even more so applies the concept of “lawful state” to the Soviet state, then this means that he is following the lead of bourgeois lawyers, this means that he is moving away from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state »[282]111. Stalin, how accurately his practice was assessed by modern legal historians V.N. Kudryavtsev and A.I. Trusov, “to strengthen one’s own unlimited power, law was required not as a system of norms developed by society and the state in the course of their natural historical development, but, first of all, as a system of decree laws imposed on society by the ruling elite, or simply by the dictator himself.” In the Stalinist period of Russian history, such a peculiar phenomenon as political justice, whose bodies were at the complete disposal of the

country's top leadership, received its final form[283]112.

Hidden not only from the state, but also from its own party, the secret office work on the implementation of real politics in the country determined the non-formalization of this power and the boundlessness of its action. This power was truly immense, but it was impossible to indicate its specific manifestations, the ways of making decisions and the methods of their implementation. Stalin, as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, and other leading figures of the party, whom he from time to time brought closer to him, were known and held high positions in official power structures, but their activity in developing fateful decisions for the country was carried out, as the representatives of the party elite then expressed

party and even more so for society. Behind the scenes of the official activities of the party elite remained the preparations for the creation of the USSR, the real story of the defeat of the opposition of the 1920s, the implementation of forced collectivization and, in the words of N. Valentinov, "drunk Stalinist super-industrialization"[284]113, the— creation of a military industry, the whole "kitchen " The Great Terror, collusion with Hitler, the "wrong side" of the Great Patriotic War, the circumstances of the creation of the "socialist" system and the atomic bomb, and Stalin's death itself are one of the mysteries of Soviet

history. The remarkable Soviet writer Vasily Grossman, who wrote back in the 1950s, clearly understood the essence of the political system under Stalin, wrote: "Stalin's hypocrisy clearly expressed the hypocrisy of his state. And this hypocrisy was mainly expressed in the game of freedom ... The mortified freedom became an adornment of the state, but an adornment not useless. Dead freedom has become the main actor in a gigantic dramatization, in a theatrical performance of unprecedented scope. A state without freedom created a model of parliament, elections, trade unions, a model of society and public life. In a state without freedom, mock-ups of the boards of collective farms, boards of unions of writers and artists, mock-ups of the presidiums of district executive committees and regional executive committees, mock-ups of bureaus and plenums of district committees, regional committees and central committees of national communist parties discussed cases and made decisions that had been made in advance in a completely different place. Even the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party was a the

This theater was in the nature of Stalin. This theater was in the nature of a state without freedom. Therefore, the state needed Stalin, who realized the character of the state through his character.—

3. PARTY - "DRIVE BELT" MASS

The process of transforming the Bolshevik party into an institution of power had two sides: firstly, the creation of a "party of the apparatus" within the party and, secondly, its transformation into a false party, a special "party of the masses", a props party. Outwardly, everything in this false party was the same as in a normal political party. It had its own program and charter, membership dues were collected, open and closed meetings took place, "elections" of the leadership, admission and exclusion. But party members not only did not make any political decisions, but also did not participate in their development, moreover, they did not know what was happening in the apparatus of their party and did not have real information about the state of affairs in the country. The edge of this information was revealed only at the turning points of its history, when closed letters from the Central Committee were read at closed party meetings. The leadership of the CPSU supported the illusion of the existence of a normal multi-million political party in the country just as purposefully as it concealed the nature of its

authorities.

The process of changing the party, turning it into a props party was determined at the same time - in 1922-1923. Until that time, the Bolshevik Party was still a political party. Undoubtedly, it was a special party, a party of a new type, rigidly centralized in a military way. Already in the early years, the opponents of Bolshevism noted the main feature that distinguished the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks and other socialists, this is "purely Leninist intra- and inter-party tactics based on purely military discipline, on the unquestioning, widespread and simultaneous submission of all party members to the orders and instructions of the Central Committee, i.e., [Lenin himself](#)"[286]1.

Particularly insightful people G.V. Plekhanov, R. Luxembourg and others, very early saw in the Bolshevik Party the germ of its subsequent degeneration into a clique of leaders, but perhaps the earliest and most insightful forecast belongs to L. Trotsky. IN

his pamphlet *Our Political Tasks*, written in 1904, in which he sharply criticized Lenin's organizational plans, contained the following very characteristic remark: "The apparatus replaces the party, the Central Committee replaces the apparatus, and, finally, the dictator replaces the Central Committee." True, at the end of his life, citing this quote in his book *"Stalin"*, Trotsky denied the thesis that "Stalinism was completely embedded in the methods of Lenin." In his opinion, Lenin's organizational policy did not represent one straight line. Lenin more than once had to rebuff excessive centralism in the party and appeal to the lower classes against the upper ones. "After all, Trotsky wrote, the party, in the face of the greatest difficulties, grandiose shifts and upheavals, maintained the necessary balance of the elements of democracy and centralism." However, no matter how hard Trotsky tried to convince readers that "the disruption of this balance was not the logical result of Lenin's organizational principles, but the political result of the changed relationship between the party and the class," the premises of Stalinism were laid down precisely in the organizational principles of Lenin's party. As soon as Lenin, who was distinguished by special maneuverability and flexibility in politics, including organizational ones, left the stage, and came to a person who "to the masses, to events, to history, according to Trotsky, there was no other approach than through the apparatus" [287]2, then the rapid degeneration of the Bolshevik Party into an institution of power immediately began. Without a doubt, the root of evil was precisely in the foundations of this party, since everything depended on the will of one person.

Nevertheless, for the first two decades of its existence it was a party of like-minded people. "We are walking along a steep cliff," wrote hands tightly," a centralized Lenin. The specificity of holding party that staked on the working masses and strove to organize its cells everywhere and maintain close ties with them, became a huge advantage in the struggle for power. It is far from accidental that Lenin wrote in his work "What is to be done?": "Give us an organization of revolutionaries, and we will turn Russia over!". Back in 1902, he realized the advantages of just such an organization of the party and the possibility of creating it in Russia to achieve his main goal of taking power. Opponents of Lenin, saying that "the worst thing that could be expected

happened”, nevertheless, they recognized not only the fact of “the catastrophic departure of the masses to Lenin”, but also the fact that “from the technical side, the enterprise (I. P.’s October Revolution) was carried out —

artistically”[288]3. The activity of the party in the period from 1917 to 1922, which indicates that even then violence was the main way of fighting for the assertion of its power, is a special topic. However, it must be remembered that this method, these principles of activity, were then recognized by all the leaders of the Bolshevik Party and the entire mass of the Party. “I can’t imagine,” wrote Trotsky, that in human history one can find another example of such solidarity, such idealistic enthusiasm, such devotion, such disinterestedness, which distinguished the Bolshevik Party and were reflected in its ruling headquarters. There were tensions, conflicts, in a word, everything that is characteristic of people. The members of the Central Committee were people, and nothing human was alien to them. But a special era raised them above themselves. Without idealizing anything and without turning a blind eye to human weaknesses, one can still say that the atmosphere of mountain heights reigned in the Party in those years. —

In Trotsky's words, “violence can play an enormous revolutionary role. The violence of the Bolsheviks against the bourgeoisie, against the Mensheviks, against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, under certain historical conditions, yielded gigantic results,” any member of the Bolshevik Party could sign during the years of revolution and civil war. The tragedy of the old Bolsheviks in 1937 was predetermined at the very beginning of their path, when they chose violence as the main method of their actions, thinking that, having taken power, destroyed the hostile classes and eliminated exploitation, they would thereby create the necessary conditions for a creative movement towards the bright future. This choice led first them, and then the whole country conquered by the

Lenin always believed that the Bolshevik party should be small. No wonder he considered it precisely as “the core of professional revolutionaries.” By the time of the October Revolution, the party had grown significantly from 24 thousand people. in February 1917, to 400 thousand in October, and Lenin was very worried about this, especially since the “flower” of the party died on the fronts of the civil war. In 1919, Lenin considered it sufficient to have a party of 200,000

workers, then united in trade unions, at 4 million, i.e. recommended that this ratio be 1 to 20, no more[290]5. "We don't need — ostentatious party members, even for nothing. The only government party in the world that cares not about increasing the number of members, but about raising their quality, about purging the party of "adhering" people, is our party, the party of the revolutionary working-class .[291]6 Further, in his work "Infantile Disease of "Leftism" in Communism," he continued: "We are afraid of the excessive expansion of the party, because careerists and rogues who deserve only to be shot will inevitably strive to cling to the government party. The last time we opened the doors of the Party wide was only for the workers and peasants in those days (winter 1919) when Yudenich was a few versts from St. Petersburg, and Denikin in Orel (about 350 versts from Moscow), that is, when the Soviet the republic was in desperate, mortal danger even when adventurers, careerists, rogues, and generally unstable people could in no way count on a profitable career (but rather could expect the gallows and torture) from joining the communists. It is difficult to free oneself from emotions, quoting these lines with the words "shoot", "gallows and torture", etc., however, Lenin's vision of the image of the future party is

obvious here. In agreeing to the purge of the party in 1921, the overwhelming majority of its members sincerely believed that in this way it would be possible to get rid of the careerists, and did not expect that the purges would very soon become the main means of liberation from the most thinking members of the party. After the purge in 1921, the membership of the party decreased from 650,000 to 490,000 people, that is, by 24%. Lenin insisted on fixing the results of the purge with stricter reception conditions. And here we should pay special attention to Lenin's position on the question of the size of the party and its composition. This is a fundamental position, according to which there was a discrepancy between him and the new leadership of the party. Lenin's position is detailed and detailed in A. Zimin's book *The Origins of Stalinism*. Let us highlight the most

important points in this issue, based on the results of his research. After the purge of the party in 1921, Lenin paid special attention to n

the issue was discussed at the 11th Congress of the RCP(b), and Lenin was uncompromising in it. He agreed to accept as a basis the initial draft of the theses prepared for the congress by Zinoviev, but suggested that stricter requirements be set for transfers from candidates to party members. "It should, in my opinion, require three years of service for workers, four years for peasants and Red Army soldiers, and five years for the rest." Zimin noted that this addition was written on March 9, 1922, and was first published only in

1964. Having familiarized himself with the revised draft approved by the Politburo (at the meeting of which he was not present), Lenin in a special letter asked to transfer the question of the candidate's candidate to the plenum of the Central Committee seniority for future party members: "I consider it extremely important to lengthen the seniority for the admission of new members to the party. Zinoviev's length of service is defined as 1.5 years for workers and a year for the rest. I propose to leave half a year only for those workers who have actually been working in large industrial enterprises for at least 10 years. For the rest of the workers, assign 1.5; Designate 2 years for peasants and Red Army soldiers and 3 years for everyone else. A special

exemption is allowed with the joint permission of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. I consider it extremely dangerous to leave the short terms proposed by Zinoviev unchanged. Undoubtedly, among us people are constantly considered workers who have not gone through the slightest serious school, in the sense of large-scale industry. Quite often, the real petty bourgeois, who accidentally and for the shortest period of time turned into workers, fall into the category of workers. The ostensibly proletarian character of our Party does not, in fact, in the least guarantee it against a possible predominance, and, moreover, in the shortest possible time, of the small-owner elements. Short terms of service will in fact mean the complete absence of any serious test as to whether the candidates are really, in any way, tried and tested Communists. If we have 300,000-400,000 members in the Party, then even this number is excessive, because absolutely all the data point to the insufficiently trained level of the present Party members. Therefore, I strongly insist on the need to

develop and strictly apply rules that would really make the experience a serious test, and not an empty formality.

I think this question should be discussed especially carefully at [the congress](#).—

However, the plenum of the Central Committee did not heed Lenin's warnings, and then he addressed all the members of the Central Committee with a second letter: "Having read the decision of the plenum of 25.III. on the question of the period of candidate experience for new members to join the party, I would like to challenge this decision at the congress. But, fearing that I will not be able to speak at the congress, I ask you to read my following considerations.

There is no doubt that our party is now insufficiently proletarian in the majority of its composition. Since the war, factory workers in Russia have become much less proletarian in composition than before, because during the war those who wanted to evade military service entered the factories. Further, it must be taken into account that the temptation to join the government party is currently gigantic. Half a year's work experience for workers is by no means able to stop this pressure (of petty-bourgeois elements and directly hostile to everything proletarian), for there is nothing easier than to artificially adjust such a short work experience, all the more so since for quite a few intellectual and semi-intellectual elements, admission to the workers' present no difficulties in our conditions. From all this, I conclude that we must significantly increase the period of candidate experience, and if we leave 6 months for workers, then it is absolutely necessary, in order not to deceive ourselves and others, to define the concept of "worker" in such a way that only those who, in fact, according to their life position, should have mastered the proletarian psychology. Therefore, it is necessary to facilitate the liberation of the Party from those of its members who are not at all Communists, who are pursuing a completely consciously proletarian policy. I do not propose a new general purge of the party, because I think that this is now practically impossible, but it is necessary to find some means of actually purge the party, i.e., to reduce its membership. According to Zimin, Lenin attached such serious importance to his letter of appeal that he added to it: "If

perhaps I would ask the members of the Central Committee reading this appeal to answer me at least with a short telephone message addressed to one of the secretaries of the Council of People's Commissars. Until now, not a single response of the members of the Central Committee to Lenin's appeal has been published, it is not known whether it was brought to their attention at all. It is only known that the 11th Congress approved the resolution proposed by the commission, which basically abandoned the plan of the Central Committee, which Lenin challenged^[295]¹⁰. The resolution of the congress "On the Strengthening and New Tasks of the Party" established for all workers without distinction (and not only for those who had worked in industry for at least 10 years), as well as for Red Army soldiers from ~~workers~~ and peasants, a six-month candidate period^[296]¹¹. Zimin corrects. Today's historian cannot doubt that here we have one of those events (precisely events!), which very soon turned out to be decisive for the emergence of the possibility of the Stalinist deformation of the proletarian party under the guise of its proletarianization. The process of massive expansion of the party began shortly after Lenin's death. In—

Soviet historical literature, he was inextricably linked with the so-called Leninist appeal. "The unity of the working people with the party, their desire to continue the work of Lenin, wrote the authors of the multi-volume History of the CPSU, found real expression in the mass desire of advanced workers and peasants to join the RCP (b)." And the Central Committee of the party only "approved and supported the mass striving of the workers to join the ranks of the Leninist party. To give it an organized character, the plenum of the Central Committee, held on January 29 and 31, 1924, announced Lenin's call to the party. The plenum also emphasized that the attraction of advanced workers to the party was also observed in the previous period, on the basis of which the XIII Party Conference set the task of drawing at least 100 thousand industrial workers into the RCP (b) "^[298] 13. However, nowhere was it said that this Leninist call was part of the policy of the "dictatorship of the party", a policy that had been prepared long before the Thirteenth Conference, nor that it was in direct conflict with Lenin's ideas about the proletarian party. Summing up the results of Lenin's appeal at the XIII Congress of the RCP(b), Molotov admitted that "in recent times, organizational issues have acquired exceptional importance"^[299]¹⁴. And in response to the statement

Trotsky that no one foresaw what happened during the Leninist draft, stated bluntly that "we were preparing very seriously for this" and that the slogan of the Leninist draft "came out of the leading bodies of the party"[300]15. The

question of the broad involvement of workers in the party came up sharply in the autumn of 1923 in connection with the opposition that arose to the then leadership of the party. "The party, it was said in the report of the Central Committee for September-October 1923, is now faced with the task of attracting into its organizations a new layer of proletarians, which already now surrounds our cells in factories and factories with a sympathetic ring. We have such resolutions from some organizations in the industrial provinces (Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhny Novgorod), where a broad campaign is being carried out to attract workers to the Party, where this campaign is already reaching thousands of workers. The Party can only welcome the initiative of these organizations, and now we are faced with the task of expanding this work on an all-Party scale. At the same time, a circular of the Central Committee signed by Molotov "On the study of the issue of admission and exclusion of workers employed in production" was sent to the localities. To begin with, 26 party organizations were requested[302]17. On December 13, 1923, at the suggestion of Stalin, the Politburo approved the decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of December 10 on admission to the party without undergoing candidate e

And one more interesting fact. On January 19, 1924, the Organizational Department of the Central Committee requested that the delegates of the XI All-Russian Congress of Soviets be brought to the attention of the announcement that on January 21, 1924, at 2 pm, a meeting of representatives of industrial regions on the issues of involving workers in the party from the machine tool and the approximation of cells to the production activities of enterprises[304]19. On the same day at 18.50 Lenin dies and the Leninist call is announced. Inevitably, the thought arises that such a coincidence is not accidental. Was it all a carefully planned action?

The policy of a massive increase in the membership of the Communists imitated the democratization of the party and looked like a convincing response to the opposition's accusations of clamping down on internal party democracy and the bureaucratic degeneration of the party. Relying on the mass entry of workers into the Party, its leadership could now

talk as much as you like demagogically about inner-party democracy, hiding their real political goals. "The talk in the speeches of the opposition about democracy," Stalin ranted at the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(b), is empty chatter, but when the working class sends 200,000 new members to the party, this is real democracy. Our Party has become the elected organ of the working class. Point me to another such party. You will not indicate it, because it is not yet in nature. But it's strange, our oppositionists don't like even such a powerful party. Where will they find the best match on earth? I'm afraid that in search of a better one they won't have to migrate to [Mars](#)"[305]20. Lenin's warning about the danger of declassed elements joining the party was rejected by the new leadership of the party, rejected by Zinoviev's

simple demagogic statement that "the process of declassing and dispersing the working class has undoubtedly ceased. The qualitative composition of the proletariat has improved. His cultural level has grown. The revolution raised the working masses culturally to unprecedented heights. Zinoviev talked a lot about this in his significant article "New Tasks of the Party", published in Pravda on November 7, 1923. The actual situation in the party organizations differed sharply from the lengthy speeches of G. Zinoviev. According to the results of the 1922 party census, 75.1% of communists had a lower education and only 0.6% [had a higher education](#)[306]21. The Petrograd organization, which was considered the most

advanced detachment of the working class, in fact occupied one of the first places among the Party organizations of large industrial centers in terms of negative phenomena. Drunkenness, as stated in the secret review of the GPU, "continued systematically throughout 1922, in the current year it has been continuously developing up to the present, both in the city and in the districts. Not only single individuals were drinking, but also entire collectives of factory enterprises"[307]22. Naturally, the situation in the provincial party organizations was even worse. Here, for example, is a description of the Novonikolaev organization, and this is an official description that hid the dark sides of life. Nevertheless: "Our organization is overwhelmingly peasant, having no experience

only underground work, but also the revolutionary period. The members of the party, most of whom joined in 1920, have not yet been able to acquire sufficient political knowledge, due to which they sometimes turn out to be unstable, are subjected to petty-bourgeois influence (drunkenness, economic growth), become passive and are not interested in party work "[308]23.

Lenin's call, "coming out of the leading bodies of the party", had from the very beginning purely political goals. "This will be, said Zinoviev, a small salvific "revolution" in the party in the best sense of the word, a good "October" Bolshevik revolution, when instead of 50 thousand workers from the machine tool we will have 150 thousand and when a certain part of the non-proletarian elements who turned out to be bad communists, we will ask you to clear our

ranks"[309]24. And the goals were quite definite: under the slogan of the unity of the party, that is, with the tacit approval of the ruling factional group, the fight against any manifestations of dissent and the implementation of its own group policy. Moreover, using the resolution of the Tenth Congress "On the Unity of the Party", this group itself accused anyone who dared to have an opinion of factionalism. "The apparatus suppresses all thought under the guise of factionalism," said opposition representative T. Saprionov at a meeting in December 1923. [310]25—into the trap that they themselves so actively arranged for Trotsky in 1923-1924.

Already in 1923, when there was a rapid process of separation of party committees and the practice of making decisions only by the top leadership of the party entered the system, the rank and file mass of party members was cut off from information about the state of affairs in the party and the country, a "yawning hole was formed in the inner-party area, as Yevg wrote. Preobrazhensky[311]26. information, cut off from information or knowing only one side of the matter, most easily become the object of manipulation. The discussion that unfolded in the autumn of 1923 vividly demonstrated this fact. It was incomprehensible to ordinary communists and showed their complete ignorance of what was happening in the echelon of the top party leadership. The party did not know either Trotsky's letters or the "Statement of

which gave impetus to the discussion. In addition, in the course of it it turned out that the Pravda newspaper gave one-sided information, as evidenced by the conflict that occurred in the editorial office at the end of December 1923, when two employees of the Party Life department refused to follow the instructions of Stalin's secretary A.M. Nazarene.

They "worked" a lot, orienting local party committees, members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission: Yaroslavsky in the Tver province, Kirov and Ordzhonikidze in Transcaucasia, Skrypnik in Chernigov, Sokolnikov in Yaroslavl, Solts in the Vyatka provinces, Mikoyan at the plenum of the South-Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee, Uglanov in Nizhny Novgorod, Voroshilov in the North Caucasus, etc. The provincial committees, in turn, "sharply and definitely" expressed their point of view on the discussion in letters to lower party committees. As a result, opposition sentiments in the localities turned out to be insignificant and were lost in the general noise of approval of the Central Committee line. There were rumors about Zinoviev's order to release the necessary funds from the special fund of the Politburo to factory and factory cells for propaganda and support of the position of the Central Committee during the party discussion[312]27. In addition, the secretaries of local provincial and regional committees, by a special directive of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, undertook to elect as delegates to the XIII Party Conference only those who held paid positions of responsibility in provincial and regional organizations and fully supported the policy of the Central Committee. Only those communists could be delegated from factory and factory cells, for whom the secretaries of the cells assumed responsibility. The same candidature from the Red Army had to be coordinated at joint meetings of political instructors and political committees with secretaries of provincial committees and regional committees. Before leaving for the conference, the delegates received additional instructions on how to behave at the conference[313]28. As a result, the Secretariat of the Central Committee managed to ensure that there was not a single representative of the opposition as a delegate with a decisive vote, and the factional group in the XIII party the highest bodies of the party was able to hold all conference, not only condemned their decisions, the opposition as a manifestation of a petty-bourgeois deviation in the party, but also, as already mentioned, decided to publish the seventh paragraph of the resolution of the

The nomenklatura delegates listened to Stalin's words that "some comrades fetishize, absolutize the question of democracy, thinking that democracy is always and under all conditions possible, that there will obviously be no full democracy"[314]29 . But outside the hall where

the conference was held, the situation was less calm - after the news of the decisions that rejected the opposition's amendments, emergency meetings were held in a number of cells of the capital's military units of the OGPU and some factories and factories. Their participants refused to accept as binding on themselves the resolutions of the conference on workers' democracy. The speakers demanded the convening of another conference, the delegates of which would be selected by the organizations not "according to the circulars of Stalin and Zinoviev", but elected by secret ballot. Harsh resolutions were also adopted in three regiments of the Moscow garrison and in one special-purpose detachment of the OGPU troops. They talked about the monopolization of the power of the Politburo, headed by persons who had long lost all confidence of the working masses and ordinary party members. Workers' meetings, at which the defenders of workers' democracy spoke, were also held on the day of Lenin's death.

January 21. And at night the first arrests were made, which continued in the following days[315]30. At the same time, the Politburo decides to intensify terror against opposition sympathizers and to purge party organizations[316]31. At the same time, a circular of the Central Committee was sent to the localities, according to which all discussions in grass-roots party organizations were allowed henceforth only with the —

permission of the party committee, it was made responsible to the provincial committee for the nature of the discussion and the resolutions adopted[317]32. So the atmosphere in which the top leadership of the party decided to carry out the Lenin appeal was far from euphoric. The ruling factional group strove to protect itself above all from oppositional actions. Workers, - wrote St. Ivanovich in 1924, "drawn into the bosom of the RCP by seductive benefits, in any case,

become members of the ruling class, even if they get the miserable scraps from the commissar's table"[318]33.

At the same time, the involvement of workers in the party pursued another goal - the creation of a covert agency of the OGPU among the working masses. It is no coincidence that at the same time information began to spread about the secret decision of the Politburo to pour into their ranks new detachments of secret agents, who were instructed not to stop at any means of provocation and deception in order to split the labor movement[319]34. Most likely, it was in this way that the news of the mass admission to the party was perceived in wide circles. At the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Central Control Commission S.I. Gusev expressed the widespread opinion: "Lenin once taught us that every member of the party should be an agent of the Cheka, that is, watch and inform. I do not propose to introduce a Cheka in our party. We have the Central Control Commission, we have the Central Committee, but I think that every member of the Party should inform. If we suffer from something, it is not from denunciation, but from non-information"[320]35.

A three-month period from February 15 to May 15 was set for the Leninist draft, and for remote regions of the country, some national republics and regions it was extended until October 1, 1924. machine. "The admission of intellectuals and employees to our party (i.e., the most thinking people I.P.), said Molotov, of course, will be limited to a very small number, mainly those of them who have gone through the Komsomol school and who already have a fairly good political training in order to enter our party organizations"[321]36. In the "Instructions for the admission of workers from the machine to the party", signed by Molotov and published in Pravda on February 12, 1924, it was emphasized that "particular attention of the party committees is drawn to ensuring that this instruction is observed with accuracy." Moreover, party committees were recommended to consider the applications of applicants without the usual recommendations, provided that the applicant was recommended by the general meeting of the workers of the enterprise and accepted at an open meeting of the cell. At the same time, special attention was paid to the involvement of Komsomol workers in the ranks of the party. The following is a very significant remark -

"A certain production experience should not be set." This was a direct violation of both the previous conditions of admission and the requirement of Lenin, who insisted on six months of candidate experience only for workers who had worked at large industrial enterprises for at least 10 years. Thus, Lenin's call deliberately opened the "doors" to the party for the lumpen proletariat. Simultaneously with the mass entry into the party of workers

from the machine, the process of cleaning the party organizations of communists who supported the opposition or actively sympathized with it began. Kuibyshev at the 13th Congress of the RCP(b) openly admitted: "We found it necessary precisely at this moment, when we are accepting a mass of proletarians into our midst, to purge the party of adhering elements, primarily in the Moscow, Leningrad, Penza and Odessa organizations"[322]37, i.e., where opposition sentiment was strongest. It is significant that the overwhelming majority of the members of the commissions involved in the purge were proletarians and almost half were workers from the machine [323]38. This was the first test of their fitness as thoughtless performers.

According to information received from Moscow, Petrograd and other large cities, before February 1, 1924, at the direction of the OGPU and party committees, 276 party members who supported the opposition were dismissed from government service. By the order of the People's Commissariat for Education, by February 5, all university committees were to provide lists of those who voted "for" when passing resolutions that did not support the Central Committee during the discussion, in order to deprive them of government scholarships[324]39. The general check of students for political reliability, organized by the directive of the Central Committee, was to be completed by June 1924. [325]40

On the night of January 23, 1924, numerous arrests took place in Moscow among Soviet employees, young students, unemployed workers, and former members of the RCP (b). Among those arrested were communists - supporters of workers' democracy, who switched to active speeches and developed agitation in the Red Army units[326]41. Until March 4, there were

262 workers were sent, of which 42 were communists who participated in the opposition, and from March 1 to March 8, 2,035 people were dismissed from government institutions in Moscow, 29% of them were former opposition

communists[327]42. Admission to the party was basically over by the XIII Congress of the RCP(b) (May 23-31, 1924). During this time, more than 350 thousand applications were submitted; 241.6 thousand workers became communists. As a result, the number of party cells at enterprises increased by 2.5-3.5 times, which led to the organization of a new structure in the hierarchy of party committees of shop collectives, which were combined into a plant-wide or factory-wide cell headed by a party bureau. In many enterprises, the "Leninists" outnumbered the former Communists by 2-3 times. And although, as noted in the materials of the Information Department of the Central Committee, "Leninists poorly grasped the essence of the latest discussion in the party, at general meetings of the cells they were more active than the old members of the party"[328]43. By the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of March 31, 1924, all of them were granted the right to a decisive vote in the selection of delegates to the congress, which was another direct violation of the party charter in force. But the political goals of the then leadership of the party - for the time being the "troika" of Zinoviev - Stalin Kamenev were achieved. The speeches of the leaders of the opposition - Trotsky and Preobrazhensky - were drowned in the general chorus of voices supporting the ruling factional group. No one wanted to listen to B. Souvarine's report that during the discussion "a lot of slander and lies were spread, directed against the opposition in the RCP and especially against Trotsky"[329]44. The congress fully approved the resolutions on party building and on the results of the discussion adopted by the 13th All-Union Party Conference. But the main thing is that he ignored Lenin's "Letter to the Congress", which was read out "to the delegations" and was not discussed at general meetings. It did not take much effort for Kamenev and Zinoviev to convince such a congress of the need to keep Stalin in the post of General Secretary. At the same time, the ruling group tirelessly swore allegiance to Leninism and the new "creed" of party

Speaking at a general meeting of the bureau of party organizations in Leningrad, Zinoviev, choking with delight, shared his impressions of the congress. "The congress gave the impression that the foremost workers of the working class formed up in an impenetrable square around the Central Committee. It was the Bolshevik wall. It was a calm iron unity, such an absolute determination, which has not been seen at our congresses for a long time. It was such solidarity that you can't pierce anywhere with a needle." And then Zinoviev revealed his cards: "The opposition demanded that we consider the resolutions of the XIII All-Union Party Conference, where it was characterized as a petty-bourgeois deviation. We demanded confirmation of the decision of the conference on behalf of the Central Committee. The congress fully and completely confirmed the decision of the XIII All-Union Party Conference. A question of tremendous importance was being decided: whether we should be a patchwork party of liquefied Bolshevism or a monolithic party of genuine Leninist Bolshevism. The question of whether the party will be patchwork or monolithic is decided irrevocably. Whoever tries to bring our Party back to the discussion, whoever tries to prove the democracy of his factions, the Party will already

ridicule." [330]45 Literally a year later, Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves made such an attempt at the Fourteenth Congress, and the delegates to the congress, representatives of the new party they had created, did not let them speak and ridiculed them in a boorish way. Indeed, in the words of Trotsky, "it is difficult to imagine a more merciless irony of fate"

An objective description of the Leninist appeal was then given by St. Ivanovich: "Tens of thousands of people who are dissatisfied with the autocracy of the Politburo, the top of the RCP and demanded during the discussion the winter of 1923, the so-called. "intra-Party democracy", that is, the division of power with the dissatisfied. They are thrown out of the RCP and deprived of profitable places, and at the same time crowds of mob are recruited into the party so that the communist court has someone to rely on in the struggle against the communist nobility. This newly recruited public voted as if on command for the delegates proposed from above and failed with their votes the representatives of the noble opposition objectionable to the court. The Lenin recruitment has already rendered the first service to the communist leadership" [332]47.

The subsequent calls to the party in 1925 and October 1927 finally dissolved in its composition the very party (or rather, its part left after the civil war), which made the revolution and remembered the first party congresses. According to Zinoviev, by the end of 1925, out of more than 1 million party members with experience up to 1905, less than 2,000 people remained, of which half were semi-disabled, out of action. Until 1917, there were only 8,500 [\[333\]48 members of the party](#). The new party, more than half illiterate, lumpenized, could not imagine any other organization, it knew only about its one right and duty to fulfill what descended from above and strengthen "iron unity". This party, of course, did not know what was really going on in the echelon of the top party leadership. However, the new party members believed in the infallibility of the ruling group in the party, in the power of the apparatus, and coped well with the role of klack, gagging the former leaders of the revolution - "stop pulling the rigmarole", "don't talk your teeth", etc. etc. Especially this transformation is strikingly visible when you read about how the same Trotsky was greeted only two years ago: "The huge corps of rotation, it seemed, was not able to accommodate everyone who wanted to see and hear their beloved leader. Cars, windows, stairs were all filled with workers, who gathered up to two thousand people. Adult workers and workers,

youth and children all merged into one huge living mass. Some workers came with children in their arms, having abandoned their household chores"[\[334\]49](#). The

new members of the party did not understand the policy of their leadership and did not know about the real state of affairs in the country. The documents through which the policy was made, secret circulars, closed letters and encrypted telegrams sent by the Secretariat of the Central Committee to the secretaries of local party committees, remained unknown to the broad masses of the party. This was a conscious policy of the party leadership. "To bring the question to the discussion of 20,000 cells means to take the question out into the street," Stalin blurted out at the Twelfth

Congress [of the RCP\(b\)\[335\]50](#). The higher the place of a communist in the party hierarchy, the more information about the state of affairs in the country he had. All the information was available only to those who were at the ve

Even Evg. Preobrazhensky, one of the leaders of the opposition in 1923 and by no means the last person in the party, only heard about some kind of "treika"[336]51. What can be said then about the ordinary mass of communists, who really knew only what they were allowed to know! As a result, among the members of the party, as he wrote during a developed to consider one of the ~~discussions~~ ~~discussions~~, in 1923, "a habit has timely and reasonable only offered "from above"»[337]52. —

Moreover, the secretaries of local party committees were concerned about any knowledge of the rank and file or judgment about the state of affairs in the party leadership. This anxiety is well felt in some letters from local secretaries to higher party organs. For example, in a letter from the secretary of the Tomsk Provincial Committee of the RCP(b) Stroganov to the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee dated February 6, 1923, we read: "I received at the same time No. 16 of Pravda and a letter from the Central Committee regarding Lenin's article "How can we reorganize the Rabkrin". A general attitude has not been revealed, the more active public has two opinions: some believe that there is something in the Central Committee that forced Ilyich to write an article, others are inclined to attribute it as a result of Ilyich's general state of health. But apparently, the broad party masses have not yet [attached special significance to the article](#)"[338]53. And here is a characteristic remark by the Secretary of the Sibburo of the Central Committee S. Kosior in a letter dated December 19, 1923, sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee: »[339]54. After Lenin's death, an intensified

education of the party masses "in the spirit of Leninism" began, its purposeful orientation to support only the general line of the party, or rather, the ruling factional group, which sanctified itself in the name of Lenin. Although in the 1920s the works of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and other members of the opposition were still published, the attitude towards them was obviously biased, and Stalin's book On the Foundations of Leninism was offered as the best manual on Leninism. In June 1924, a special Commission of the Central

Committee for the education of the Leninist draft was created, headed by L. Kaganovich. For young communists, short-term schools of political literacy were opened with a six-week course of study according to reduced programs. All Party organizations regularly held talks about

Lenin, the charter and program of the party. Huge editions were issued "Lenin's libraries". In 1924, the first edition of Lenin's works was basically completed, and preparations began for the second and third. By August of this year, according to statistics, 70% of the communists of the Leninist draft had received initial political training.

What were the results? Here is a description from the report of the Novonikolaev Provincial Committee for the period from October 1924 to March 1925 (the report was prepared as material for the report of the secretary of the provincial committee N. Filatov at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee): "A typical phenomenon for all cells (urban) - party members mechanically memorize theoretical questions, not knowing how to link them with current party life. Some comrades, even among those assigned to the 2nd and 3rd groups, have perfectly memorized the facts and chronological dates from the history of the party, know the basic principles of political economy, but show complete helplessness in matters of current party and political life. Even the biography of Lenin, which has been studied for a year now in circles, at cell meetings, in special reports, is not known. Many of these comrades have been in circles for many years, some of them graduated from Soviet party schools. Similar phenomena are noted among qualified party members who graduated from

[universities](#)"[340]55. in the political life of the 1920s. It was not easy to figure it out even for a trained person and almost impossible for a semi-literate mass of party members, who were pressed by the pressure of ideological propaganda. As a result, their consciousness was so distorted that even many years after Stalin's death, many of the survivors were not able to appreciate the situation in which they then found themselves. Some still believe in the flourishing of democracy under Stalin.

The new lumpenized party became the very "trap" into which the opposition fell. She realized too late the irreversible changes that had taken place in the party. The moment was lost precisely in 1923, when the opposition made one mistake after another, when its indecisiveness, and in many respects its lack of understanding of the political situation that was taking shape, strengthened the power of the ruling factional group. "Only after taking your lawsuit with the "apparatchiks" outside the party," wrote a former member of the Central Committee

the Menshevik Party of F. Dan, only by posing the political problem in its entirety and expanding the question of "inner-party democracy" to the dimensions of the question of state democracy, could the "opposition" with certain chances of victory become a concentration of democratic forces interested in preventing the inevitable Bonapartist outcome elimination of the party dictatorship. And not only without succumbing to intimidation and boldly turning away from specific "Leninism" to the path of revolutionary, class social democracy, the proletarian wing of the "opposition" could become one of the crystallization centers of the resurgent labor movement. It could... but it didn't. Nevertheless,

the assessments of the situation in the party given by the opposition deserve the closest attention. Let's take a look at some of them. "Neither physically nor morally, either the working class or the party," wrote H.G. Rakovsky, do not represent what they were about ten years ago. I think I am not exaggerating too much if I say that a party member of 1917 would hardly recognize himself in the person of a party member of 1928. "A party divided into cells, which are forbidden to communicate with each other, which are forbidden to get acquainted with the main documents of party policy, which are forbidden to listen to the opinion of even a member of the Central Committee, ceases to be a living organism capable of developing a party opinion and unanimously implementing the decisions taken by the party, it becomes an organization people who are obliged to fulfill, under threat of exclusion, the will of the party bureaucracy, it becomes an organism incapable of acting arbitrarily in case of danger" (from a collective

document prepared in October 1927)[343]58 . By the end of the 1920s. even the rigidly centralized party of the Leninist period seemed to the communists, who still remembered "those" times, an unattainable ideal. "In recent years, it was said in the draft platform of the Bolshevik-Leninists (opposition) for the XV Congress of the CPSU (b), there has been a systematic destruction of inner-party democracy, contrary to the entire past of the Bolshevik Party, contrary to the direct decisions of a number of party congresses. Genuine electivity is actually dying out. The organizational

the charter is systematically changed in the direction of increasing the scope of the rights of the tops and reducing the rights of the lower cells. The term of office of regional committees, district committees, provincial committees, and the Central Committee is increased to one year, to three years or more. The tops of provincial committees, provincial executive committees, provincial trade union councils, etc., are virtually irremovable (for three, five years or more). The right of every Party member, of every group of Party members "to bring fundamental differences to the judgment of the entire Party" (Lenin) has been effectively abolished. Congresses and conferences are convened without preliminary (as was the case under Lenin) free discussion of issues by the entire party, and the demand for such a discussion is regarded as a violation of party discipline. Lenin's words that the Bolshevik "headquarters" should "rely" really on the good and conscious will of the army, following the headquarters and at the same time directing its headquarters, have been completely forgotten.

In this regard, the remark of the old Bolshevik A.G. Shlyapnikov about the inner-party struggle under Lenin and after Lenin: "Our inner-party ideological struggle in 1920-1922. differs from the current depth of content and instructiveness. The lessons of that time were not in vain either for the Party or for us. But now is not the time: 1926 is not 1921, and according to the disagreements of our time, we are deeply convinced that we would be together with V.I. Lenin against the leaders of the present majority of the Central Committee, as they were with him in the very first days of the February Revolution against the leaders of the present majority of the [Central Committee](#)." "It is becoming increasingly clear," Trotsky wrote in September 1926 in his article "On the Unity of the Party," that it is becoming clear to the whole party that until recently it was clear only to initiated circles, namely, that the goal of all these discussions and organizational conclusions is the complete destruction of that core, which until recently was called the old Leninist guard, and its replacement by the sole leadership of Stalin, relying on a group of comrades who always agree with him. The unity in the management of the party, which Stalin and his narrow group call "the unity of the party", requires not only the defeat, elimination and cutting off of the current united opposition, but also the gradual removal from the leadership of the more authoritative and influential representatives of the now ruling faction. It is absolutely clear that neither Tomsy, nor Rykov, nor Bukharin in their past, in their authority, etc. Not

may or may not be able to play under Stalin the role that Uglanov, Kaganovich, Petrovsky and others play under him. Cutting off the present opposition would mean the inevitable actual transformation into opposition of the remnants of the old group in the Central Committee. A new discussion would be next in line, in which Kaganovich would denounce Rykov, Uglanov Tomsy, and the — Slepkovs, Stans and Co. would debunk Bukharin. So, in fact, it happened. However, it was too late an insight to change the situation.

The creation of a large army of performers is the is not only result of the transformation of the party that happened to it in the 1920s. The implementation of the policy of the "dictatorship of the party" assumed the arrangement of party cells literally in all cells of the social organism from industrial enterprises to kindergartens, in order to cover the life of society with tens of thousands of tentacles, to atomize it to the utmost, thus eliminating the appearance of any dissent and putting everyone's life under the control of the party and the state. member of society.

As a result, no obstacles could arise in the way of party directives descending from above, no matter how monstrous or absurd they were. The pressure from above assumed only execution. Moreover, the order of execution was facilitated by the territorial production principle of building the party. Its ideologists attached fundamental importance to the fact that the cells were not numerous in composition and existed everywhere. The Circular of the Central Committee of March 16, 1923, "On the Merger of Cells," signed by Molotov, condemned the practice of liquidating small cells by some organizations and combining them into larger collectives. "The Central Committee, it was said in a circular, recognizes the merger of cells as generally inexpedient and permissible only in exceptional cases, only in relation to Soviet cells, each time with the permission of the provincial committee. In particular, it is unacceptable to merge small cells and unite them along trade union lines"[347]62. Party organizations were instructed to take the necessary measures to organize cells at all enterprises and in all institutions and establish their close connection with production life.

The cells were completely deprived of freedom in their actions and had only to follow the instructions of higher party officials.

organs. This practice was consolidated by the "Regulations on cells of the RCP (b)". By a circular of the Central Committee signed by Kaganovich dated October 4, 1924, all regional bureaus of the Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics, regional committees, provincial committees and ordinary communists were instructed to discuss the draft regulation on the cells of the RCP (b), which, after approval by the Politburo on September 3, 1925, became the main law of life for 20,000 party cells. It said: "The cell is the main organizational unit of the party. Through it, the Party contacts the masses, carries out all its undertakings and decisions, through it it receives new forces from the stratum of the working people for work and struggle, and constantly has a complete idea of the opinions and moods of the working masses. The cell is approved by the ukom, okrkom or district committee (which enjoys the rights of the ukom), for which the party committee sends its representative to the organized cell, who convenes an organizational meeting of party members and candidates working in this enterprise, village, etc., checks the party affiliation of those gathered their party documents, organizes the election of the cell bureau and, together with the list of members of the organized cell, submits the minutes of the meeting for approval to the party committee. The Party Committee, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Criminal Code (OkrKK) sends its decision on the approval of an organized cell to the sanction of the Gubernia Committee (Oblast Committee). Before the final approval by the party committee, the cell may hold its own closed meetings and meetings, but does not have the right to speak on behalf of the party. The cell conducts its work under the leadership of the local party committee. Decisions and resolutions of party committees are obligatory for the cell. The cell regularly reports to the party committee on its work. The dissolution of a cell can be carried out by a plenum of a district committee or ukom only with the sanction of the provincial committee. The cell co

work among its members to educate them, to raise the level of Marxist knowledge of all members, to enlist them in active participation in resolving all issues facing the party;

work among the masses to constantly exercise Party influence in them, to raise their political and cultural level, to enlist them to participate in Soviet construction, to ascertain the needs and demands of the workers and peasant masses, to direct the work of non-Party public organizations;

participation in the work of the party in building the Soviet state, in managing the economy, in carrying out within the framework of one's enterprise, institution, village, etc., all the tasks and measures planned and carried out by the party as a whole.

A cell is an organization linking the masses of workers and peasants with the leading organ of the party in a given locality. The tasks of the cell in this area of work are: to carry out the party slogans and decisions among the masses;

attracting new members;

assistance to the local committee in its organizational and campaign work;

active participation as a party body in the economic and political life of the country. The cell, through its faction, directs the work of the factory committee, co-operatives and other organizations, organizes the involvement of its members and non-party workers in production work, and influences the production life of a given enterprise, institution and locality.

Thus, as a result of the policy of the "dictatorship of the party", the place and position of the party in the political system of Soviet society changed fundamentally. Now not only the Soviets, trade unions, Komsomol and other public organizations were "transmission belts" from the party to the working masses, but the party itself became such a "belt" from the masses to the party apparatus. This new provision is clearly expressed in the "Draft Regulations on Cells of the RCP(b)" quoted above: "A cell is an organization linking the masses of workers and peasants with the leading organ of the party in a given locality." The party of the masses as a "transmission belt" ensured the functioning of the party apparatus as an institution of power and consecrated its actions in the name of the people. At the same time, the party was a supplier of party personnel for the apparatus.

The passage in the pamphlet of the German Communists, which Lenin laughed at in his "Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism", that "two communist parties now stand, therefore, against each other: one party of leaders, the other mass party", has become in Russia a reality that had far from ridiculous consequences.

The party of the apparatus dominated the country. She had all the privileges, and these privileges were all the greater, the higher the place of the cadre party worker in the system of the apparatus hierarchy. As the size of the party expanded and the party nomenclature became isolated, its privileges increased and, conversely, the privileges of ordinary communists were reduced. This fact can be illustrated by the changing procedure for bringing communists to justice. On January 4, 1923, a circular of the Central Committee was sent to the localities, correcting the circular of the Central Committee of April 16, 1922, which actually excluded the responsibility of the communists to the judicial and investigative institutions, since the opinion of the party committee had the character of a party directive for

the courts. The Circular of the Central Committee of January 4, 1923, suggested that in the future the Communists should be guided by general rules, but the judicial and investigative institutions were still instructed to inform the party committee about each such fact. In the event of initiation of a case or investigation against some of the most responsible communists or the disclosure of the criminal activities of the majority of members of the local party committee, the case was to be transferred to a higher judicial-investigative and party authority. As before, however, the judicial and investigative institutions were obliged to change the measure of restraint against a party member and release him from arrest if a guarantee was provided by at least three members of the RCP, who should have received prior approval from the provincial committee. The right of the control commissions of the RCP to get acquainted with all the cases of communists brought to justice^{[349]64} was also preserved. In addition to the circular dated January 4, 1923, a circular dated January 9 of the same year, signed by Kuibyshev, ordered the organization of temporary commissions at all provincial committees consisting of the secretary of the provincial committee, the provincial executive committee of the provincial council of the chairman of the trade union chairman, placing on them the duty to hear reports of provincial prosecutors on the merits of cases initiated against responsible communist workers, especially business executives. As stated in the circular, "the conclusions of these commissions are not binding on the judiciary, but the provincial prosecutors must

pay full attention to the information reported at the meetings of the commission on the situation of a particular industry or to data on the identity of a particular worker, taking into account the reported material for the most correct and expedient approach to the matter in its further direction"[350]65. It was very a significant reservation in relation to the communists - responsible

workers. In connection with the campaign of the so-called revolutionary legality, which replaced revolutionary expediency, during which numerous abuses of the communists of their position were revealed, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on April 26, 1925 adopted a special resolution "On the procedure for bringing communists to justice for misconduct associated with their work in party, Soviet, professional, cooperative and other public institutions. In order to eradicate all sorts of negative phenomena associated with the abuse of power by the communists and the connivance of the courts in relation to them, it was proposed to establish the following rule: each communist for the crime he committed is subject to prosecution, arrest and punishment on common grounds with all citizens. The party committees and control commissions could under no circumstances, as stated in the resolution, by way of a directive prejudge the verdict of the judiciary. The mitigation of sentences in mercenary cases, arbitrariness, cases of violence and counter-revolutionary ones was also forbidden. Investigators were no longer supposed to report to party bodies about the fact that a communist had been brought to justice, but only to report it to the appropriate assistant

prosecutor[351]66. In the end, the rank-and-file communists were left with one privilege: to be soldiers of the "party of the apparatus" and unquestioningly carry out its directives. In relation to ordinary communists, a special cynicism of the Stalinist government manifested itself, which made them its hostages. Not all of them became executioners and not all of them were responsible for the lawlessness that was happening in the country, but they were all made accomplices. This is the historical cri

4. POLITICS AND ECONOMY

The formation of the party-apparat management system took place in conditions when its competence included vast areas of life, which, before the October Revolution, as the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the USSR A.I. Rykov at the XII Congress of the RCP (b), had nothing to do with the conduct of state power [352]1. Even then, the party held in its hands the economic the country's ties with the outside world, excluding, by establishing a monopoly of foreign trade, any possibility of independent entry into the foreign market. The policy of "war communism" pursued during the years of the civil war was not caused by the needs of Russia's economic development. It was a violence against common sense, but this violence had its own logic, the logic of strengthening power and conducting a planned experiment.

The critical situation in Russia by 1921 forced the leadership of the party to retreat for some time. But the retreat was not caused by economic difficulties, but, first of all, by political ones. If economic problems determined the government's policy, then the NEP should have been adopted as early as February 1920, when Trotsky made a proposal to abolish the surplus appraisal, and the Politburo rejected it by a majority of votes (10 against 4). Only when a threatening political situation was created for the power of the party leadership were mass uprisings of peasants (in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces, the Middle Volga region, Turkestan, Siberia, Ukraine, Don, Kuban), the Kronstadt rebellion, the slogans of which were "Power to the Soviets, not parties", "Soviets without communists", the government was forced to retreat and proclaim a transition to a new economic policy.

But what was this retreat like? The story of A.I. Svidersky, a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food, N. Valentinov (N. Volsky) about one of the meetings of leading workers in 1921, at which Lenin said: "When I look into your eyes, you all seem to agree with me and say yes, but turn away, say **no**." —

Historiography has repeatedly noted that in 1921 "NEP was perceived as a shameful retreat, and indignation at the NEP economy, politics and culture did not stop throughout the 1920s. This attitude towards the NEP corresponded to the Bolshevik tradition of the October Revolution and the Civil War and was most strongly manifested among the cadres, the decisive hardening of which was 1918-1920, and the party youth"[354]3. None of the— leaders of the party considered the NEP as a policy designed for the future. Lenin himself was also initially far from such an understanding. Therefore, it was no coincidence that he stated in his report at the XI Congress of the RCP (b), literally a year after the announcement of the transition to a new economic policy: "We retreated for a year. We must now say in the name of the Party: Enough! The goal pursued by the retreat has been achieved. This period is coming to an end or has come to an end. Now another regrouping of [forces is moving forward](#)"[355]4. Only a few months later he extended the framework of the NEP for 5-7 years, and then, after painful reflections and a personal tragedy, he came to the need to recognize a radical change in the whole point of view on socialism, but did not have time or could not substantiate it with sufficient clarity. The rest of the party leaders did not go through such an evolution, moreover, they not only did not want to listen to the words of their teacher, but did everything to remove him from political activity altogether. Therefore, it is quite natural that in 1923, at the 12th Congress, Stalin spoke of "the so-called NEP", and Zinoviev that the NEP "is not in the queue now." Even Trotsky, in his report on industry at that congress, noted the enormous danger created by the fact that "we called into the light of the market devil." The fear of this devil, i.e. NEP in general, according to the just remark of N. Valentinov, manifested itself in Trotsky in the following words in the same report: "The era of the growth of the capitalist element begins. And who knows whether in the coming years we will not have to defend every inch of our socialist territory with teeth and claws against the centrifugal tendencies of private capitalist forces? N. Valentinov also cited in his book the statement of the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy Pyatakov: "The germs of the commodity capitalist system have grown and thre

Variations of Pyatakov's speeches on this subject, he writes, I have heard many times with my own ears. "Seriously and for a long time" NEP was not adopted. It needs to be known. Without proper attention to this fact, without knowledge and analysis of it, the entire subsequent history of —

Bolshevism remains incomprehensible. What many thought about, but did not dare to say out loud, was expressed by Kamenev at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1922 in a report on domestic and foreign policy: "If, which, of course, would not happen, I speak only theoretically, If we have decided together with you to stop the functioning of private capital, then it would not cost us not only not a drop of proletarian or peasant blood, but not even a single broken glass. The NEP can end with a simple order from you or from any supreme body of Soviet power, and this will not cause—any political upheaval"[357]6 (emphasis added by I.P.). As a matter of fact, the leadership of the party in the person of Zinoviev-Stalin Kamenev had already made such an attempt to abolish the NEP by issuing a decree in the summer of 1922 on a temporary ban on the free trade in grain [358]7. And in the fall of 1923, it quite officially announced the possible

abolition of the NEP in the event of the victory of the revolution in Germany. In subsequent years, having accepted the NEP as a necessary evil, the communist authorities remained true to their rejection of capitalism. Communists, for example, were strictly forbidden to hold administrative positions in concession and private enterprises. An exception was made in each individual case with the special permission of the provincial or district party—

committee (Decree of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of August 23, 1926) [359]8. It is obvious that the post-Lenin leadership of the party did not consider the NEP as a strategy in the development of the economy for any long period. Statements of this kind belong to Soviet historiography, which interpreted the NEP as a policy designed for the entire period of building socialism. This influence is still felt today, when historians speak of NEP as a set of measures in the economic, social and cultural fields, of the NEP period, of NEP Russia. The leadership of the party did not have any more or less coherent concept of NEP. This was pointed out more than once in the 1920s. wel

46 communists who on October 15, 1923 opposed the policy of the Politburo: "We do not have a single fundamental resolution on the NEP ... For more than a year and a half, our Soviet ship has been sailing in the muddy waves of the NEP. We call them muddy not from the point of view of morality and the immaculate conception of socialism, but primarily because it is difficult to see anything in these waters. It is so difficult that some comrades do not even dare to determine where, in fact, the sides of our ship end and the elements of the NEP

[turbidity begin](#). Moreover, we will not go far from the truth in asserting that the party leadership did not consider the NEP as a tactical line in the development of the economy either. It was only a card in the political struggle of the Stalinist factional group with the opposition. But, fearing to lose power and fighting for it, the party leadership did not openly ban the NEP, but tacitly broke and strangled the NEP principles throughout the entire period of the 1920s. Only after the last opposition in the party, the so-called right deviation in the person of Bukharin-Rykov Tomsy, had been crushed, did the Stalinist leadership decide to abolish the NEP. However, having strangled the NEP, she continued to swear by his name.

Consistent development of the economy on the principles of NEP would inevitably require the solution of the question of the "political" NEP, the weakening of the dictatorship. In reality, the opposite processes developed in the political sphere. First, the existence of all political parties, except for the communist one, was prohibited. After the trial of 32 members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (June 8-August 7, 1922), a widespread anti-Socialist-Revolutionary campaign began, accompanied by the expulsion of former Socialist-Revolutionaries from institutions, enterprises, and public organizations. According to the directive of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), ^{there were} all active members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, on which materials were transferred to the revolutionary tribunal, others were preparing for exile, the rest were forbidden to be admitted to responsible positions in Soviet institutions, industry and transport. The task was set to bring the defeat of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to the end of 1922. [\[361\] 10](#) And on June 4, 1923, a circular of the Central Committee signed by Molotov "On measur

Mensheviks”, which ordered the dismissal of the Mensheviks from trade unions, consumer cooperatives, trusts, industrial enterprises, insurance authorities and universities, as well as the bodies of the NKPS, NKPoshtel, NKVT, NKtrud,—

[NKID\[362\]11](#). Secondly, in the Communist Party itself there was a process of curtailing intra-Party democracy. But the main thing is that simultaneously with the proclaimed transition to the NEP, there was a rapid formation of a totalitarian regime that excluded any kind of freedom in both the political and economic spheres. Already in January 1924, one of the members of the US Senate Lodge, analyzing the situation in Russia, wrote: “We are dealing with a very impressive oligarchic organization, with tyranny of the most absolute type. Russia has always been ruled by tyranny, but this tyranny has never been more comprehensive and more shameless than the one that reigns [now](#). —

No one in the leadership of the party prevented just such a development of events in the political field. Trotsky came to his senses only in the autumn of 1923, when on October 8 he delivered his letter to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. He correctly understood that “the extreme deterioration of the intra-Party situation has two causes: a) a fundamentally wrong and unhealthy intra-Party regime, and b) the dissatisfaction of the workers and peasants with the difficult economic situation, which has developed not only as a result of objective difficulties, but also as a result of obvious fundamental mistakes. [economic policy](#)”[364]13. However, the epiphany was belated, and the act inconsistent.

However, during the 1920s in the history of Russia stands out for its relative prosperity. There is nothing surprising. Even with a huge drop in the productivity of labor in all branches (for example, to perform a unit of work on the railways now required eight times more people than [before\[365\]14](#)), the situation in the country was not comparable to the chaos of the civil war. The transition to the civilian world meant the revival of normal life, breaking through even through the obstacles that the new government put up literally at every step. Of course, the beginnings of NEP contributed a lot to this revival, but these were precisely the beginnings that could never turn into a system. They

then banned, then allowed again. The development of NEP cannot be characterized otherwise than as convulsive. In modern Russian historiography, almost no one disputes the conclusion that the NEP was not a period of harmonious and crisis-free development of the Soviet economy, but, on the contrary, was characterized by almost continuous crises: the financial year of 1922, the sales crisis in the fall of 1923, the commodity famine of 1924, the growth of inflationary tendencies and the commodity famine of 1925 and then the subsequent, and not the sudden crisis of grain procurements in 1927/28. It is also recognized that "the qualitative characteristics of the processes of the "pure NEP five-year period" of 1922-1927. are found only in comparison with the pre-revolutionary five-year period. All the data at our disposal, writes N.L. Rogalin, - testify in favor of more efficient management that took place in the pre-revolutionary decade. This applies both to such general indicators as the national income per capita, the standard of living of the rural population, its consumption, and specific figures on productivity, marketability, crop density, the volume of exports of bread and other products. According to G.I. Khanin, the national income in the USSR in 1928 did not increase compared to pre-revolutionary times, but turned out to be 12% lower than the level of 1913, per capita production (taking into account population growth by 5%) decreased by 17-20%^[366] 15 . The NEP was suffocating under the dictatorship of the party and state apparatus, shackled by directives, administrative arbitrariness and the

threat of repression. This book does not set out the task of a comprehensive and detailed coverage of the processes that took place in the Russian economy in the 1920s. It is important to understand the essence of the government's policy towards the economy. And this policy, which allowed the beginnings of the NEP, was amazingly inconsistent and half-hearted, moreover, incompetent. The German professor M. Reimann is absolutely right when he says that "descriptions of local administrative and political practice in the initial period of Soviet power often give frightening pictures of complete ignorance" refers not only to the period of "war communism"^[367]16. The — consequence of such a policy was the fuzziness of terminology, and the "crafty figure" of statistics and other diseases of the Soviet

economic science, manifested in the 1920s. Foreign economists already noted then that "there were no examples of such a shameless lie as the one used by the Bolsheviks in the history of the financial activity of any government"[368]17. —

In the economic policy of the communist leadership during the NEP period, as well as during the period of "war communism", there is only one desire to preserve and strengthen power, to make it all-encompassing. Here it is appropriate to cite one more piece of evidence "from the outside" the Austrian newspaper "Wiener Arbeiter Zeitung" wrote on November 30, 1924: "Thus, the circle of those who rule over Russia is narrowing more and more. In the weeks when the October Revolution was victorious, Russia was truly ruled by the insurgent mass of workers and soldiers with the help of their soviets. Since then, the mass has long since become a mere object of bureaucratic dictatorship. The Soviets have turned into an empty facade, the dictatorship of the proletariat has turned into the dictatorship of the Communist Party, the dictatorship of the Party into the dictatorship of the Central Committee, its monstrous bureaucratic apparatus, after the Central Committee, along with Trotsky, pushes away from itself everyone who does not belong to the narrow circle of the "old guard". "In the end, only the dictatorship of a small clique of a few dozen people will remain, ruling in Russia as unlimitedly and uncontrollably as the

royal court once ruled "[369]18. Characteristically, the party leadership always demagogically hid behind the interests of the working class. What the actual policy was is clearly shown by the Politburo's resolution of November 6, 1925, sent out as a directive to all local party organizations: "The Central Committee is resolutely against the individual participation of workers in profits; The Central Committee recognizes only such a form of collective participation of workers in profits, which has been recognized by our practice for two years now, i.e., deduction of a certain percentage from the profits of state enterprises for improving the living conditions of workers (housing construction, etc.) "[370]19 . Already from this decision it is clear that the new Russian government did not want to share with anyone either the property that was at its disposal or the income from it. The workers did not and could not become the owners of their en

servant of that state. If we talk about the country's economy as a whole, then the communist leadership was primarily interested in strengthening its own power. It was precisely in this that his policy was consistent, which is confirmed by the entire course of Russia's economic development in the 1920s. Let's turn to specific examples.

The NEP completely perverted the price policy, which Trotsky called the policy of the military-communist price command. "The monstrously increased discrepancy between prices for industrial and agricultural products," he wrote in a letter to members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of October 8, 1923, is tantamount to the liquidation of the New Economic Policy, for it is indifferent to the peasant of the NEP base why he cannot buy: is it because trade forbidden by decrees, or because two boxes of matches cost as much as a pood of [bread](#)"[371]20. Nevertheless, the party leadership deliberately pursued a policy of maintaining low prices for bread. In a cipher telegram to the secretaries of the provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics dated August 24, 1922, signed by Stalin, it was directly stated: the level of the working [class](#)"[372]21. ("The interests of the working class" Stalin covered himself, of course, in this case too). The so-called "scissors" of prices and a sales crisis arose in 1923 as a result of precisely such a policy, and not because of high prices for manufactured goods. A. Rykov, speaking at the XIII All-Union Party Conference, hid the fundamental points

when he called this crisis a crisis of overproduction, "an excess of peasant bread that could not be placed on the city market, resulting in low bread prices and low purchasing power of the peasantry. At the heart of this crisis lies the discrepancy in the development of agriculture and industry in our Union. This discrepancy is given to us by history. Our October Revolution received a historical legacy in the form of a discrepancy in the relationship between the city and

village"[373]22. Following the official point of view (and Rykov expressed the position of the majority of the Politburo at the conference), Soviet historiography also explained the "scissors" of prices and the sales crisis

the discrepancy between the rates of development of industry and agriculture, the faster saturation of the market with agricultural goods compared to industrial ones, as well as the desire of industrial marketing organizations to arbitrarily raise prices for industrial [goods](#)[374]23. —

In explanations of this kind, fundamental points are hidden. The assertion of an overabundance of bread in the country did not correspond to reality. The harvest, according to the Central Statistical Bureau, in 1923 was on average 10% lower than the harvest in 1921 and less than the country's needs by 500-600 million pounds. Prices for bread in 1923 averaged 40-45 kopecks. gold for a pood of rye and 60 - 65 kopecks. per pound of wheat, while on the world market they reached 120 kopecks. for rye and 180 kop. for a pood of wheat. If the prices for bread on the world market increased by 80-100% in comparison with 1914, then in the USSR they were approximately 56-70% of pre-war[375]24. In addition, some regions of the country (in the Tsaritsyn province, Buryatia, etc.) were starving in 1923. However, the party leadership was not going to draw any conclusions from the crisis of this year. Moreover, the 13th Congress of the RCP(b) in May 1924 emphasized the role of the state in

the policy of price regulation, mastering the market, and exercising real control over the activities of private capital. At the same time, the well-known and repeatedly tested in practice position is that "any attempts to control prices or the quantity of goods deprive competition of the ability to coordinate the efforts of individuals, since price fluctuations in these cases cease to reflect changes in the market and cannot serve as a reliable guide for individual activities"[376]25. But the communist authorities were not interested in the laws of the development of a market economy; their concern was their own political goals and, above all, the concern

Today, historians recalled that F. Dzerzhinsky attributed the first attempt to start industrializing the country at the expense of the [countryside to 1923](#)[377]26. Low prices and the restriction of free trade in bread made it possible to export it abroad in significant quantities compared to the previous year. The purpose of this export was to create a gold fund for the development

industry, especially the military. On November 10, 1923, the Politburo approved the minutes of the meeting of the special Politburo Commission of October 13, the decision of which provided for, among other things, strengthening imports in the field of the military industry and simplifying military orders through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade[378]27 . The first___

attempt by the Politburo to increase state budget revenues by selling vodka also dates back to 1923. Some members of the party understood the consequences of such a step, but they were no longer able to change anything. H.G. At the same time, Rakovsky, in the article "The Degeneration of NEP," banned for publication by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, wrote: "In the process of finding new and new incomes, we sometimes reach the point that, without realizing it, we begin to deny the essence of our proletarian statehood. In the pursuit of income, we neglect the basic interests of the proletariat and the peasantry and undermine the very authority of the Soviet government and the Communist Party. He especially focused on the incredible destruction that alcohol will cause in the body of workers, wars due to exhausting imperialist and civil wars, and, what is most terrible, this is that the effect of alcoholated determines not only the offspring. Those who use it, but with alcoholism, its inevitable companion is poverty, prostitution, coarsening of morals and crime"[379]28.

However, what failed in 1923 was succeeded in 1925 after preliminary processing by the secretaries of local party committees. Among the materials of the Siberian Regional Committee of the RCP (b), a curious document dated December 23, 1924 has been preserved. On it, under the words "We strongly support the sale of pre-war fortress vodka within Siberia," all the secretaries of Siberian provincial committees and chairmen of provincial executive committees left their autographs under the words "We strongly support the sale of pre-war fortress vodka within Siberia." And someone signed below - a "historical document"![380]29 As a result, with the blessing of the party leadership, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 28, 1925 officially allowed the sale of forty-degree vodka and at the same time established the monopoly of the Gosspirt of the Supreme Council of National Economy on its production. Since that time, its sales have sta

So, in Leningrad in 1926-1927. annual per capita alcohol consumption reached 59 [liters](#)[\[381\]](#)[30](#). But how important

were the interests of the working people, especially the health of the future generation, when the task of the survival of communist power was on the agenda?! By the way, it is already in the 1920s. understood that it was possible to gain a foothold in the world only through the creation of modern military equipment. Considerable funds were required for the maintenance of both the party-state nomenklatura in the country and illegal communist parties abroad [\[382\]](#)[31](#). The communist —

government has always considered the peasantry as the main internal source of income. Although in the 1920s the policy towards him was much softer, in comparison with the previous years of "war communism" and the subsequent period of collectivization, even in these years it was characterized by constant pressure on the village and administrative arbitrariness, which was most clearly manifested in price policy. During the entire period of the 1920s, the party leadership tried to maintain low prices for bread and retreated only after another crisis situation that arose due to the unwillingness of the peasants to sell bread at such low prices. After retreating for a short time, the authorities then again went on the offensive.

Having survived the crisis of 1923, the party leadership introduced the so-called limit prices for bread. Stalin personally signed a cipher sent to all local party committees, which set out the decision of the Politburo of August 30, 1924: real wages. Inflated grain prices threaten the disorganization of the entire economy and the disruption of wages. The Central Committee proposes: 1. Strictly, rigorously carry out the procurement limits for bread given by the executive committee of the STO to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, in no case raising them. 2. Strictly ensure that the internal trade and grain procurement agencies carry out the limits and, in general, the orders of the People's Commissariat for Internal Trade on grain procurement within 24 hours after receiving them. 3. Avoid setting minimum limits. 4. Spend

campaign to explain the policy of combating exorbitant prices. Responsibility for the implementation of this resolution shall be placed on the secretaries of regional committees, provincial committees, national Central —

Committees, and bureaus of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party [personally](#) [383]32. This cipher unleashed the hands of local secretaries and chairmen of provincial executive committees. In addition, having before them the circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice dated October 28, 1924, that the intensification of repression could be dictated by "the conditions of the political moment or economic expediency", local leaders could use it to get out of this or that economic difficulty, they themselves created. So, by the way, did the deputy chairman of Sibrevkom R.I. Eikhe at the beginning of 1925, when there were difficulties with grain procurements. He gave a directive to the authorized representative office of the OGPU in Siberia to apply a measure of arrest to the most distinguished private grain merchants and flour millers in their grain operations. As a result, five large purveyors were arrested, who bought bread at prices above the limit. In a letter to Rykov dated February 3, 1925, Eikhe acknowledged that "by the measures taken, which were by no means massive (yet! I.P.), the market was improved, as evidenced by the success of procurements" [384]33. Moreover, Eikhe was guided not only by the circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice dated October 28, 1924, but also by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, according to which, in some regions of the RSFSR, the OGPU bodies were given the right to imprison people speculating in bread in forced labor camps [385]34. I liked this measure. Eikhe defined it as expedient, because, firstly, private individuals began to more carefully conduct grain procurements, trying not to go beyond the prices set by the state, and, secondly, they reduced the size of their procurements and exports, which improved the conditions for state and cooperative bakers.—

Moreover, at the same time he proposed to extend it to the whole [of Siberia](#) [386]35. In the spring of 1925, the central authorities again changed their grain procurement policy, deciding to go for a slight increase in limit prices. The cipher from the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade dated March 26 said: "The panic mood that has created in Moscow, L

the threat of the complication spreading to other consuming areas. We insistently ask you to take the most decisive measures for emergency shipment and promotion to Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo-Voznesensk of rye, rye flour for all available from the main suppliers. Measures must be taken to minimize sales for local needs ... by directing all resources of rye to [export](#)"[387]36.

The retreat was caused by the emergence of a new grain shortage. Instead of 80% of the procurements according to the plan, by December 1, 1924, only 50% were received, which led, on the one hand, to the need to revise the original plan and reduce it from 360 to 290 million poods, and on the other hand, to change the policy of limit prices in the direction of their raises[388]37. A cipher from Moscow signed by Molotov on March 25, 1925 (by that time, by the way, he had returned from a trip to the Tambov, Kursk and Tula provinces, where he personally observed the situation in the countryside) dictated not to take any administrative repressions in relation to procurement and export bread by private individuals and procurers from other regions[389]38. And a month later, after the XIV Party Conference, in a circular sent to the localities, also signed by Molotov[390]39, the attention of all Party organizations was drawn to "the need for a resolute rejection of the previous methods of administrative regulation of the grain market (limits) and for the obligatory holding of a grain procurement campaign through correct flexible state economic regulation of grain prices, which, providing the peasantry with the opportunity to the greatest extent to raise and improve the economy, would correspond to the interests of the entire national economy as a whole. According to this circular, the Council of Labor and Defense (STO), on the basis of a decision of the Central Committee, set directive prices for bread for Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Crimea, where the market had already been sufficiently determined (the price of wheat was not lower, but not higher than one ruble per pood) . It was assumed that in the future the service station would set directive prices for other regions as well. "But these directive prices," the circular stressed, "should not become firm and obligatory for grain purchasers and peasant grain purchasers, preventing them from being guided by commercial considerations." It was also said prices,

that, due to the lack of manufactured goods on the market, the Central Committee took a number of measures to increase their import from abroad and suggested that party organs pay special attention to the primary supply of the countryside. A certain

liberalization of the course of the party leadership towards the countryside in 1925 has already been sufficiently described in modern literature[391]40. But she was short-lived. From the second half of 1925, with the growth of a new round of crisis phenomena, the mood at the top of the party began to change. This was immediately felt in the localities and the offensive against private grain producers was launched again.

So, from September 27, 1925, the Executive Commissariat for Siberia I.P. Pavlunovsky ordered to be guided by the provision, according to which flour was not to be taken out of Siberia and not to be stored from those who were not on the list of procurers (primarily private traders). On October 19, 1925, the Sibrevkom decided to take measures to bring the market back to normal by limiting the supply of wagons for private traders[392]41. a concrete example, firstly, of administrative arbitrariness and repression against private merchants, and secondly, of the military-communist command, state intervention in price policy, that is, something that sharply contradicted the very essence of the NEP. Economist B.S. Pinsker rightly remarked that "the idea of being able to control pricing processes was one of the most destructive and pernicious ideas of that period, uniting all the forces and groups in the party in the policy of disintegrating the economy and preparing it for complete centralization"[393]42. The English economist J. Keynes, who visited the USSR in 1925 and at the same time published a number of articles in the foreign press, correctly captured the main feature in the policy of the party leadership towards the peasantry: "The official method of exploiting the peasantry is not so much taxes (although the agricultural tax is profitable budget item), how much price policy. The monopoly of import and export trade and effective control over the products of industry make it possible for the government to maintain prices at a high level, which is very unprofitable for the peasantry. It buys wheat from the peasants at a price far below the world price, and sells textiles and other goods to the peasants at a price far exceeding their own.

world price; from this difference in prices, a fund is formed from which high production costs, low industrial productivity, shortcomings in the distribution apparatus, etc. can be financed "[394]43. From the end of 1925, the authorities also began to—

pursue a targeted policy of inflaming the class struggle in the countryside, a policy of inciting the village lower classes against wealthy peasants. This was the second wave of its offensive against the peasantry after the 1918 Kombedniks. The poor were directly regarded as the main lever for overcoming the capitalist elements in the countryside. This was discussed in the resolutions of the October 1925 plenum of the Central Committee, the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and subsequent resolutions. Thus, the resolution of the congress emphasized that the poor "with the help of the party and state power in the struggle on the economic and political front (collective farms, artels, partnerships, cooperation, peasant committees, Soviets) must get rid of the remnants of dependent psychology, take the path of an organized class rebuff to the kulak and become a reliable support for proletarian policy in its struggle to rally the middle peasants around the proletariat. And on May 24, 1926, the Orgburo of the Central Committee adopted a special resolution on work among the poor, which directly stated that "the task of the party to rally the poor around the party, every party organization, every village cell, every communist must carry out day after day as the main part of the mass party work in the

countryside"[395]44. In the 1920s the scenario of the future policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class was played out. Circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice dated January 21, 1925, signed by D.I. Kursky, it was proposed (with reference to the law developed on the initiative of the People's Commissariat of the RCT and the Central Control Commission of the RCP, which was supposed to finally resolve the issue) that the former landlords should be completely deprived of the right to use the lands and buildings of their former estates by resettling in areas scheduled for colonization[396]45 (highlighted by me I.P.). This circular was preceded by a special discussion of the issue at the Politburo on December 24, 1924.

[397]46 The country's landed estates, which were not subjected to expropriation

most of these farms were working. Many accepted Soviet power, worked as teachers and even served in the Red Army. But, despite Kalinin's bold speech (perhaps one of his last such speeches), who protested against the indiscriminate eviction of former landowners from their homes, as always, the point of view of the majority won. The policy of clamping down on the NEP principles was carried out

in literally every area of the economy. Cost accounting, about which much has been written in relation to the New Economic Policy, was admitted, as is well known, only at the level of trusts (and never reached enterprises). To understand the specifics of this cost accounting, it is necessary to recall that the trusts were squeezed by the directives of higher party and state bodies - it is no coincidence that each trust had its own secret record keeping. According to the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR dated April 10, 1923 "On State Industrial Enterprises Operating on the Basis of Commercial Calculation (Trusts)", their planned management was carried out by the Supreme Economic Council, whose "indispensable jurisdiction" included: issuing permits for the acquisition of land and other major considerations, putting up the subgalizing, taking them and surrender to APDENDA, alienation, collateral and main of the main consistency, purpose and displacement of the appropriation and the application committee of the requirement, restraint of the proceedings, report and balance, and the subcount of a year, the release of the one Meat associations etc. [398]47 The resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of March 7, 1924 further restricted the freedom of state institutions and enterprises that were self-supporting, obliging them to place at least 60% of their reserve capital in state interest-bearing papers[399] 48. The new regulation, approved by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 29, 1927, put an end to the policy of final subordination of trusts to the planned tasks of the state and generally excluded the clause on making profit as the purpose of the trust's activities.

And the "enviable consistency" in the conduct of self-financing! On August 9, 1921, the "Order of the Council of People's Commissars on the Implementation of the Beginnings of the New Economic Policy" was adopted, by which state enterprises were transferred to economic accounting, and they were granted the right to limited sales of their products. But already

On September 22, 1922, the STO makes a decision "to propose to the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Education, which were allowed to transfer their enterprises to self-financing, to suspend further transfer from now on. Explain to all other people's commissariats that they have not been granted the right to transfer their— institutions to self-financing"[401]50. The circular of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) "On strengthening the leadership of party committees by administrative and economic bodies in the field of regulating their budgets", adopted on September 21, 1923, took another step in this direction[402]51.

Speaking about the monetary reform of 1922-1924, it must be remembered that the hard currency chervonets lasted no more than two years. The weak points of the chervonets were the small amount of the gold reserve, which was only 1/7 of the pre-revolutionary one, the unrealistic exchange rate and the low level of Soviet exports. As soon as the positive balance of the trade balance was replaced by a negative one, the entire monetary system staggered. Losing gold reserves and not being able to get help from outside, the State Bank already at the beginning of 1926 refused to exchange Soviet money for foreign currency [403]52. But even for the best, banks exchanged amounts no more than 10% of the time in 1924 of the presented[404]53. Chervonets actually did not penetrate into the village. And, as always, the monetary reform was carried out not as a system of economic and financial measures, but by binding regulations. Therefore, the foreign press called it "a combination carried out with the help of administrative measures"[405]54. It is difficult to imagine a more precarious position of private trade than that in which

it was during the NEP years. Here is Keynes's impression on this matter: "At the present time, under the Soviet system, there is no direct prohibition on buying and selling at a profit. The policy of the authorities is not to ban these professions, but to make them fragile and shameful. The private merchant is a kind of outcast, without privileges or protection, like a medieval Jew. Private trade is an outlet for those who are drawn there by an omnipotent instinct, but by no means a natural or pleasant occupation for a normal person. On October 9, 1923, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the forced placement of the state 6 percent

winning loan among those with high incomes. Refusal was equated with state tax evasion and

[fees\[407\]56](#). At the beginning of 1924, a direct offensive was launched against private trade, the eviction of Nepmen from Moscow, carried out by the OGPU. Arrests and deportations took place at the end of December 1923 and continued into January 1924. All those arrested and accused of being, according to the official Soviet terminology, "NEP scum", were exiled to Solovki and Narym. Members of their families, with the exception of civil servants, were expelled from Moscow with a ban on living in the capitals of the Soviet republics and densely populated industrial and commercial centers. The apartments were sealed and, together with all the contents, were transferred to

order of the Moscow Department of Real [Estate\[408\]57](#). Then another step was taken towards the prohibition of private trade. On April 24, 1924, Pravda published a resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on domestic trade and cooperation, which ordered: 1) to oust private and, first of all, wholesale capital from trade; 2) to start regulating trade with the leading participation in this matter of representatives of state trade; 3) to develop the issue of the maximum limitation of lending to individuals and private organizations, etc. As a result of such a policy in Siberia, for example, the turnover of private trade has halved [409]58. In general, the share of private capital in the trade turnover of Siberia in 1925-1926 was only 18 %[\[410\]59](#) On November 4, 1925, in connection with the commodity shortage,

the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a special resolution on the fight against speculation: widespread consumption to the detriment of the interests of the state, the urgent consideration of such cases and the holding of a number of show trials ... to establish for these cases a two-week deadline for conducting an inquiry in the OGPU bodies with the participation of a senior investigator ... to conduct an investigation as soon as possible "[411]60 . To all these orders was added a refusal to approve new concessions, as well as administrative arbitrariness in the field, taxation

local authorities, which was not condemned or prosecuted in any way by law.

Thus, the NEP was not only not an ideal, but also a period of somewhat normal socio-economic relations. "All the sprouts of economic development brought to life by the NEP, as F. Dan figuratively wrote, are suppressed by the iron cap of the Bolshevik dictatorship"[412]61. A certain rise in the Soviet economy of that period became possible not thanks to, but in spite of the actions of the party leadership. NEP did not lead to a public confrontation with the authorities, which was so feared by his opponents in the communist leadership. A certain freedom declared from above. economic activity, not supplemented by political freedoms, was reduced to only some indulgences. NEP itself was unable to lead to civilizational changes of extent. The new the bourgeois type. NEP's beginnings affected production to the least Russian semi-capitalism has spread mainly in the sphere of trade and distribution. Not by chance, in the 1920s. speculation and other "grimaces" of NEP flourished. The processes of democratization could not unfold either in the economy or in social life. New did not entail the emergence of civil society. The repressions applied to speculators received approval in society because of a misunderstood, but widespread sense of justice in it. The regime used the NEP for its own purposes not only economically, but also politically: behind the façade of the NEP was the strengthening of the Stalinist power system. In this sense, the regularity of the country's slide along the path of the new economic policy towards Stalinism was manifested.

CHAPTER II

THE TRAGEDY OF LENIN AS A POLITICAL MANAGER

*Who did we have? Well, I conducted organizational
work in*

*the Central Committee. Well, what was I in
comparison with Ilyich? Fuzzy...{2}*

Stalin

1. LENIN'S POLITICAL REFORM

The transition to the power system of Stalinist totalitarianism was not accidental, but a natural phenomenon. Despite the colossal changes that took place in public life, the changes in the systemic qualities of the Russian socio-cultural whole were minimal. The political culture and mentality of the elite and the people, the stereotypes of their behavior, as well as the traditions of Russian statehood, remained virtually unchanged. Separate parallels in the activities of the Bolsheviks were noted even before they came to power. The Bolsheviks, a truly Russian force, wrote in September 1917 a prominent ideologue of the Cadets, the future theorist of "smenovekhevstvo" N.V. Ustryalov, "and the manners are all old habitual, truly Russian. Is that just a different sign: before "Orthodoxy, autocracy", well, now "proletarians of all countries". And the essence is the same: to force, arrest, exile, execute. The Bolsheviks and other "revolution deepeners" are the brothers of Tsar Nicholas, no matter how they treat him. Their hatred for him is the

burning hatred of rivals who fight with equal means and have the same outlook"[413]1. The tragedy of Lenin actually began in April 1917, when he, abandoning the principles of the social democratic movement and relying on the traditions of Russian statehood, proclaimed the slogan "socialism through the seizure of state power." Moreover, he was ready to do anything "just to take [power](#)"[414]2. The misanthropic calls and actions of Lenin during the civil war, "war communism", his role in organizing the Red Terror, his provocative repressive-terrorist policy against the peasantry, the church, the intelligentsia and even the working class are well known. Here we again come close to the question of the type of the Bolshevik party. This party was a combination of features of the European social democratic movement and Asian revolutionaryism. Such a connection bro

very dirty side of the Russian movement", the adventurous — as estimated activity of the Nechayevites [Engels\[415\]3](#). In this sense — Nechaevism is the forerunner of Leninism and Stalinism.

In those cases when Lenin and the Bolsheviks deviated in their actions from the principles of the social democratic movement, from the civilized methods of political struggle, they inevitably slipped into banditry. It was precisely such Bolsheviks as Stalin that were needed then. From the very beginning, the Bolshevik Party included, in addition to the intelligentsia, the marginal lumpen socio-cultural layer, the future Stalinists. Stalin became a prominent figure in the party when its leadership accepted from him the "blood" money received as a result of the Caucasian expropriations. On the initiative of Lenin, in 1912 he was not only co-opted to the Central Committee, but also elected one of the four members of the Russian Bureau, created to direct party work in Russia. It was to Stalin that Lenin turned for help in order to hide the story of German money from the Central Committee. After Lenin finally departed from the principles of social democracy and formulated the basic principle of Leninism: "socialism through the seizure of state power", Stalin became simply necessary for the party.

After the October Revolution, Lenin used it more than once in the struggle to strengthen his power. So, it was to Stalin that he turned during the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b), entrusting him with the behind-the-scenes work of selecting suitable candidates for the leading bodies of the party, in which Trotsky and his supporters would have a minority. Knowing Stalin's criminal inclinations, Lenin nevertheless agreed with his election to the post of General Secretary of his party. Lenin's tragedy was also predetermined in the sense that "the discoverer of the dialectic of the usurpation of power was destined to fully experience the inexorability of one of its basic laws: an immoral usurper is inevitably eliminated by his absolutely immoral comrade-in-arms"[416]4. However, the truth of history requires that we also see the other side, namely, the struggle of Lenin with the majority of the Politburo in 1922-1923, which objectively became a struggle against the emerging Stalinism - in it Lenin again appeared as a revolutionary, a socialist. You can't throw her out of history, she was, and in the context —

history of the formation of the mechanism of power of Stalinist totalitarianism should take its appropriate place. "In this struggle," writes V.L. Doroshenko, - Lenin faced a new type of political opponent for himself. Martov, Plekhanov, Bogdanov, Trotsky were intellectuals, and here is a lumpen who became a party statesman.

In Soviet historical literature, despite the presence of the most extensive Leniniana in it, the description of the last period of Lenin's life and work in 1922-1923. presented very pale, fragmentary and with significant fundamental distortions. As for the analytical research work, either it was not carried out at all, or it cannot be considered satisfactory, since, first of all, it does not agree with the data of the sources and was undertaken for purposes that are clearly extraneous to science. This characteristic can be attributed to all officially published Soviet historical works on this topic from the mid-1920s to the end of the 1980s. Only with the beginning of perestroika did

works appear whose authors developed a point of view that was different from the official position established and approved by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU. For the first time it was said first about the apostasy from Lenin, and then about the betrayal on the part of the closest associates[418]6. There were also publications on the history of the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922-1923. [419]7 A number of new documents about the last period of Lenin's life was published in 1989-1991. magazine "News of the Central Committee of the CPSU". In subsequent years, interest in Lenin declined markedly, but evidence and documents, albeit haphazardly, continue to emerge. They allow us to say that his removal from the leadership of the party began already in 1921. Confirmation of this is the letters of Lenin himself. If in the already mentioned letter to a close friend G.L. Shklovsky of June 4, 1921. Lenin complains about the "prejudice, and stubborn opposition, and pure distrust" towards him on the part of the "new" party members, without naming specific names, then in a letter to F. Dzerzhinsky of December 20, 1921 he directly accuses Stalin of his virtual isolation from the party and socie

Indeed, from the second half of 1921, Stalin's role in internal party affairs increased noticeably - the Politburo instructed him to conduct organizational work on the preparation of plenums of the Central Committee, sessions of the Central Executive Committee, etc., i.e. essentially perform the duties of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party^[421]⁹. However, Lenin's reaction to the secret party-state reform, carried out by the Secretariat of the Central Committee from the middle of 1922, is still not clear enough. Yes, and he had very little time to get to know her and understand her (and she, no doubt, was held "behind Lenin's back"). After the first attack of illness, Lenin returned to Moscow only four months later - on October 2, 1922. Two months later, on December 7, he, at the insistence of doctors, again leaves for Gorki, and from December 13 a new deterioration begins, and Lenin is already moving away from active participation in political activities. At least he no longer worked in his office in the Kremlin.

But his position in relation to the party-state construction was manifested during the XI Party Congress, which adopted a resolution aimed at delimiting the functions of party and state bodies. Returning to Moscow, Lenin again turned to this issue. On October 31, 1922, he spoke at the final meeting of the IV session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the IX convocation, which adopted the "Regulations on provincial congresses of Soviets and provincial executive committees", designed to restore the former authority of local Soviets. "This, Lenin emphasized, is a question, the resolution of which has been very late until now under all previous systems of legislation and under all previous constitutions. It was considered unimportant."^[422]¹⁰ It was

assumed that at the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1922, an appropriate resolution would be adopted on the issue of delimiting the functions of party and Soviet bodies. It turns out that on December 22 the theses of the commission's report were considered and approved by the communist faction of the Congress of Soviets. They noted that in the context of the strengthening of civil peace, the Communist Party retains mainly ideological and political leadership, and all practical work should be carried out by the Soviets. "Decision by party organs (cell, provincial committee and even the Central Committee) of issues related to the competence of the Soviet

bodies, in the opinion of the commission, discredits Soviet power as a system. Mixing party functions with Soviet ones will lead to discontent among the peasant masses, deprive the Soviets of their social base. The commission proposed to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the faction of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to develop practical measures for the precise separation of the functions of party and Soviet bodies, and the Central Committee to give the appropriate directive along the party line. However, as stated by A.S. Yenukidze at a meeting of the committee of the Tenth Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to remove the issue of Soviet construction from the agenda of the congress, confining itself to discussing the issue of the formation of the [USSR\[423\]11](#).

Undoubtedly, having returned to Moscow, Lenin felt the effect of the "nucleus" formed behind him in the person of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin, who was in alliance with them. On a number of problems of domestic and foreign policy at the end of 1922, decisions were made without the participation of Lenin, who was only confronted with a fait accompli - members of the Politburo used the fact that doctors allowed him to attend important meetings for a strictly limited time. Behind the words about concern, which explained such an attitude, the purely political interests of the majority of the members of the Politburo were hidden. Lenin, having understood this maneuver, was indignant and dictated to the plenum of the Central Committee a proposal on the rules of the Politburo, which would exclude ignoring the opinion of any of its members. It also specifically emphasized that "the Politburo meets on Thursdays from 11 and not later than 2"[\[424\]12](#).

Lenin sharply opposed the desire of the "troika" to remove Trotsky from the party leadership. V.P. Naumov published the text of Lenin's note to Kamenev, which dates back to the time before his return to Moscow (between July 14 and 18, 1922): "I think that exaggeration can be avoided. "Throws out (the Central Committee) or is ready to throw a healthy cannon overboard," you write. Isn't this an immense exaggeration? To throw Trotsky overboard is what you are hinting at. Otherwise it is impossible to interpret the height of absurdity. If you don't think I'm stupid to the point of hopelessness, then how can you think that!!! Boys have blood in [their eyes](#)"[\[425\]13](#).

Lenin's reaction was natural: in the last period of his activity, he greatly appreciated Trotsky, trusted him more than anyone else.

or from their former associates. With Trotsky, in his words, he had "maximum agreement", which later manifested itself during the discussion of the question of the monopoly of foreign trade and the question of the growing bureaucracy of Soviet and party organs, as well as on the national question [426]14 . It was to Trotsky that he turned at the end of November 1922 with a proposal to conclude a bloc, when he realized the increased role of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and Stalin as General Secretary. Trotsky relayed this conversation in the following way: "Lenin summoned me to his place, to the Kremlin, spoke about the terrifying growth of bureaucracy in our Soviet apparatus and about the need to find a lever in order to properly approach this issue. He suggested creating a special commission under the Central Committee and invited me to take an active part in the work. I answered him: "Vladimir Ilyich, in my opinion, now in the fight against the bureaucracy of the Soviet apparatus, one must not forget that both in the localities and in the center a special selection of officials and specialists is being created, party, non-party, around well-known party leading groups and persons in provinces, in the region, in the center, i.e., under the Central Committee. By pressing on an official, you will stumble upon a leading party member, in whose retinue the specialist is, and, in the current situation, I could not take on such a job. Vladimir Ilyich thought for a minute and - here I will quote almost verbatim his words - he said: "I am talking, therefore, about the need to fight the Soviet bureaucracy, and you propose to add to this the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee?" I laughed out of surprise, because I didn't have such a complete formulation in my head. I replied: "Perhaps so." Then Vladimir Ilyich says: "Well, I propose a bloc." I said: "It is very pleasant to conclude a bloc with a good person." In the end, Vladimir Ilyich said that he was proposing to create a commission under the Central Committee to combat bureaucracy "in general", and through it he would approach the Orgburo of the Central Committee. He promised to "think over" the organizational side. On this we parted. Then I waited for two weeks for a call-up call, but Ilyich's health was getting worse, he soon fell ill. And then Vladimir Ilyich sent me his letters on the national question through his secretaries, so that there was no further continuation of this matter .

In continuation of this conversation with Trotsky, on December 1, 1922, on his initiative, Lenin had a conversation with the secretary of the Central Committee, Molotov, and the head of the accounting and distribution department

Syptsov. On December 15, according to the agreement, Lenin received materials for accounting and distribution of leading [party workers](#)^[428]¹⁶. And on the night of December 15-16, Lenin's health deteriorated sharply. On December 18, the plenum of the Central Committee, by a special resolution, placed on Stalin personal responsibility for observing the regime established for Lenin by the doctors. Literally, this resolution looked like this: "Comrade Stalin is to be held personally responsible for the isolation of Vladimir Ilyich, both in relation to personal relations and correspondence"^[429]¹⁷. The word "isolation" sounds ominous here. It seems that the authors of the resolution unconsciously used this very word, the first one that came to mind. But it most accurately expressed their political interests, above all Zinoviev - Stalin Kamenev in relation to Lenin.

Stalin began to act immediately. On December 22, he insults H.K. Krupskaya because of the letter she wrote under Lenin's dictation to Trotsky. In this letter, Lenin asked Trotsky "not to stop and continue the offensive" on the issue of the monopoly of foreign trade, for which the issue should be prepared at the [congress](#)^[430]¹⁸. On December 23, 1922, Krupskaya sent a letter to Kamenev: "Lev Borisovich, regarding a short letter I wrote under dictation from Vlad. Ilyich with the permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday in relation to me the rudest trick. I'm in the party for more than one day. For all 30 years I have not heard a single rude word from a single comrade, the interests of the party and Ilyich are no less dear to me than to Stalin. Now I need maximum self-control. What can and cannot be discussed with Ilyich, I know better than any doctor, because I know what worries him, what does not, and in any case better than Stalin. I have no doubts about the unanimous decision of the Control Commission, which Stalin allows himself to threaten, but I have neither the strength nor the time that I could waste on this stupid squabble. I am also alive, and my nerves are ~~tense~~

to the extreme. H. Krupskaya"^[431]¹⁹. The incident that took place suggests that relations between Stalin and Lenin have changed dramatically. Stalin, having gained political control over the sick Lenin, no longer considers it necessary to play diplomacy. The insult of Krupskaya on December 22, 1922, contrary to the opinion prevailing in the official

a single case. Stalin's cheeky behavior towards Lenin's relatives only aggravated the patient's personal tragedy. It is characteristic that it was then, on the night of December 22-23, that Lenin's state of health continued to worsen: paralysis of his right arm and right [leg set in](#)^[432]²⁰. Fearing complete paralysis, loss of speech, death, Lenin begins to dictate the "Letter to the Congress." His condition is somewhat stabilized, he continues the dictation, which has turned into a cycle of Lenin's last letters and articles. Particularly noteworthy is his vision of political reform, which he proposed to the next congress of the party as "a series of changes in our political system." Lenin considered it necessary, first, to increase the number of members of the Central Committee "up to several tens or even hundreds", considering this as a guarantee to avoid a possible split in the party. According to him, the new members of the Central Committee should not be apparatchiks, but workers, "mainly not from those workers who have gone through a long Soviet service," but workers "standing below the layer that has advanced among us in five years among Soviet employees, and belonging closer to the number of ordinary workers and peasants. According to Lenin, "such workers, being present at all meetings of the Central Committee, at all meetings of the Politburo, reading all the documents of the Central Committee, can form a cadre of devoted supporters of the Soviet system, capable, firstly, of giving stability to the Central Committee itself, and secondly, able to really work over updating and improving the apparatus. For the same purpose, he proposed reorganizing the Rabkrin and the Central Control Commission to reduce the Rabkrin "to 300-400 employees, especially checked in terms of conscientiousness and in terms of knowledge of our state apparatus", mainly from advanced workers, "for whom you can vouch for what they say they won't take it on faith, they won't say a word against their conscience", workers who "would not be afraid to admit to any difficulty and were not afraid of any struggle to achieve a goal seriously set for themselves." "The members of the Central Control Commission, who are obliged to be present in a certain number at each meeting of the Politburo, must form a close-knit group, which, "regardless of persons", will have to ensure that no one's authority, neither the General Secretary, nor any of the other members of the Central Committee, could not prevent them from making an inquiry, checking documents, and generally achieving unconditional awareness and

By these measures, Lenin intended to "finally transform the plenums of the Central Committee into the highest party conferences, convened every two months with the participation of the Central Control Commission." They were assigned the main role in making decisions, and the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat should only carry out the current work on behalf of the Central Committee. Thus, according to Lenin, it was possible to create a counterbalance to the concentration of power in the highest bodies of the party and in the hands of the General Secretary[433]21.

Objectively, Lenin's proposals were directed against the secret party-state reform, which was carried out by the party leadership without Lenin and "behind" Lenin. But his political reform could not become a counterbalance to the practice of the new leadership of the party, which, as was shown above, had already yielded results by the end of 1922. Due to illness, Lenin was not able to think through and systematize it to the end, especially since fundamentally, it is half-hearted, dual, and untenable. His proposals indicate that Lenin lost control over the position in the party, he no longer leads it, moreover, he does not know about the secret party-state reform that is being carried out by his former associates. The logic of the development of the political system in the conditions of the New Economic Policy required cardinal changes in the emerging system of power, but at the end of 1922 Lenin did not yet realize such a need. He still remained an adherent of a strictly centralized one-party system and the decisive role of the Central Committee in this system, although more than once, including in his "Letter to the Congress," he noted "the exaggeration of the administrative side" in resolving state issues.

The only thing that Lenin succeeded in was to give an accurate sociological analysis of the relations in the party leadership, as a result of which he proposed "to consider a way to move Stalin from this place and appoint another person to this place, who in all other respects differs from Comrade. Stalin with only one advantage, namely, more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capriciousness, etc. rude..." Lenin ended with a prophetic warning: "this is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle that can get

crucial"[434]22.

Nevertheless, Lenin's proposals cannot be completely discounted. In those conditions, their meaning was seen differently. Lenin's contemporaries, who had some idea of the situation at the top of the party, realized that these proposals were directed specifically against the dysfunctional, group politics of the then leadership. Evg. Preobpazhensky wrote bluntly: "It doesn't take much logic to understand to what extent Comrade Lenin's famous articles on the rabkrin and against the bureaucracy of the Soviet apparatus are completely turned against the current party course"[435]23 (emphasis added by I.P.) . Understood this and the top leadership of the party. Therefore, Bukharin, as editor of Pravda, having read the layout of Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin. (Proposal to the XII Congress of the Party)", suspended the further passage of the article in the printing house and informed Stalin, reading to him by telephone certain passages from it[436]24. Therefore, the members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee objected especially sharply and categorically to the article, and Kuibyshev suggested that a special issue of Pravda with the article be printed in one copy (Lenin insisted on its immediate publication) in order to calm him down, at the same time hiding the article from the party. In the end, as is known, Lenin's article was published in Pravda on January 25, 1923, but with a cut in the place

concerning the General Secretary. And on January 27, the leaders of the party prepared a closed letter, which, on the one hand, disavowed Lenin's article as an article of a sick person, and on the other hand, denied the actual orientation of his proposals: "It goes without saying that Comrade Lenin does not take part in the meetings of the Politburo and he is not sent, again, in strict accordance with the instructions of the doctors, the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo and the Orgburo. The doctors, however, considered it possible to allow Comrade Lenin, in view of the unbearability of complete mental inactivity for him, to keep something like a diary, where he enters his thoughts on various issues, and parts of this diary, at the direction of Comrade Lenin himself, appear on the pages of the press. Even these external conditions for writing the article "How shall we reorganize the Workers' Party" testify to the fact that the proposals contained in this article were inspired not by any complications with

difficulties that are still ahead of the party in the upcoming historical epoch" [437]25 (emphasis added by I.P.). The letter was signed by all available members of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee: Andreev, Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin, Kamenev, Kuibyshev, Molotov, Rykov, Stalin, Tomsy, Trotsky, that is, all the leaders of the party, with the exception of Zinoviev, who at that time was in Petrograd. In haste on the same day, it was sent to the secretaries of the provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics, along with a cover letter from Stalin, emphasizing the strictly secret nature of this document [438]26. It is-

characteristic that in the government report on the state of Lenin's health dated March 12, 1923, it was again said that after the deterioration in the second half of December, "the doctors considered it possible to allow Vladimir Ilyich to work on questions of a general nature, limited by time, which resulted in famous articles by Vladimir Ilyich about public education, the reorganization of the RKI and the improvement of the Soviet apparatus"[439]27 (emphasis added by I.P.). At the same time, Lenin's proposals on the reform of the

political system, made by him in the articles "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin" and "Better less is better" and then published in Pravda (January 25 and March 4, 1923), could not be directly ignored by the party leadership. But it has done everything to belittle and pervert their significance. The question of the reorganization of the Workers' Pediatric Committee and the creation of the Central Control Commission was considered at the XII Congress not at a plenary session, but at one of the sections. A.D. Tsyurupa: "I will not talk about the old RCT, or about the magnitude of the task set by Ilyich, because in the haste that we have now, it is impossible to discuss all these issues. And if, comrades, we carry out work in the same order, then we will fail the case and discredit the very idea of Vladimir Ilyich, which is of tremendous importance. Tsyurupa proposed to create a special commission to discuss the issue more thoroughly, but this proposal was not even put to a vote, and after it

speeches, the session of the section was closed [440]28.

Another noteworthy episode took place at the congress, confirming that the new leadership of the party was firmly

its organizational policy and did not want to put itself under the control of the expanded Central Committee and Central Control Commission:

"Chairman (Kamenev). Are there any amendments? (Voice from the floor: "Is there anything else about the Central Control Commission?") Dzerzhinsky. There is an explanation in Comrade Molotov's theses. There a whole paragraph speaks of this, paragraph 4 speaks of the Central Control Commission, and this has already been announced.

Voice from the spot. First, in Comrade Molotov's theses on the Central Control Commission, everything was removed. I worked in the commission, I can give such a certificate. Secondly, it says here that the Central Control Commission must be helped to organize work along the line of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, but nothing in the line of combating party diseases. It turns out, therefore, that the work of the Central Control Commission focuses exclusively on improving the Soviet apparatus. presiding. Tov. Molotov announced the resolution, in which paragraph 4 contains the question of the Central Control Commission, and you listened to it.

At the congress, not only was there no normal discussion of Lenin's proposals, but their content was distorted or emasculated in the decisions of the congress. The XII Congress of the Party decided to increase the number of members of the Central Committee from 27 to 40 people, but not at the expense of the workers, who "won't say a word against their conscience", but at the expense of apparatchiks, mostly former candidates for members of the Central Committee. As for the control of the work of the Politburo by the working members of the Central Control Commission, who are obliged to be present at every meeting and "regardless of faces" to achieve "the strictest correctness of affairs", then this proposal of Lenin, aimed at democratizing the party elite, in the resolution of the congress looked completely different: "Na meeting of the Politburo, in addition to members of the Central Committee, have the right to attend three permanent representatives of the Central Control Commission from the presidium of the latter.

The new Central Committee is instructed to work out the issue of supplying Politburo documents to members of the Central Committee who are not members of the Politburo, as well as to the Presidium of the [Central Control Commission](#)^[442]³⁰. Specifically, these permanent representatives of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission were determined by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

It can be imagined that if it were possible to implement Lenin's proposal and find such independent workers who "won't say a word against their conscience", then it wouldn't cost them anything to understand the true goals and intentions of the party leadership and see its real face without any socialist "husk". And this face was very unsightly. Here are two testimonies about the meetings of the Politburo and the plenums of the

Central Committee in the 1920s. Stalin's former secretary B. Bazhanov: "And at meetings of the Politburo, I often ask myself where am I? At a meeting of the government of a vast country or in Ali Baba's cave at a meeting of a gang of malefactors?"[443]31.

L. Trotsky: "In 1927, the official meetings of the Central Committee turned into truly disgusting spectacles. No substantive issues were discussed. All matters were decided behind the scenes at Stalin's official meetings, and then, by agreement of the right group: Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky. The most insolent members of the highest institutions, brought in only as a reward for their impudence towards the opposition, continuously interrupted the speeches of experienced persons, first with meaningless repetitions of accusations, shouts, and then with swearing, vulgar swearing. The director of this was Stalin. He walked behind the back of the presidium, looking at those who were scheduled to speak, and did not hide his joy when swearing at the oppositionists took on a completely shameless character. It was hard to imagine that we were at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party"[444]32. In 1922-1923. it has not yet reached this point, but it has developed in this direction. The tragedy of Lenin also consisted in the fact

that in the last period of his life he literally had no one to rely on from his closest associates. Probably, he was aware of this - in any case, giving them characteristics in the "Letter to the Congress", he did not name anyone as his immediate successor. But Lenin still did not imagine to what degree of baseness his former comrades-in-arms could reach in relation to him. Every step he took, every note that he prepared for the 12th Party Congress (and not for the 13th, as the official Soviet literature claimed) and which he considered "absolutely", "categorically" secret, became known the same day

Stalin and other members of the Politburo. Lenin's secretaries L.A. played an unseemly role in this. Fotieva and M.A. Volodichev, who worked for Stalin. At the very least, Stalin and other members of the Politburo were informed of all the notes made before December 29[445]33. At the same time, they did everything to hide the most acute and topical of Lenin's last works. "Letter to the Congress" and "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" remained unknown to ordinary members of the party until 1956. prohibited at the congress. The "Letter to the Congress", as is known, was read out at the Thirteenth Congress only to the delegations, and Kamenev and Zinoviev carried out the appropriate "explanatory" work to smooth out all the sharp characteristics of this document. The "Letter to the Congress" was used in the course of sharp clashes during the intra-party struggle, as a result, it was published in the "Bulletin of the XV Congress of the CPSU (b)" in 1927, but this publication was intended only for a narrow circle of party workers. Former

associates of Lenin, as already mentioned, disavowed his article "How do we reorganize the Workers' Party" in a secret letter to local party committees. Stalin also made a characteristic commentary on the article "On the question of nationalities ..." at a meeting of the seigneurial convention of the XII Congress of the RCP (b), declaring that the article was written by "a sick Lenin under the

But that's not all. In purely political interests, Lenin's articles were edited. The bill of the place about the General Secretary is not the only case of this kind. Historian Yu.A. Buranov, who had the opportunity to compare the original of the first entry from the "Letter to the Congress" dated December 23, 1923, and the published text, came to the conclusion that in the text familiar to us: , going in this respect towards Comrade. Trotsky to a certain extent and on certain conditions", the highlighted words are the result of Stalin's falsification[447]35. Under the secret letter of members of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee dated

January 27, 1923, regarding Lenin's article on the Workers' Peasants' Committee, there is also a signature

Trotsky. Moreover, he wrote the text of the letter himself. How did it happen that Trotsky, with whom Lenin had "maximum agreement" in the last period of his political activity, ended up on a par with his comrades-in-arms who betrayed him? After all, it was to him that he addressed on March 5, 1923, on the eve of the third, most severe attack of the disease, one of the last letters with a request to defend his position on the national question at an emergency plenum of the Central Committee:

"Strictly secret. Personally.

Dear comrade. Trotsky! I

would ask you to take it upon yourself to defend the Georgian cause at the Central Committee of the Party. This matter is now under the "persecution" of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Even quite the opposite. If you agreed to take over his protection, then I could be calm. If for some reason you do not agree, then return the whole case to me. I will take this as a sign of your disagreement. With the best comradely greetings, [Lenin](#).

It was to Trotsky that Krupskaya wrote after Lenin's death, on January 29, 1924, a heartfelt letter about Lenin's good attitude towards him, which "didn't change with him until his [death](#)"[449]37. —

Trotsky himself, in one of the conversations after the death of Lenin, assured that he was "the only consistent conductor Leninist line against the anti-Leninist [Central Committee](#)"[450]38. And in the book "My Life" he later wrote: "I have no doubt that if I had spoken on the eve of the XII Congress in the spirit of the "bloc" of Lenin-Trotsky against Stalinist bureaucracy, I would have won without Lenin's direct participation in the struggle"[451] 39.

These statements of Trotsky's justification before posterity. It was precisely the consistency that Trotsky did not have either in 1923 or in the subsequent 1924 and 1925. One can speak of a certain sequence in his political actions only from the end of 1926,

when he was removed from real power, but this sequence was already too late.

Moreover: there is reason to talk about several alliances between Trotsky and Stalin during 1923-1926. [452]40 Feeling his outsider status and understanding the direction of the policy of the new leadership against Lenin and against himself, he went for these alliances, clinging to power, striving to remain first in the Politburo of the Central Committee, and then at least in the party. Neither in his letters from Alma-Ata, nor in the books written after his expulsion from the USSR, Trotsky touched on this issue. No matter how much he criticized Stalin, he avoided his relations with him in the "case" of Lenin, at best he limited himself to deaf allusions. When he began to approach the disclosure of his main secret, the punishing right hand of Stalin overtook him. The book "Stalin" remained unfinished[453]41. After Trotsky

signed the secret letter dated January 27, 1923, disavowing Lenin, at the February plenum of the Central Committee, he made a belated proposal to create a Party Council from members and candidates for membership of the Central Committee, members of the Central Control Commission and two dozen specially elected members of the Council, thus striving to create a counterbalance to the power of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee. But the plenum rejected this proposal, evaluating it

as a desire to create a dual center in the party. Trotsky did not immediately find himself on a par with the new party leaders who betrayed Lenin, but they eventually forced him to commit this betrayal. Having accepted the ultimatum of the new party elite, he thus paid for his place in it. An analysis of this ultimatum has already been made in the literature [454]42. This is a "Letter from members of the Politburo and candidates for membership of the Politburo to the members of the Politburo and comrades who were present at the meeting of the Politburo on March 22, as well as to all members of the Plenum and candidates", published among the materials of the XII Congress of the RCP (b) [455]43. Under this "Letter" are the signatures of G. Zinoviev, I. Stalin, L. Kamenev, M. Tomskey, A. Rykov, N. Bukharin, M. Kalinin, V. Molotov. Only the signature of L. Trotsky, against whom this "Letter" is directed, is missing. Having delivered an ultimatum to Trotsky, they forced him to refuse to def

April 16, 1923, the day before the opening of the XII Congress, L.A. Fotieva, along with Lenin's article "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" sent letters to Stalin and Kamenev, which spoke about Lenin's position on the national question. A copy of the letter to Kamenev was also sent to Trotsky. Having received it, Trotsky immediately wrote a letter addressed to all members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), where he detailed the circumstances of his receipt of Lenin's article on March 5. By shifting the decision on the issue of "bringing the article in one form or another to the attention of the party or party congress" to the members of the Central Committee, Trotsky relieved himself of "personal responsibility for this article ~~in~~ relation to the party congress"[456]44. The next day, rejecting Stalin's accusations of concealing the article, Trotsky proposed "to investigate this matter in the conflict commission of the congress or ~~in~~ a special commission"[457]45. At the XII Congress of the RCP(b), Trotsky kept silent on the national question, although he knew perfectly well that Lenin was "extremely worried about this issue, and he was preparing ~~to~~ speak on it at the party congress"[458]46.

2. LENIN AND THE RECOVERY OF THE EMPIRE

Considering the tragedy of Lenin as a political figure, it is impossible to avoid the question of the formation of the USSR, since it manifested not just the difference between two points of view on the solution of the national question, but the struggle of the sick Lenin with the emerging Stalinism, which was never brought to an end. If Lenin's reaction to the secret party-state reform is not clear enough, then on the national question it was more clear. And this struggle became part of his tragedy. On the one hand, the formation of the Soviet Union took place under the conditions of the policy of "party dictatorship" and the formation of a new

mechanism of power, which greatly facilitated the implementation of many fundamental decisions on the national question through secret party directives or "in the Soviet order." On the other hand, the Stalinist mechanism of power received its final expression precisely in the creation of the USSR. In fact, it was not the Union, a unitary centralized state called "USSR". Its creation in 1922 was a time bomb that exploded in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union was predetermined, since its creation and the formation of the power mechanism of Stalinist totalitarianism are two Soviet socialist republics, A sides of the same process. The re-establishment of the empire changed the nature of the supreme state power, as a result all the republics came under the direct control of the central allied bodies. All orders of the secret authorities now fully applied to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics. With the collapse of the system of power that existed in the USSR, the disintegration of the unitary state began.

At the heart of the creation of the Soviet Union was the Stalinist plan for autonomization. Its appearance should not be attributed to 1922 - it found a complete expression of the general ideas that existed in the party on the question of the right of nations to self-determination and the nature of the future federation of Soviet republics. If Lenin proceeded from the idea of it as an association of states organized according to the Soviet type (this was also written in the program adopted by the VIII

congress of the RCP(b)[459]1), then Stalin considered the federation as a single state union. At the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) in 1921, he bluntly stated that “the federation of Soviet republics is the desired form of state union, the living embodiment of which is R.S.F.S.R.”[460]2. For Lenin, “the idea of the Union of Republics was the idea of a constantly updated and renewed treaty,” and if you take the risk following M.Ya. Gefter “to construct a certain whole out of fragments”, then it can be assumed that “multiple structures, national relations on the principle of an agreement form the framework of a new model of socialism, for which Lenin did not find a political equivalent”[461]3. For Stalin, the goal

was to recreate a unitary state, which opened up opportunities for the further spread of a totalitarian dictatorship of the Asian type. The status of independent Soviet republics in such a state was considered by analogy with autonomies within the RSFSR. Proceeding from his ideas, he acted as the initiator of the prompt solution of the question of the unification of the republics. On the one hand, he wanted to earn on this authority in the party leadership, on the other hand, to use the recent victory in the civil war, when all the republics were conquered from the Center by the Red Army. In a letter to Lenin dated September 22, 1922, he wrote about this: “If we now do not try to adapt the form of the relationship between the center and the outlying areas to the actual relationships, by virtue of which the outlying areas in everything fundamentally must unconditionally obey the center, i.e. if we do not now replace formal (fictitious) independence with formal (and at the same time real) autonomy, then in a year it will be incomparably more difficult to defend the actual unity of the Soviet republics.

By this time, the first steps had already been taken. Immediately after the end of the XII Party Conference, on August 10, 1922, the Politburo instructed the Orgburo to form a commission, which was to prepare for the next plenum of the Central Committee the question of the relationship between the RSFSR and independent republics. The next day, the Orgburo approved the composition of this commission under the chairmanship of Kuibyshev, and at the end of August, a draft resolution prepared by Stalin[463]5 was submitted for its consideration. He provided for the entry of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan into

Russian Federation as autonomous republics. This project was supported only by the Central Committee of the communist parties of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia opposed: "Proposed on the basis of the theses of comrade. Stalin consider unification in the form of autonomization of independent Republics premature. We consider it necessary to combine economic efforts and a common policy, but with the preservation of all the attributes of independence"[464]6. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus spoke in favor of maintaining treaty relations between the republics. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine did not discuss the project at all.

Despite this, at the meetings of the commission of the Orgburo of the Central under the Committee of the RCP (b), on September 24, 1922, chairmanship of those present on 23 Molotov, the Stalinist project was adopted by a majority of votes. At the same time, resistance was rendered insignificant and mainly by representatives of the republics. Moreover, the very important proposal of Petrovsky to allow the discussion of the decisions taken by the commission in the bureau of the provincial committees of the republics (voted for - G.I. Petrovsky, A.G. Chervyakov, S. Aga-Maly-Ogly and P.G. Mdivani), but under the pressure of the majority, a typical Stalinist proposal passes, in which the action of the emerging mechanism of power is concretely demonstrated: "The present decision, if it is approved by the Central Committee of the RCP, is not published, but transmitted to the national Central Committee as a circular directive, for its implementation in the Soviet order through the Central Executive Committees or congresses of Soviets, of the republics mentioned above until the convening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, at which it is declared as the wish of these republics"[465]7. Here are literally all the components of the mechanism of Stalin's power: and the assignment of decisions from above through party directives, and secrecy, and the passage of the "Soviet order", and complete disregard for the will of the republics themselves. All this is already happening in September 1922.

In such conditions, the effect of which was aggravated by the aggravation of political relations between the leaders of the party, Lenin categorically disagrees with the Stalinist project. Writes a letter to Kamenev for all members of the Politburo. It requires the intervention of him and Zinoviev. Demands that the independence of equal republics not be destroyed. Demands to postpone the consideration of the issue until its return. Stalin agrees with this, but urgently reworks the project and submits it to the Politburo. What is the result? Members

The Politburo, knowing that Lenin is against the autonomization project, that he asks to wait for his return, nevertheless accept this document! Indeed, a new alignment of forces in the Politburo is evident. Such an arrangement, which makes Lenin's [participation](#) not so significant, and perhaps not particularly desirable [466]8.

During the meeting of the Politburo, which took place on September 27-28, 1922, Kamenev and Stalin exchanged

notes: Kamenev: "Ilyich is going to war in defense of independence. Offers me to see the Georgians. Refuses even yesterday's amendments.

Stalin: "We need, in

my opinion, firmness against Ilyich. If a couple of Georgian Mensheviks influence the Georgian communists, and the latter influence Ilyich, then the question arises, where does "independence" come into play? Kamenev: "I think, since Vladimir Ilyich insists, it will be worse to resist."

Stalin: "I don't know. Let him do as he pleases." [467]9 What was this revised document adopted by the Politburo? Employees of the former Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, the authors of the documentary publication "From the history of the formation of the USSR", tried in 1989 to convince readers that "Lenin's position on the issue of the principles of relations between the Soviet republics was taken into account by the commission, as a result of which original, prepared by I.V. Stalin, the project underwent serious changes" [468]10.

Let's see if that's the case. The first paragraph of the new draft on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent Soviet Socialist Republics, signed by Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov and Molotov and sent to all members and candidates of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), said: "It is necessary to recognize the conclusion of an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics and RSFSR on their unification into the "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" with each of them retaining the right to freely withdraw from the ["Union"](#) [469]11. Indeed, the change has been made. Instead of "joining the Russian Federation" written "association in the "Union"". But nothing is said about what, in fact, this "Union" is a union of states or a single state. This is the fundamental position according to which

Lenin just disagreed with Stalin. The essence of these discrepancies was most clearly expressed by Kh.G. Rakovsky in his remarks on the draft resolution on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent republics: "... Instead of developing a real federation that would provide the same conditions for revolutionary construction for everyone, would unite the working class of all nationalities of Russia on the basis of equality, this project misses this task. This project ignores that the Soviet Federation is not a homogeneous nation-state. In this regard, the draft resolution is a turning point in

the whole national policy of our [Party](#).^[470]¹² Indeed, if

Stalin had agreed with Lenin's amendments, then why would he, in a letter to members of the Politburo dated September 27, 1922, reproach Lenin for "national liberalism"? (b), at which he could not attend, to write ~~a~~ note to Kamenev with the following content: "T. Kamenev! Great Russian chauvinism I declare a fight not for life, but for death. As soon as I get rid of the damned tooth, I will eat it with all healthy teeth.

We must absolutely insist that in the allied Central Executive Committee chaired in turn: Russian Ukrainian
Georgian,
etc.

Absolutely!"^[472]¹⁴.

The fact is that Lenin guessed the maneuver of Stalin and the other members of the Politburo who agreed with him; he understood that the same idea of "autonomization" was dragged under "unification into the Union" and categorically disagreed with it. So the assertions that "the plenum of the Central Committee fully supported Lenin's proposals"^[473]¹⁵ are highly doubtful. Not ~~Lenin~~ist, but Stalinist
he supported the proposals.

Lenin's suspicions were soon confirmed by the so-called Georgian incident. Enough has already been said about him, with the involvement of new documents, in modern literature^[474]¹⁶. Let me remind ~~you~~ the main thing. The immediate cause of the conflict between the Transcaucasian

the regional committee of the RCP (b) headed by S. Ordzhonikidze and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which included K.M. Tsintsadze, M.S. Okudzhava, S.I. Kavtaradze, F.I. Makharadze, was the latter's refusal to enter the Union through the Transcaucasian Federation. The confrontation became tough, in which the parties allowed harsh accusations and actions. On October 22, 1922, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia resigned, refusing to work under the "Dzhimordov regime" of Ordzhonikidze, who, in turn, hit one of A. Kabakhidze's opponents, who called him "Stalin's donkey." Characteristically, members of the Georgian Central Committee attempted to seek help from Moscow, to Kamenev, Bukharin, and directly to Lenin, bypassing the Stalin Secretariat. Ordzhonikidze, on the contrary, maintained close contact with Stalin, exchanging cipher telegrams with him. Initially,

Lenin did not understand the essence of this conflict and condemned the actions of the Georgian communists. "I am convinced," he wrote, "that all disagreements have been settled by the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee with my indirect participation and with the direct participation of Mdivani. Therefore, I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and insist on referring your conflict in a decent and loyal tone to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, to which your message was —

transmitted by direct wire . However, this conflict continued. According to the statement of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, on November 24, 1922, the Politburo sent a special commission to Georgia consisting of F.E. Dzerzhinsky (chairman), D.Z. Manuilsky and V.S. Mickiewicz-Kapsukas. In the voting of the composition of the commission at the Politburo, Lenin abstained. Historians V.V. Zhuravlev and A.P. Nenarokov believe that Lenin did not agree with the candidacy of Manuilsky, whom Stalin included in the commission instead of L.S. Sosnovsky, known in the party for his greater independence in views and behavior[476]18. According to Yu.G. Felshtinsky, Lenin generally refused to vote on the composition of this commission, thus protesting against the

appointment of Dzerzhinsky [477]19. The commission had to urgently consider the application of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and propose measures to normalize the situation. Having visited Georgia, she submitted a report to the Politburo, in which the po

against Ordzhonikidze were recognized as untrue. On December 12, the very first

day after the commission returned, Lenin met with Dzerzhinsky. This conversation affected him very badly, because Lenin was dissatisfied with the results of the work of the commission. On December 14, he was going to dictate a letter on the national question, but because of his rapidly deteriorating condition, he was able to carry out his plan only on December 30. On that day, at the First All-Union Congress of Soviets, Stalin delivered a report on the formation of a single union state of the USSR, and the ailing Lenin dictated an article "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization", which he began with the words: "I seem to be greatly to blame for the workers of Russia for not intervening energetically and sharply enough in the notorious question of autonomization, officially called, it seems, the question of the union (Lenin writes this word with a small letter I.P.) of the Soviet socialist republics"[478]20. In the course of the dictation, Lenin concluded that "the whole idea of "autonomization" was fundamentally wrong and untimely." In his opinion, "Political responsibility for this whole truly great Russian nationalist campaign should, of course, be made of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky." Demands "approximately punish comrade. Ordzhonikidze". Lenin regarded the actions towards the Georgian Central Committee as "imperialist attitudes towards the oppressed peoples", which were inherited from the traditional great power of the Russian state apparatus, with its desire to subjugate and centralize everything. As a result of the analysis carried out, Lenin proposed a number of practical measures. Let's pay attention to the first two: "Firstly, we should leave and strengthen the union of socialist republics; there can be no doubt about this measure. We need it, just as the world communist proletariat needs it to fight the world bourgeoisie and to protect itself from its attacks." Secondly, it is necessary to leave the union of socialist republics in relation to the diplomatic apparatus"[479]21. Historian V. Doroshenko considers the phrase in the sentence "the union should be left and strengthened" to be falsified ;

the next Congress of Soviets back, that is, to leave the union of Soviet socialist republics only in military and diplomatic respects, and in all other respects to restore the full independence of individual people's commissariats"[481]23. Lenin finished his —

dictation on December 31, and three days later, in the "Addendum" to the "Letter to the Congress" dated January 4, 1923, he proposed to consider a way to move Stalin from the post of General Secretary [482]24 .

In January - February 1923, the main thing for the sick Lenin was carried out with the help of L.A. Fotieva, M.I. Glasser and H.P. Gorbunova additional investigation of the materials of the Dzerzhinsky Commission. In conclusion on this case, Lenin concluded that there was a great-power bias in the leadership of the party. If earlier in his work "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" Lenin accused Stalin of Great-Russian chauvinism, of embitterment, of overdoing some of the truly Russian mood, now Lenin accused him of being a great power, pointing out the great-power chauvinistic bias in the leadership of the party. The great-power deviation is no longer overdoing, but a conscious group policy on behalf of the party and the Soviet state. Stalin, meanwhile, is forcing

the approval of the report of the commission and its proposals to the Politburo. On January 25, 1923, a decision was made to send a special letter to the gubernia and regional committees about the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia, signed by Stalin. At the same meeting, the Politburo approved the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of December 21, 1922, on the transfer to work outside Georgia of opponents of the Stalinist plan for the formation of the USSR - Tsintsadze, Mdivani, Kavtaradze and Makharadze[483]25. This decision is again taken "behind Lenin's back", i.e., a new mechanism of power is again put into action!

We must not forget about the position in which Lenin was. Sick, semi-paralyzed, blocked by illness, by doctors, by Stalin. The latter isolates Lenin from the party, instructs doctors, monitors his activities through his agents of Lenin's secretaries, insults his relatives. Not only on December 22, 1922, but at least two more times Krupskaya was insulted at the end of January and the beginning of February 1923 and a few days before March 5, when Lenin wrote a letter to Stalin about the break in relations[484]26. What —

was it necessary to tell poor Nadezhda Konstantinovna that, after a conversation with Stalin, she would become “completely unlike herself, crying, rolling on the floor, etc.”? M.I. Ulyanova, who owns these lines, among other things, reported that “she (Krupskaya I.P.) told V.I. about this reprimand a few days later, adding that she had already made peace with Stalin”[485]27.

Most likely, it was after this last incident
outraged Lenin and wrote the famous letter on March 5, 1923:

Strictly secret

Personally “To Comrade

Stalin. Copy vols. Kamenev and

Zinoviev. Dear comrade Stalin! You were rude to call my wife to the phone and scold her. Although she expressed her consent to you to forget what was said, nevertheless this fact became known through her to Zinoviev and Kamenev. I do not intend to forget so easily what was done against me, and it goes without saying that I consider what was done against my wife to be done against me. Therefore, I ask you to consider whether you agree to take back what was said and apologize or prefer to break off relations between us. Yours faithfully, [Lenin](#)”[486]28.

This incident aggravated the already poor state of Lenin.

But let's get back to the political side of things. The main thing here was that during the six months of Stalin's policy, Lenin managed to reveal this phenomenon of the twentieth century, Stalinism, which consisted of a great power, then in and start a fight against it. At the February (21 24) plenum of the Central Committee of 1923, Stalin's "Theses on the question of national aspects in party and state construction" were considered. The content of the discussion that took place at the plenum on this issue is unknown. Until 1924, the meetings of the plenums were not recorded in shorthand, only the minutes of decisions were recorded. But the fact that it was can be judged at least by the proposals of M.V. Frunze. The first item in them is written: “To confirm in a categorical form the need to separate the governing bodies of the Union of Republics

from the existing bodies of the RSFSR" [487]29. It is worth highlighting this particular point, since it sharply diverged from what was in the Stalinist project, namely: "Indel, Vneshtorg, Narkomvoen, NKPS and Potel of the Republics and Federations that are part of the Union, merge with those of the Union of Soviet Sots. Respubliki" so that the relevant people's commissariats of the "Union of the Republics" had their representatives in the republics and federations with a small apparatus, appointed by the people's commissars of the "Union" in agreement with the CECs of the federations and republics "[488]30. On the one hand, as we see, Frunze's attempt to defend the state independence of the republics, and on the other hand, the desire to completely subordinate them to the supranational bodies of the Union. As a result, the February plenum decided

not to publish Stalin's theses, but to communicate them to Lenin (with the permission of the doctors). If he demands a revision of the theses, convene a new, emergency plenum of the Central Committee. In addition, the plenum recognized the need to form at the XII Congress a section or a broad commission on the national question with the involvement of communists - "nationals" who will come to congress.

[489]31. Lenin rejected Stalin's theses. An emergency plenum of the Central Committee was being prepared. The policy of Stalin and the members of the Politburo who supported him was under threat. It was at this moment on the eve of the congress that Lenin suffered the third stroke of the disease with increased paralysis and loss of the ability to speak. As already mentioned above, literally a day before the onset of deterioration, on March 5, 1923, Lenin turned to Trotsky for help to speak on the national question at the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), and on March 6 he dictated a letter to P. G. (Budu) Mdivani, F. E. Makharadze and others: "Dear comrades! I follow your work with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing notes and a speech for you"[490]32. —

Having learned about Lenin's letter to Trotsky, Stalin on the same day, March 5, sent a cipher telegram to all local party committees about the postponement of the congress from March 30 to April 15; in addition, they were "recommended not to change the dates for convening party conferences, which would be attended by members and representatives of the Central Committee in a timely manner"[491]33. The purpose of these emissaries is clear; they were to form a reliable composition of the congress, which would support the policy of the ruling group

Politburo. The new leaders of the party stopped the spread of any information about their subsequent actions with two cipher telegrams (dated March 12 and 13, 1923) about Lenin's illness, sent in a strictly secret order to the secretaries of the provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics. In a telegram dated March 13, signed by Stalin (on instructions from the Politburo), local secretaries pledged to "carefully monitor their (workers and peasants I.P.) mood and actively counter any kind of false rumors, openly exposing them and persecuting the malicious sowers of such rumors publicly - and a fast-acting court"

As for Trotsky, having received from Lenin on March 5, together with a letter, materials on the national question, the next day he sent a letter to the Politburo "To Comrade Stalin's theses on the national question." It spoke of the need to emphasize in the theses the idea that there are two deviations in the party - "great powers" and "nationals". "From some of the most central workers," Trotsky wrote, "we heard at the plenum (meaning the February 1923 plenum of the Central Committee - I.P.) views in which dormant and only inadvertently disturbed great power was seen." Trotsky's letter produces an ambivalent impression: on the one hand, one can see a certain determination to support the Leninist formulation of the question, which was manifested, in particular, in the passage that spoke of the need to wage a real struggle against the "great-power tendencies" that exist "in our state apparatus and partly , as it is said, within our own party", as well as about the danger of the great-power direction in the development of the united commissariats, which can lead to ignoring the economic or cultural interests of the national republics. On the other hand, the readiness to make concessions to Stalin is also visible: "I do not formulate exact amendments, because I think that it will be easier for Comrade Stalin to do this if he finds, as I hope, that my amendments do not contradict the general meaning of his theses" . Stalin, in his answer to Trotsky on March 7, 1923, agreed with his interpretation of the two deviations in the party, but ignored the need for the question

great-power tendencies, in which the influence of Lenin was felt[493]35. Lenin's deteriorating health—

reduced Trotsky's determination to continue the fight, and this is felt in his article "Thoughts on the Party.

II. The National Question and the Education of Party Youth", published on March 20 in the newspaper Pravda. After an extended meeting of the Politburo on March 22 (members were present - Stalin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Tomsy, candidates - Molotov, Kalinin Bukharin and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Tsyurupa), which usurped the powers of the plenum of the Central Committee, accepting Stalin's theses[494]36, Trotsky again went into opposition . On March 23, he issued a letter to the Politburo, in which he returned to the Leninist formulation of the national question. After his proposals were rejected at a meeting of the Politburo on March 26 by six votes to one, on March 28 his following appeal to the Secretariat of the Central Committee followed: "On the second page of protocol No. 57 on the question of Georgia, only my proposal to recall Comrade Ordzhonikidze is recorded. I made three proposals and, since the first is mentioned, two others must be added, also rejected: 1) to state that the Transcaucasian federation in its present form is a distortion of the Soviet idea of federation in the sense of excessive centralism; 2) to recognize that the comrades who represent a minority in the Georgian Communist Party do not represent a "deviation" from the party line on the national question; their policy on this issue was of a defensive nature - against the wrong policy of Comrade Ordzhonikidze"[495]37.

Further, Stalin and the Co-ultimatum forced Trotsky to refuse to defend Lenin's position at the plenum of the Central Committee on March 30-31. At the same plenum the Central Committee also abandoned its February resolutions. The way

for the victory of the Stalinist line at the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) was thus cleared. The "bomb" that Lenin was preparing for him did not explode. The only thing he could do on the last day of the congress was to ask M.I. Ulyanov to get a folder with papers from the closet and with great difficulty say: "Congress, comrades!"[496]38.

The 12th Congress became decisive in consolidating the policy of the "dictatorship of the party" and the Stalinist solution of the national question. Speeches

Mdivani, Makharadze, Rakovsky at the congress could not reverse the situation set by Stalin's report and all his previous policies. Especially desperate was the speech of Rakovsky, who bluntly stated that "union construction went on the wrong path", and also prophetically predicted that "this is one of those questions that promises a civil war" [497]39.

And what about the former associates of Lenin? Trotsky, as has already been said, kept silent on this issue. Zinoviev stated that "the theses of Comrade Stalin and the Central Committee are excellent, exhaustive, they are thought out to the end, completed, and no one can say that there is a mistake in them, we ~~will~~ probably accept them unanimously"[498]40. Kamenev, who presided, interrupted Mdivani endlessly, forbidding him to quote Lenin's article "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"". Bukharin came out with weak criticism, but at the end he also called on the congress to vote for "the excellent theses of the Central Committee and Comrade [Stalin](#)"[499]41. And Yenukidze agreed to the point of stating that "T. Lenin became a victim of one-sided incorrect information" and that, when he recovers, "he will agree that many times the questions that were put forward here by comrade deviators were known to him, but if they were correctly elucidated and explained, he agreed with the policy pursued there by the so-called. —

Ordzhonikidze. It could not have been otherwise ."[500]42 It is natural to ask the question: why did Stalin manage to create a single union state in just six months of carrying out his ~~na~~ national policy?[501]43. The fact is that the great-power-chauvinist bias in the leadership of the party was predetermined by a misunderstanding of the specifics of national relations in Russia both before and after the revolution. This deviation existed not only in the leadership, but throughout the entire party. As K. Radek accurately said at the Twelfth Congress, "the party, as such, has not yet taken a course on the national question. The majority of the

party does not understand the significance of this [question](#)"[502]44. The great power was closely connected with the political and cultural mentality of the Russian people. It was this that became the basis for Stalin's victory. To win, he only had to give vent to the existing great-power aspiratio

was not imposed on the party, according to the historian A.P. —
Nenarokov[503]45. She accepted him voluntarily. Lenin, however, had to overcome enormous difficulties in order to carry out his policy on the national question. He could rely on a small group of party members who understood, although not all to the same extent, the danger of a great power and its incompatibility with the idea of socialism. The names of these communists are B. Mdivani, F., mainly known to these communists Makharadze, H. Rakovsky, G. Safarov, H. Skrypnik, M. Sultan-Galiev and some others.

But the behavior of Lenin himself in this struggle raises a number of inevitable questions. Why was his position in the autumn of 1922 more of a waiting than offensive? Why did he not use all the possibilities of fighting Stalin? And, finally, did he himself manage to overcome the great-power aspirations traditional for the Russian consciousness?

Summing up, we can say that if, as a result of the October Revolution, Russia took a step towards Asia (instead of a step towards Europe), then the next step was made as a result of the creation of the USSR, the restoration of the empire. Having one Central Committee of the party, one Politburo, a joint GPU, appointed from the Center of responsible leaders who acted on the secret party directives received from it, the party elite could freely pursue a policy of expanding, strengthening and tightening Asian-type totalitarianism.

3. FINAL STEPS

In the existing historical literature, Lenin, as a political figure, died at the beginning of March 1923, when he suffered the third, most severe attack of the disease, which led to increased paralysis and loss of speech. In one of the last articles about Lenin - Yu.G. Felshtinsky - one can read: "It is obvious that in the period from March 7, 1923 to January 21, 1924, Lenin did not function as a political figure, and the task of Krupskaya and Ulyanova was only to prevent the assassination of Lenin by Stalin"[504]1. Lenin's life after he was transported to Gorki on May 15 is comprehensively reviewed in the well-known article by B. Ravdin[505]2. But he did not even allow the thought of Lenin's possible political actions during this period [506]3. This possibility is considered in the article "The Last Trip", written by me together with V.L. Doroshenko and published in 1989 [507]4 We called our point of view on the events that took place in 1923 with Lenin a historical hypothesis, which is quite acceptable in conditions where many direct evidence of Lenin's last confrontation is absent. But the data that are available are quite enough to state the very fact of the confrontation and outline its main contours. At the end of May - beginning of June 1923, feeling better after the move, Lenin again returned

to his Letter to the Congress. June 2 H.K. Krupskaya handed over to the Central Committee not only Lenin's work "On giving legislative functions to the State Planning Commission" a fact recorded in the "Biographical Chronicle"[508]5, but also his demand that the "Letter to the Congress" be published. Is it necessary to speak here about the significance of this fact and about Lenin's actions that brought this fact to life? After the publication of materials from the Trotsky archive, it became known about the reaction of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to Lenin's demand. Only Trotsky spoke in favor of the publication. The rest Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, Tomsky, Bukharin, Solts, Rudzutak, Molotov and Kuibyshev are against[509]6.

There is no doubt that Lenin was in a difficult state of health in 1923 and early 1924. However, he used the slightest opportunity for political struggle. And this was in conditions when Gorki was transferred to the OGPU under the command of G. Yagoda, when security guards were on duty around the clock at the door to Lenin's room. Under the letter of A. Yenukidze, addressed to Kamenev, Stalin, Zinoviev and Rudzutak, there is also a date - June 2, 1923. It says, in particular: "The transfer of these sanatoriums (Gorki - II, III and IV - I.P.) in the sole management of Comrade Yagoda, I find it very expedient. T. Yagoda will undoubtedly be able to perfectly organize the entire internal organization of these sanatoriums. By the way, Stalin's order was made long ago to transfer these sanatoriums to Yagoda, and it has already been carried out"[510]7. What the management of Comrade Yagoda meant can be judged from the testimony of one of Lenin's guards: "We, the guards of Ilyich, were also located in this building (northern wing - I.P.) ... We tried to be as quiet as possible on the ground floor. But the staircase that led to the second floor dried up and creaked when we made shift

There is a clear tendency in the available literature to bypass the issue of Lenin's speech in the last period of his life. In itself, the presence of contradictory evidence in the memoirs (according to some, he says, according to others - no) allows us to conclude that Lenin's speech was being restored. To characterize his political consciousness, the recognition of the fact of the preservation of intelligence is of great importance, confirmed in one of the latest publications on this topic - the book of Academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences Yu.M. Lopukhin[512]9. Even from an official source it is known that, starting from August 10 and until the end of his life, "Lenin daily looks through Pravda, and then Izvestia and other newspapers and magazines, notes materials that N.K. Krupskaya then reads to him"[513]10. The daily reading of newspapers is certainly an expression of

unflagging political interest. The fact that Lenin did not die as a politician in 1923, but tried to act, is evidenced by the facts that were undertaken to discredit him. Here is one of the most characteristic. In the ninth issue of the journal "Proletarian Revolution" for 1923, Lenin's letters to V.A. Karpinsky on April 12 (25)

1917, to Ya.S. Ganetsky and K.B. Radek from the same date and to Ya.S. Ganetsky dated April 21 (May 4), 1917. The publication was made from copies of police perustration, which were in the archive of the Minister of Justice. Under each letter is the signature: "It is true with the genuine. Lieutenant Colonel ~~L~~Medvedev"[514]11. These are the letters that appeared among the documents that gave the Provisional Government grounds for accusing Lenin of espionage and ordering his arrest. And now, in September 1923, they are published not somewhere abroad in the emigre press, but in the USSR, in a party magazine! It was a frank attack on Lenin's authority in the party. From whose side? It is unlikely that Zinoviev would have taken such a step. After all, he also returned to Russia through Germany; he was accused by the Provisional Government together with Lenin and hid with him in Razliv. With a high degree of certainty, it can be assumed that this action was personally carried out by Stalin, who thereby actually renewed Lenin's accusations of espionage. Lenin learned about this attack back in October, and 40 days before his death, on December 11, 1923, he again demanded the ninth issue of the Proletarian Revolution magazine[515]12.

An analysis of the available evidence about the last year of Lenin's life and work leads to the assumption that the struggle against Zinoviev - Stalin Kamenev objectively led Lenin to support the opposition. Despite the restrictions and direct prohibitions, in the fall of 1923 he met at least twice with E.A. Preobpazhensky, as well as with A.K. Voronsky and, in all likelihood, with T.V. Saponov, whose signatures are under the "Statement 46". Through the doctor Trotsky F.A. Getye, who was in Gorki, Lenin could well maintain relations with Trotsky himself. It is no coincidence that Lenin chose October 18 as the day of his trip to Moscow. We believe that he had more than enough reasons for that trip, and the time of the trip was chosen exactly. Lenin arrived in Moscow at the height of the political crisis: on October 8, 1923, Trotsky spoke out with criticism of the policy of the then leadership of the party of Zinoviev - Stalin Kamenev, and three days before Lenin's arrival, on October 15, a group of prominent party figures issued the so-called "Statement 46- And". What is known so far about Lenin's trip? Firstly, this is information

from his "Biographical Chronicle": "October, 18.

Lenin expresses his firm intention to go to Moscow. N.K. is going with him. Krupskaya, M.I. Ulyanova, prof. V.P. Osipov, head of security in Gorki P.P. Pakaln and others. On the way they are joined by prof. V.N. Rozanov, who was on his way to Gorki. At the entrance to Moscow (about 6 p.m.), Lenin takes off his cap and greets the capital. Arriving in the Kremlin, he goes up to his apartment, rests from the road, sitting in an armchair, then inspects the whole apartment, bookcases.

October 19.

Lenin selects a number of books in his library in the Kremlin, among them three volumes of works by G. Hegel, works by G.V. Plekhanov, own works; sorts out his notebooks. Then Lenin goes to the premises of the Council of People's Commissars, enters his office. After lunch (about 2 pm) he again goes to the Council of People's Commissars, goes to the meeting room.

Lenin takes a walk in the courtyard of the Kremlin, he is greeted by a detachment of cadets of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, engaged in the square. Around 15 o'clock. Lenin leaves by car for a walk around Moscow in the direction of the All-Russian Agricultural and Handicraft-Industrial Exhibition, but it was not possible to examine the exhibition in detail because of the rain. Around 4 p.m. 30 min. Lenin again arrives at the Kremlin, and then returns (at 7 p.m.) to Gorki, very pleased with the trip.

Secondly, this is the information of N. Valentinov, received by him from V.N. Malyantovich, that in his apartment Lenin "for a long time looked for some thing that he wrote before the third blow and remained in his Kremlin apartment when he was transported to Gorki on a stretcher. Lenin did not allow anyone to touch the papers he kept. In 1922, having left for Gorki, he demanded from Fotiyeva (she writes about this) "to lock the drawers of his desk in the office and not to disassemble anything there." He established the same order in his apartment ... Arriving from Gorki to the Kremlin, Lenin found that the order he had established had been violated by someone. The thing he was looking for was not where he expected to find it. Lenin became very irritated from this, began to wheeze, he had convulsions. Frightened, Krupskaya and Ulyanova, perhaps with someone's help, took him downstairs, put him in a car and brought him to Gorki. After that, for several days he was in the most serious morbid condition.

Thirdly, this is the information cited by B. Ravdin and A. Khanyutin: in the Kremlin, Lenin found only empty offices. By

By order of Kamenev, all meetings in the Council of People's Commissars were canceled, and employees were sent home. According to M.A. Volodicheva, L.A. Fotieva allegedly reproached herself all her life for not daring to violate Kamenev's instructions and not meeting with Lenin, who twice entered his Kremlin [office](#)^[518]¹⁵. —

There are other data as well. In our article "The Last Journey," we published Stalin's cipher telegram to local party organs for members of the Central Committee: "By a decision of the Politburo on October 18, it was decided to convene an emergency Plenum on October 25 on the internal party situation. The Plenum will sit together with the Plenum of the Central Control Commission ... Secretary of the Central Committee [Stalin](#)"^[519]¹⁶. Consciousness instantly draws a picture: Lenin, the last time participating in a meeting of the Politburo. By the way, before the exposure of the so-called personality cult of Stalin, October 18, 1923 was not included at all in Lenin's biographical chronicle: he was in Moscow for only one day - October 19.

The official minutes of the Politburo meeting of October 18 included 23 questions, two of which were about the internal party situation: paragraph 6 "Statement of Preobrazhensky and others." (Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Sapronov) and paragraph 11 "On the Resolution of the Central Control

—
Commission" (Kuibyshev) [\[520\]](#)¹⁷. It is impossible not to notice that the course of Lenin's illness is connected with his political actions. The preparation of the plenum of the Central Committee in March 1923 - and the crisis, the demand to publish the "Letter to the Congress" - and again deterioration, a trip to Moscow - and a new exacerbation of the disease. The final removal of Lenin from the leadership of the party at the same time meant the defeat of the opposition. After his return from Moscow, another attempt was made to transport him to the Crimea, but he categorically refused^[524]¹⁸. According to the latest data, which are given in the book by Yu.M. Lopukhin, "Lenin spent November and December 1923, in fact, in complete isolation..."^[522]¹⁹. He learned

about the opposition's defeat two days before his death, when Krupskaya read to him the resolutions of the XIII Party Conference. "When on Saturday, she wrote later, Vladimir Ilyich apparently began to get agitated, I told him that the resolutions had been adopted unanimously. Saturday and Sunday were spent reading resolutions. Vladimir Ilyich listened very attentively, sometimes asking

questions. On January 21, 1924, a sudden sharp deterioration in Lenin's state of health began. At 18 o'clock. 50 min. he died[523]20. —

The tragedy of Lenin as a political figure turned into a tragedy of the many millions of Russian people. In 1922-1923. a turning point could still occur in the social development of Russia, set by the October Revolution and the civil war, but it did not happen. The nascent Stalinism won. Already in 1923, it was a whole system of interconnected transformations in politics, economics, social life and culture, expressed in:

firstly, in the creation of a supranational state system of the USSR,

secondly, in the approval of the system of "dictatorship of the party" of the party-state structure with the final elimination of elements of democracy in it, with the approval of bureaucratic centralism, the sovereignty of committees over organizations and secretariats over committees, with channels of secret party-state information pation, with the subordination of the executive committees of the Soviets to the party committees , thirdly, in

experiments on the tacit abolition of the main components of the NEP - such as the prohibition of the free sale of bread during the grain procurement period, the artificial lowering of prices for agricultural products (which was also practiced from the second half of 1922 and in 1923), fourth, in the deployment since 1923 of

the "cultural revolution". In fact, it was an ethno-cultural revolution that crushed the traditions, moral priorities and spiritual values of the people. If the cultural revolution is aimed mainly at spreading and increasing the education of the people, then the ethno-cultural revolution is aimed at the violent change in the system of values of the ethnos, and this is a transformation of a different kind and with different results. Its main result was the emergence of a new socio-historical community of people - the Soviet people. There were traditions in Russian culture that prevented the establishment

of Stalinism. But, since the system of values was destabilized, traditions that favored totalitarianism prevailed. This is the priority of state property in Russian economic culture; paternalistic consciousness and

autocracy as its expression in political culture, understanding of leadership and execution as relations of domination and subordination; the leader's charisma; the traditional priority of "fairness" over legality. All these traditions were already cultivated on a new ideological basis. The end to the tragedy of Lenin was

put by the political processes of 1936-1938. "As a result of a series of Moscow trials," wrote Trotsky, it turned out that out of nine people who, during Lenin's lifetime, were in the Politburo, that is, in the supreme institution of the party and the state, all except Stalin and the timely deceased Lenin, turned out to be agents of foreign states. Only traitors stood at the head of the Red Army: Trotsky, Tukhachevsky, Yegorov, Yakir, Uborevich, Gamarnik, Muralov, Admiral Orlov, etc. The most important Soviet diplomats: Rakovsky, Sokolnikov, Krestinsky, Karakhan, Yurenev, Bogomolov and others turned out to be enemies of the people. At the head of industry, railways and finance were the organizers of sabotage: Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Smirnov, Lifshits, Grinko and others. Agents of fascism happened to be at the head of the Comintern: Zinoviev, Bukharin and [Radek](#). List

this can be continued for a long time in it practically the entire Leninist party.

4. THE "CASE" OF LENIN AND THE OPPOSITION

It is difficult to find a more distorted plot in Soviet history than the struggle that took place in the party in the 1920s. There are so many omissions and outright lies here that even today it is still very difficult to approach this topic.

Let's open the infamous "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", which determined all directions of development of Soviet historical science in the 1930s - 1950s. Members of the opposition to the general course of the party are presented in it as ardent enemies of Soviet power. "It was precisely at this difficult moment for the Soviet state (in the autumn of 1923, I.P.), when the leader of the party was bedridden, that Trotsky launched his attack against the Bolshevik party. Gathering around him all the anti-Leninist elements in the party, he concocted an opposition platform directed against the party, against its leader, against her policy"[525]1. Further, the presentation was carried out in the following expressions - "poured mud", "vilely hinted", "political double-dealers", "a miserable bunch of a few sang along", "rolled into the anti-Soviet swamp", "spies recruited by foreign intelligence", "dirty things", "unprincipled clique of political careerists", "kulak soul of the Bukharin-Rykov group", "Trotskyist-Bukharin gang of fascism mercenaries", "Trotskyist rump", "Trotskyist-Bukharin fiends", "White Guard pygmies", "White Guard boogers". Of course, there could be no question of any scientific approach to the consideration of this plot.

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a certain departure from the "Short Course" scheme was made, but the same pro-Stalinist concept remained at the heart of the coverage of the internal party struggle, as well as the history of Soviet society as a whole. The fight against the opposition in the 1920s was presented as before as a struggle against the enemies of socialist construction. The extreme expressions of the "Short Course" in assessing the opposition and its leaders were somewhat softened, but the stamps of the old historiography remained: "sally", "imposed", "hypocritical behavior of opposition leaders", "schismatic activity"[526]2.

All the monographs of historians written at that time on this topic had either the word "struggle" or "rout" in their titles[527]3. —

The process of reassessment of views on the history of the intra-party struggle continued very slowly after 1985. Danilov declared: "It is impossible to remain silent and dismiss the analysis of the views of Trotsky, Bukharin and others. We must give them an objective, conclusive, and not just a scathing assessment, convince the reader that the decisions of the Party in relation to the left and right deviations

were correct"[528]4 (emphasis added by I.P.).

Characteristic for that time is the assessment of D. A. Volkogonov in the article "The Phenomenon of Stalin", which appeared in the Literaturnaya Gazeta on December 9, 1987: "Stalin, the leading core of the party, defended and defended Leninism in the political, ideological struggle, created favorable conditions for accelerated socialist construction. Stalin was, perhaps, the most consistent and strong-willed defender of the party's course towards the establishment and strengthening of the world's first socialist state.

The ice broke in 1988 after the civil and party rehabilitation of Bukharin and other leaders of the so-called [529]5 right-wing deviation in the CPSU(b). That year was the year of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Bukharin, marked by the publication of a number of his works, the publication in Russian of S. Cohen's book Bukharin. In the writings of Soviet authors of that time, such a view of the history of the internal party struggle dominated, according to which the only opposition in the party that offered an alternative to Stalinism was the Bukharin group. Developing this version, its adherents believed that in the late 1920s. there was a departure of Stalin from Leninism and that after the death of Lenin, the majority of the leaders of the party rallied precisely around Stalin against Trotsky, who aspired to personal dictatorship. In most publications, Bukharin's activity was limited to the end of the 1920s, that is, the time when he opposed Stalin. Questions remained unanswered about what Bukharin did before 1928, what was his position during the discussion of 1923, how to assess his alliance with Stalin in 1925-1927, how to relate to his activities after the defeat of the so-called. right bias, in particular, to

the fact that just a few days after the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which removed him from the Politburo, he wrote a letter of repentance to this same Politburo.

Notes by I.E. Gorelov to the book by S. Cohen, who corrected the American historian from the positions of the pro-Stalin concept. The apogee of Bukharin's idealization was an article by V.V. Zhuravlev and V.P. "The extraordinary strength of the mind, they wrote, devotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the nobility of his spiritual appearance, simplicity, rare sociability and friendliness - all this made Bukharin the favorite of the party." But this is an assessment of his political activity: "Naturally, in the early 20s. Bukharin found himself at the head of the struggle against Trotskyism as an ideological trend. He consistently defended the Leninist understanding of the ideals, as well as the forms and methods of socialist construction.

the main thing in the article

Thus, on the one hand, there is an idealization of Bukharin and an enthusiastic assessment of the Bukharin alternative to Stalinism, on the other hand, a former assessment of the role of Trotsky and Trotskyism. This assessment was also present in numerous works by H.A. Vasetsky on the history of intra-party struggle. Being the author of almost all the prefaces to the works of Trotsky published to date, he still did not want to believe that between Lenin and Trotsky in 1922-1923. there was a unity of political views, as well as to recognize the fact that Lenin turned to Trotsky for help in his last struggle against the majority of the Politburo. According to this historian, Trotsky's allusions "to some kind of joint bloc do him no credit, not to mention the fact that they cast a shadow on [Lenin himself](#)"[530]6. For him, as for many other authors of that time, it was certainly clear that Stalin put into practice the ideas of Trotsky ~~without~~ without any desire to understand or even doubt the correctness of such a statement[531]7. Even in the writings of the most independent-minded authors, "ears stuck out" of the pro-Stalinist concept. So, according to E. G. Plimak, "the fact

that Trotskyism is a completely real trend, different from Leninism, we have no doubts"[532]8. Gradually, another —

approach to the history of the inner-party struggle emerged. In the articles of G.A. Bordyugov and V.A. Kozlov posed the problem of Bukharin's responsibility for the NEP crises[533]9. The most notable work, which, figuratively speaking, blocked the path of further idealization of this politician, was the book by Yu.V. Emelyanov "Notes on Bukharin: Revolution, History, Personality" (M., 1989). He correctly captured the fact that in Soviet publications Bukharin appears as a new ideological icon and that these publications are built according to the "bad Stalin good Bukharin" scheme, a scheme that is far from historical reality. However, in the article about Trotsky, the desire for truth betrayed Emelyanova, he was driven only by pro-Stalin hostility towards Trotsky and the Trotskyists. Trotsky was blamed for the fact that he allegedly provoked widespread repressions and that the Trotskyists directed the hand of the murderer of Kirov - Nikolaev [534]10. Gradually, albeit slowly, the

attitude towards other opposition leaders changed. After the civil rehabilitation of Kamenev and Zinoviev on June 13, 1988, their personal assessment, as well as the assessment of the entire so-called. new opposition in the party. It was Trotsky's turn. One of the first publications,

which presented a new view of this historical figure for Soviet historiography, was a conversation with the Leningrad historian V.I. Bilik, published in the magazine "Interlocutor" in August 1989 (No. 33). In the same year, for the first time in the USSR after the 1920s. the publication of Trotsky's works began [535]11. In 1990, in fact, "Stalin's school of falsifications", all his main works "Stalin", "My Life" and others were republished. Finally, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU found it possible to publish first Trotsky's letter dated October 8, 1923, which, as it was said in the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", "he launched his attack against the Bolshevik Party", then "Statement 46-i" and a letter from Trotsky to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Com

The journal "ECO" published chapters from the book of the director of the Trotsky Institute in Paris, P. Brouet "Trotsky"[537]13.

Here there was a new twist on this topic in Soviet historiography. The same V.P. Danilov, who in 1987 said that the main task of historians is to convince the reader of the correctness of the party's struggle against the left and right deviations, now believed that the main

the alternative to Stalinism was associated precisely with Trotsky[538]14.

Here is his statement, made in a conversation with the English historian R. Davis:

"Trotsky was not opposed to the market concept of economic development, as it is still presented to us. He included in his concept of future development the moment of violence in the form of seizure of 100-150 million poods of grain from 10% of the wealthy part of the village.

But by themselves, these values do not go into any comparison with the Stalinist practice. In addition, for him it was only the initial moment, an impetus for future development. The withdrawal of these 100-150 million poods in the form of a forced loan did not in any way preclude the use of the market. The proceeds were supposed to be used to purchase equipment for the textile industry in order to speed up the inclusion of a market mechanism for accumulating funds for industrialization. According to Danilov, Trotsky was superior to Bukharin and others in that he fought for a democratic intra-party regime. In 1922-1923 in connection with this, a struggle unfolded in the party, the outcome of which could be the development of Soviet society on other, non-Stalinist paths[539]15.

At the beginning of 1990, Danilov made another admission that the scheme for considering the internal party struggle of the 1920s. as a struggle for power (and it dominated Soviet historiography until the very last time!) this is a myth that Stalin really needed[540]16. Recognition of the incorrectness of the whole concept of the internal party struggle of the 1920s. meant the rejection of all previous literature on this topic. A ruthless but fair verdict of Soviet historiography was issued by V.V. Zhuravlev: "In the problems of the history of the intra-party struggle, one of the most disgusting Stalinist falsifications continued to dominate, the essence of which is as follows: everything in intra-party relations after Lenin, which, according to the most

opposed to Stalin by various circumstances and reasons, it was automatically declared "anti-Stalinist". T. n. The "concept of two leaders" of the party and the Soviet state became not only the apogee of everything immoral that had accumulated in our social thought for decades, but also the direct result of neglect and gross violation of all the norms and principles of the scientific, including the source study approach"[541]17. This statement can also be considered as a kind of repentance of the Institute itself, which of Marxism-Leninism, of the time, sanctioned precisely this, pro-Stalinist, scheme for covering the history of the intra-party struggle.

before last

The destruction of the basic myth on which the concept of the internal party struggle rested deprived this plot of any clarity and certainty. Now that the clichés have been removed, the images of the enemy have been destroyed, and all the leaders of the opposition have stood on a par with Stalin, the mysteries of the internal party struggle have been revealed. Each researcher of this topic tried to find in it some starting points, the most important facts that would make it possible to give a rational explanation for the unfolding events. Characteristic is the result, to which Vasetsky came. As such facts, he chose the situations that arose among the top party leadership in connection with Lenin's "Letter to the Congress" and the meeting in a cave near Kislovodsk in the summer of 1923. Without them, in his opinion, "it is impossible even approximately to understand anything in the character intra-party — struggle of that period"[542]18. Danilov also singled out two mysterious moments in Trotsky's behavior, which, from his point of view, "are not amenable to any convincing explanation (at least according to the documents revealed so far). First of all, we are talking about the refusal to accept the proposal of V.I. Lenin to become deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which would make Trotsky the actual successor to Lenin. Even more incomprehensible is the failure to fulfill the order, even Lenin's personal request to speak at the next plenum of the Central Committee in defense of their common position on the case." To exceptional meaning"[543]19.

"Georgian the latter, Lenin gave Trotsky's completely Jewish origin, about which he himself spoke at the October 1923 plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the summary of his speech first published by Danilov does little to ex

The internal party struggle of the 1920s, no doubt, had external and internal sides. The external side consisted in a different understanding of the problems and prospects for the development of the country. It is difficult to imagine a different position, because the very development of the country in those years was extremely contradictory. It is no coincidence that the decisive clashes occurred precisely during the periods of NEP crises: the NEP crisis of 1923 and Trotsky's opposition; the crisis of 1925 and the performance of the so-called.

new opposition, the grain procurement crisis of 1928 and the emergence of the so-called. right bias. The riddles, in any case, do not begin here, but when considering the inner side of the internal party struggle. Given the obviousness that the defeat of the opposition was predetermined by the policy of the "dictatorship of the party", in the implementation of which all its future leaders participated, it is incomprehensible that the bitterness that reached its heat when it came to the attempts of the opposition to raise the question of Lenin's latest documents? How can one explain the striking inconsistency of all, without exception, the leaders of the opposition, their retreat, it would seem, at the most decisive moments of the struggle, their retreat up to the complete rejection of their former views? "From the party masses, as G.A. Trukan, it (Lenin's testament) was hidden by a strange mutual agreement of all representatives of the highest echelon of power, as if they had taken a vow of silence. This letter ("Letter to the Congress"), ~~then~~

known verbatim only to the narrowest leading circle, was, as it were, an unspoken [ban](#)"[544]20. There is reason to believe that there was a mutual agreement between Lenin's former associates not to meet with him. It is known that Bukharin, Kamenev and Zinoviev repeatedly came to Gorki, secretly watched Lenin, hiding from him now in the bushes, now behind a screen or curtain, and more than once had the opportunity to meet him, but did not take advantage of it. Young doctor N.S. Popov, who was in Gorki as an orderly with the sick Lenin, described in his diary one of Bukharin's visits: "Ilyich, on the lower terrace overlooking the park, is sitting in an armchair, N.K. (Krupskaya - I.P.). Ilyich is learning to write with his left hand. <...> At the door overlooking the terrace, slightly open - behind the curtain - Bukharin, two

profile ... Hears the words that he says ... "Old man ... bravo, Old man ...", - then "shouts in a whisper": "Il ... Iyich, Eee ... leiii! Weyy here! Between us stredoeeeeeeeee!" The fact that the "mediastinum", about which Bukharin "shouted in a whisper", did not consist at all in medical prohibitions or restrictions, is evidenced by another entry in the same diary: "Three days ago Bukharin came with Zinoviev, and Foerster allowed them to meet with Ilyich, but both chickened out, talked with M.I. (Ulyanova - I.P.), the three of us got cold feet, and Bukharin and Zinoviev, like real Indians from the novels of Fenimore Cooper, circled after Ilyich in the park, hiding behind the trees, diving into the grass or behind the bushes, when M.I. from a distance she made warning gestures to them, and once M.I. waved her hand to them, calling them to come up, they, apparently imagining that this was a particularly disturbing signal, rushed headlong to flee along the path"[545]21.

In his letter to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RCP(b) dated October 23, 1923, Trotsky turned to history with Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin": "How, however, did the Politburo react to the project proposed by Lenin to reorganize the Rabkrin? Bukharin did not dare to publish Comrade Lenin's article, who, for his part, insisted on its immediate publishing. H.K. Kpupskaya informed me about this article by telephone and asked me to intervene in order to publish the article as soon as possible. At the Politburo immediately convened at my suggestion, all those present: vols. Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Rykov, Kalinin, Bukharin were not only against Comrade Lenin's plan, but also against the very publication of the article. Members of the Secretariat objected especially sharply and categorically. In view of Comrade Lenin's insistent demands that the article be shown to him in printed form, Comrade Kuibyshev, the future People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee, proposed at the said meeting of the Politburo to print in one copy a special issue of Pravda with Comrade Lenin's article in order to reassure him, hiding at the same time the article from the party. T. Kuibyshev, a former member of the Secretariat, was placed at the head of the Central Control Commission. Instead of fighting against Comrade Lenin's plan, the path of "defusing" this plan was adopted. Control Commission. We solved this case the Central Control Commission as a partial party independent institution that upholds and affirms the ground of party rights and unity from all sorts of party-administrative excesses, for discussion

I will not go into this question here, because I believe that the question is already clear even without

that"[546]22. It is known from Soviet history that on October 25-27, 1923, an emergency plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission was held with the participation of representatives of the 10 largest party organizations - Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Kharkov, Donetsk, Yekaterinburg, Rostov, Baku and Tula. The plenum was also attended by 13 of the 46 signatories of the October 15 statement. Stalin made a report on the inner-party situation. The plenum condemned by an overwhelming majority the speeches of Trotsky and the 46th and decided not to publish their statements and letters

However, it is not known what actually happened at a private meeting between Zinoviev and Stalin Kamenev in the apartment of the sick Trotsky regarding the preparation of a resolution on partnership building, adopted on December 5, 1923 at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission?

Kamenev spoke of this meeting at the XI Moscow Provincial Conference as follows: "We tried with all our might for our resolution (December 5) to be unanimous, and we achieved this, and you, as politicians, understand that when two groups achieve a majority unanimous resolution, then it is and minority based on mutual concessions that we had to give

in to those claims, those formulations, those corrections of Comrade Trotsky, which seemed to him necessary in order for him to sign this resolution with us, and we did it. Otherwise Comrade Trotsky would not have given us his signature under the resolution on workers' democracy. After a rough bargaining about each amendment, for example, Comrade Trotsky proposes an amendment, I say that it is unacceptable, soften it, Comrade Trotsky, he says: OK, I will soften, but you will yield in another"[547]23 . The quoted passage from Kamenev's speech gives some idea of

the atmosphere of that private meeting, but the main thing is hidden in it, so it remains unclear what was the basis of Trotsky's agreement with the "troika" and why, literally the next day, he violated it by sending a letter to party meetings with comments to the unanimously adopted resolution? For the Troika, this step by Trotsky was a complete surprise, and

Kamenev bluntly said this: "For all of us, who learned late at night that Comrade Trotsky's letter was read out at the Krasno-Presnensky meeting at his request, it became clear to all of us, and only in this way: this is a breakdown of the unanimity achieved. T. Trotsky went into battle with the Central Committee, despite the fact that all the concessions that were required were made to him in order for unanimity to be achieved"[548]24.

Why did Trotsky, in his letter to party meetings[549]25, known as the "New Course", evade a specific formulation of the question, as in the letters of October 8 and 23, and concentrated all accusations around the bureaucratization of the party apparatus? "Bureaucratization," he wrote, in its long development threatens to break away from the masses, focusing all attention on issues of management, selection, displacement, narrowing the field of vision, weakening the revolutionary instinct, i.e., more or less opportunistic rebirth of the older generation, at least a significant part of it. Such processes develop slowly and almost imperceptibly, but are detected immediately. To see in this warning, based on an objective Marxist foresight, some kind of "insult", "assassination attempt", etc. is possible only with painful bureaucratic suspiciousness and bureaucratic arrogance"[550]26. What kind of strange "illness" (in the bulletin on Trotsky's state of health it was called influenza with catarrhal phenomena from the upper —

respiratory tract [551]27), forced Trotsky, in the midst of an intra-party discussion in the fall of 1923, to leave for the South and thus not be present at decisive for the fate of the opposition XIII party conference? Why, in the autumn of 1924, in his Lessons of October, did he lash out at Zinoviev and Kamenev for their hesitation in 1917, and not say a word about Stalin, whose position at that time was also far from impeccable? After his defeat during the so-called. literary discussion, Trotsky wrote a letter of repentance to the Central Committee and fell silent again.

At the beginning of 1925, the book of the English publicist M. Eastman "After the death of Lenin"[552]28 was published in the West, in which it was told about the history of the publication of Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin", his "testament", and also cited a letter from Krupskaya Trotsky dated January 29, 1924, which spoke of that warm

attitude that Lenin kept towards Trotsky until the end of his life. This book infuriated Stalin [553]29. On his instructions, the book was translated, and on June 17, 1925, Stalin sent a letter "To all members and candidates of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission", in which he detailed the eight main theses of Eastman's book and demanded that the Politburo take the following decision: dissociate himself from Eastman and go to press with a categorical refutation." Literally the next day, the Politburo approved Stalin's proposal. At the same meeting, Trotsky promised the Politburo to present the text of his refutation in three days[554]30.

This text, titled "On Eastman's book 'After Lenin's Death'," was published in the 16th issue of the Bolshevik magazine in 1925. In it, Trotsky, firstly, disavowed his own letter of October 23, 1923: "No less false," he wrote, "is Eastman's assertion that the Central Committee wanted to silence (i.e., not publish) Lenin's article on Rabkrin. The disagreement that arose on this issue in the Central Committee, if we can speak of a "disagreement" here at all, was of completely secondary importance, concerning only the question of whether the publication of Lenin's article should be accompanied by a statement by the Central Committee that there was no reason to fear a split, but even this the issue was unanimously resolved at the same meeting, and all present members of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee signed an appeal to party organizations, which says: "Not going into this purely informational letter into a discussion of the possibility of historical dangers, the question of which was promptly raised by Comrade Lenin in his article, the members of the Politburo and the Orgburo, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, consider it necessary to declare with complete unanimity that there are absolutely no such circumstances in the internal work of the Central Committee that gave any grounds for fear of a "split". there is, among ten others, my signature, but the text itself was written by me (January 27, 1923). Since under this letter, which expressed the unanimous attitude of the Central Committee to Lenin's proposal on Rabkrin, there is also the signature of Comrade Kuibyshev, another false statement is thereby refuted in passing

Eastman, as if Comrade Kuibyshev was placed at the head of the Rabkrin, as an "opponent" of Lenin's organizational plan.

Secondly, Trotsky declared: "In several places in the book, Eastman says that the Central Committee "hid" from the party a number of extremely important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (the case concerns letters on the national question, the so-called "wills "and so on.); this cannot be called anything other than a slander against the Central Committee of our Party. From Eastman's words, one can conclude that Vladimir Ilyich intended these letters, which had the character of internal organizational advice, to be printed. In fact, this is completely wrong. Since the time of his illness, Vladimir Ilyich has repeatedly addressed the leading institutions of the party and its congress with proposals, letters, etc. All these letters and proposals, of course, were always delivered to their destination, brought to the attention of the delegates of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses of the Party, and always, of course, had a proper influence on the decisions of the Party, and if not all these letters are printed, it is because they are not were intended by their author for publication. Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any "testament", and the very nature of his attitude towards the party, as well as the character of the party itself, ruled out the possibility of such a "testament". Under the guise of a "testament" in the emigrant and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press, one of Vladimir Ilyich's letters is usually mentioned (in a form distorted beyond recognition), containing advice on an organizational order. The 13th Congress of the Party treated this letter as carefully as all others, and drew conclusions from it in relation to the conditions and circumstances of the moment. Any talk about a hidden or violated "testament" is a malicious fiction and is entirely directed against the actual will of Vladimir Ilyich and the interests of the [party he created](#)[555]31. In the same issue of the journal there is also a letter from Krupskaya. How it was necessary to intimidate Lenin's widow so that she agreed to write the following lines about the "testament": "Such a letter could be addressed only to those about whom there was no doubt that for them the interests of the case were above all. There is no distrust of these comrades, with whom Vladimir Ilyich was associated for many years of joint work, in the letters. On the contrary, in

letters there is a lot of flattering to their address. The cause of Lenin was and remains their own, vital [affair](#)"[556]32.

All the leaders of the opposition were strikingly inconsistent. In the autumn of 1925, the already so-called new opposition in the person of G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev, N. Krupskaya and G. Sokolnikov entered into correspondence with the Stalinist "nine", which at that time was the real power in the party and the country[557] 33 . At the Fourteenth Congress, Kamenev ventured a desperate statement that "Comr. Stalin cannot fulfill the role of a unifier of the Bolshevik headquarters," but he immediately disavowed him: "So, I ask myself: is there any slipping from the Leninist line in the party? No, and I'm sure it wasn't. Was there a slide from the Leninist line to the Bukharinist line of the Central Committee as a whole? No"[558]34. How, then, were the delegates to the congress supposed to perceive Kamenev's previous statement? Only as a personal rivalry?! By the way, they took it that way when they shouted to him, interrupting the performance: "That's the point! Revealed cards! We will not give you —

command heights! Stalin! Stalin!"[559]35. After the defeat at this congress, it was the turn of Zinoviev and Kamenev to turn to the secret concealment of Lenin's documents as the last resort to stay in the leadership of the party. "1) There are letters from Lenin on the national question," they wrote, addressing the Politburo on April 16, 1926, "in which Comrade Stalin's policy is sharply criticized. These letters are devoted to deeply fundamental questions. V[ladimir] I[lyich] never took these letters back. On the contrary, it is known that until the very end of his life he was greatly disturbed by precisely these questions. They were read by the delegations of the XIII (so in the document - I.P.) Congress, but they were not handed over, and a number of members of

the Central Committee of the current composition do not know them in their original form. 2) There is a so-called "testament" of V[ladimir] I[lyich], in which he directly proposes to the party to remove comrade Stalin from the post of general secretary, since V[ladimir] I[lyich] fears that Stalin is capable of abusing his enormous power, concentrating in the hands of the Secretary General. The essence of this letter - testament is as follows: remove Comrade Stalin from the post of General Secretary and work together with everyone, including Trotsky - despite the

the most important letter was only read by the delegations of the Thirteenth Congress and was not

handed over. And this testament was written not in 1917, but in 1923, not in the midst of an acute, albeit short-term conflict, but in an atmosphere when V[ladimir] I[lyich] was giving his last advice to the party. V[ladimir] I[lyich] never took back the proposal to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary, on the contrary, all this indicates that V[ladimir] I[lyich] did not put this proposal into practice only because he could no longer be not at the XII, at the XIII congresses..."[560]36.

The culmination of the internal party struggle was the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on July 14, 23, 1926. the plenum, the Trotskyist- opposition jointly Now at Zinoviev Central Committee was accused of hiding the last Leninist documents. In his speech at that plenum, Zinoviev admitted: "I made many mistakes. I think two are the most important. My first mistake in 1917 is known to all of you. I consider the second mistake more dangerous because the mistake of 1917, made under Lenin, was corrected by Lenin, as well as by us, with his help, a few days later, and my mistake of 1923 was that ... ". Ordzhonikidze interrupted Zinoviev in time with his question: "Why are you fooling the

whole party?" Zinoviev did not begin to speak about his mistake of 1923, but only admitted: "We say that now there can no longer be any doubt that the main core of the opposition in 1923, as the evolution of the current leading faction has revealed, correctly warned of the dangers of a shift from the proletarian line and the threatening growth of the apparatus regime. Yes, on the issue of the apparatus-bureaucratic clamp, Trotsky turned out to be right against us"[561]37. Nevertheless, in his desperate speech, Zinoviev managed to speak about the content of Lenin's letter to Stalin dated March 5, 1923, which dealt with the break in relations between them,

and about the assessments given to Stalin in the second part of Lenin's "Letter to the Congress", written on 24 December 1922, and in the addendum dated January 4, 1923, as well as in the article "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"". In this regard, Stalin had to read out the following documents at the plenum: Lenin's letter to the congress of December 25, 1922, and a letter of December 30, 1922 "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"".

At the same time, he read out his "Letter to members of the Bolshevik Party" dated October 18 (31), 1917 on the attitude of Kamenev and Zinoviev to an armed uprising.

Trotsky left his testimony about how these documents were read: "Stalin rarely loses his temper, rarely raises his voice or uses gestures, only by the rudeness of expressions, by the cynicism of accusations, and even by the muffled timbre of his voice, one can notice the anger that strangles him. It was in this tone that he read Lenin's testament. He read with deliberate distortions intended for the protocol. He was interrupted, corrected, convicted. He did not find an answer to the exclamations from the places. Polemical resourcefulness is not characteristic of his clumsy mind. In the end, he completely lost his balance and, rising on tiptoe, forcing his voice, with his hand raised up, began hoarsely shouting frantic accusations and threats that caused a shock in the entire hall. Neither before nor later have I seen him in such a state of frenzy." [562] 38 The situation at the plenum reached an unusual severity. After his speech at the plenum on July 20, 1926, Dzerzhinsky died of a broken heart. By the decision of the same plenum, Zinoviev was expelled from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Removed for allowing himself to violate the unspoken agreement concluded in 1923 by all party leaders, "forgetting" the history of Lenin's confrontation with the then leadership of the Politburo. However, the story

did not end there. On July 26, a letter from M.I. Ulyanova to the Presidium of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Bukharin's note containing the draft of this letter has been preserved in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This note shows that the letter was deliberately inspired. It says that "V.I. he appreciated Stalin very much ... addressed him with the most intimate instructions ... and at the same time emphasized that he wanted to speak with Stalin, and not with a

There was an incident between Lenin and Stalin, which Comrade Zinoviev mentioned in his speech and which took place shortly before Ilyich lost his speech (March 1923), but it was purely personal and had nothing to do with politics. All the opposition's talk

about V. I.'s attitude towards Stalin is completely untrue. These relationships were and are

the closest and comradely"[563]39. This letter was written not only for the participants of the July 1926 joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, but also for future historians. It is only unclear whether Maria Ilyinichna wrote under threat or agreed voluntarily, without understanding the tragic opposition of Lenin to the majority of the Politburo in late 1922 and

early 1923. In political history there are always personal motives. In Soviet historiography there are, perhaps, no more idealized images than Lenin's relatives. The reality was much more complicated. Trotsky's diary contains an entry about M.I. Ulyanova, made just in connection with this letter of hers: "An old maid, restrained, stubborn, she concentrated all the strength of her unspent love on her brother Vladimir. During his lifetime, she remained completely in the shadows: no one spoke about her. In the care of V.I. [Lenin] she competed with H.K. Krupskaya. After his death, she came into the world, or rather, she was forced to come out. Ulyanova, according to the editors of Pravda (she was the secretary of the newspaper), was closely connected with Bukharin, was under his influence, and after him was drawn into the struggle against the opposition. Ulyanova's jealousy began, in addition to her narrow-mindedness and fanaticism, by her rivalry with Krupskaya, who for a long time and stubbornly resisted to prevaricate. During this period, Ulyanova began to speak at party meetings, write memoirs, etc., and it must be said that none of the people close to Lenin showed so much misunderstanding as this selflessly devoted sister to him. At the beginning of 1926, Krupskaya (although not for long) finally contacted the opposition (through Zinoviev Kamenev's group). It was at this time that the Stalin-Bukharin faction in every possible way raised,

in contrast to Krupskaya, the importance and role of M. Ulyanova"[564]40. The history of 1923 developed dramatically not only for Lenin. It had serious long-term consequences for all other leaders, except for of the Stalin, who headed the main apparatus of the Secretariat Central Committee and usurped the ability of the party to manipulate the opinion of the entire party through him. There is reason to believe that it was the history of the last year of Lenin's life that bound the future leaders of the opposition and predetermined not only their subsequent behavior, but also their tragic fate. Opposition leaders "tied up" themse

Lenin's life, just as the members of Nechaev's group "tied up" themselves with the murder of the

student Ivanov [565]41. In relation to Lenin in 1923, the whole depth of the moral fall of his closest associates was revealed. Covering themselves with the banner of Leninism, they refused virtually all of his proposals aimed at changing the regime that had taken shape during the years of the revolution and civil war and in the first years of NEP. If we are talking about real alternatives to Stalinism, then this alternative was just connected with the last actions of the sick Lenin, but at the same time it turned out to be discarded. It was the disclosure of this story, in my opinion, that its direct participants were afraid of. The political heirs of Lenin, I think, took care of the destruction of documents compromising them before History. Even Trotsky, who left in his writings a lot of evidence about Stalin and the history of the intra-party struggle, who, more than others, was aware of the essence of the changes taking place in the mechanism of Communist power and introduced into circulation many concepts to characterize it, such as "bureaucratic centralism", "Stalinism", "Stalinism", etc., touched on the "case" of Lenin only in deaf allusions. "It was as if a leaden cloud enveloped the story of Lenin's death," he wrote. "Everyone avoided talking about her, as if they were afraid to listen to their own anxiety"[566]42; "Stalin acted as if Lenin

were already dead. But the patient deceived his expectations"[567]43. In the internal party struggle of the 1920s. manifested not only the moral fall of the leaders of October, but also their striking political short-sightedness. Instead of fighting the main enemy, they fought each other and thereby strengthened the power of the Stalinist factional group. By 1927, when the intention to physically eliminate the opposition became dominant in the party: "We will expel a thousand, shoot a hundred, and it will become quiet in the party," Bukharin, still in alliance with Stalin against Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev and not knowing that in a year will be in their place, he —

declared: "If the opposition tries to cause a "catastrophe", the party will not leave a wet place from it" [568] 44. The results of the victory over

he blackmailed, falsified, engaged in forgery, in which he was helped a lot by the unscrupulousness of all, without exception, the leaders of the opposition. In the absence of intra-party democracy, Stalin's factional group could easily fight against any opposition actions, covering up its struggle with any slogan, whether it be the struggle for Leninism against Trotskyism or against the kulak right deviation. This struggle was carried out with reliance on the party apparatus, which, in turn, formed the opinion of party organizations, or rather manipulated them, giving only the information that was allowed from above and was beneficial to Stalin's factional group. All the threads that connected the mass of the party, the party apparatus and the top leadership of the party were in the hands of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its General Secretary.

In addition, there is irrefutable evidence of the participation of the OGPU in the internal party struggle. Stalin made extensive use of compromising evidence and fakes prepared by the OGPU to put pressure on the vacillating members of the Politburo. A special unit was engaged in provocations against opposition leaders. Such a provocation, for example, was their "connection" with a mythical military conspiracy through a former Wrangel officer who turned out to be an agent of the OGPU. To justify the searches of the Communists, he was presented as a counter-revolutionary. The secretariat of the Central Control Commission, on the basis of Yaroslavsky's report, approved the actions of the OGPU, and the Politburo issued a notice on this subject for all members of the party[569]45. And since 1928, a special program of undercover work among the "right" under the name "Opponents" was developed.

As for the "case" of Lenin, after the defeat of the opposition, his interpretation became the monopoly of Stalin. At the 7th enlarged plenum of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International), he, speaking out against Trotsky's accusations that "Stalin made a rather big mistake on the national question", declared in his closing speech on December 13, 1926: "This is not true, comrades. This is gossip. I never had any disagreements on the national question with the party or with Lenin. What Trotsky is talking about here must be about one insignificant incident when Comrade. Before the Twelfth Congress of our Party, Lenin reproached me for being too strict

organizational of Georgian separatists, semi-communists like Mdivani, who was recently the trade representative in France, that I am "pursuing" them. However, subsequent facts showed that the so-called "deviators", people like Mdivani, actually deserved a stricter attitude towards themselves than I did as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of our party. Subsequent events have shown that the "deviators" are a decaying faction of the most outright opportunism. Let Trotsky prove that this is not so. Lenin did not and could not know these facts, since he was ill, lying in bed and unable to follow the events. But what relation can this insignificant incident have to Stalin's principled position? Trotsky is obviously hinting in gossip about some kind of "differences" between me and the party. But is it not a fact that the Central Committee as a whole, including Trotsky, unanimously voted for Stalin's theses on the national question? Isn't it a fact that this vote took place after the incident with Mdivani, before the 12th Congress of our party? Isn't it a fact that it was Stalin, and not anyone else, who was the speaker on the national question at the Twelfth Congress? Where are the "disagreements" on the national question here, and why, in fact, did Trotsky want to mention this insignificant incident?"[570]46.

At the October 1927 joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Stalin generally denied the existence of Lenin's "testament" and referred to Trotsky's letter in the Bolshevik magazine for 1925. "Is it clear?" he said. "This is written by Trotsky, and not by anyone else. On what grounds are Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev now fooling around, asserting that the Party and its Central Committee are 'concealing' Lenin's 'testament'? It is 'possible' to fornicate with one's tongue, but one must know when to stop" [571]47. Denying the existence of Lenin's "testament", Stalin, nevertheless, shamelessly used it in the subsequent struggle against the so-called. right bias, quoting in parts. Here is one of the most typical examples. Speaking at the April 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he stated: "They refer to Comrade Lenin's well-known letter about Bukharin as a theoretician. Let's read this letter" and then quoted the part of the "Letter to the Congress" referring to

[Bukharin\[572\]48](#). Lenin's "testament" with Stalin thus turned into a letter about Bukharin.

Subsequently, the "Letter to the Congress" became a banned document. Even for mentioning him, people were subjected to reprisals. In the same way, Stalin acted with his former allies, and then opponents in the internal party struggle. He brought them to the very brink of moral decline, forcing them to retreat, repent, humiliate, and in the end, physically destroyed them all.

Chapter III

STALIN'S VIEWS OF SOCIALISM

There is no power ... power has come {3}

Stalin

1. THE THEORY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

As a man of few words and giving preference to practical actions in politics, Stalin spoke little about the theoretical problems of building a future society and about this society itself. In addition to the thoughtful maxim that "socialism is a good thing"[573]1, expressed by him in a speech at the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers on February 19, 1933 (in the midst of a mass famine!), it is perhaps difficult to find anything from him. then more meaningful on the question of how exactly he imagined socialism. To the question about communism, which was put to Stalin by the first American working delegation during a conversation with him on September 9, 1927, he answered as follows: "The general characteristics of communist society are given in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. If we give a brief anatomy of a communist society, then it will be such a society: a) where there will be no private ownership of the tools and means of production, but there will be public, collective property; b) where there will be no classes and state power, but there will be workers in industry and agriculture,

economically governed as a free association of workers; c) where the national economy, organized according to a plan, will be based on the highest technology both in the field of industry and in the field of agriculture; d) where there is no opposition between town and country, between industry and agriculture; e) where products will be distributed according to the principle of the old French communists: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"; (e) where science and art will enjoy conditions sufficiently favorable to achieve their full flowering; g) where a person, free from worries about a piece of bread and the need to adapt to the "powerful ones", will become truly free.

Etc. and so on.

It is clear that we are still [far from such a society](#). —

Socialism in 1927 seemed to Stalin a completely achievable prospect. Until the mid-1920s, when a discussion began at the top of the party about the possibility of building socialism in one country, taken separately, Stalin did not speak on this topic at all. The first years after taking office as General Secretary of the Central Committee, he was engaged in the construction of the party apparatus - the very lever that provided him with autocracy in the party.

However, like any of the leaders of the party, especially those who were at the very helm of power and determined the life of a vast country, he could not help but think about its future. But unlike such theoreticians as Trotsky and Bukharin, who wrote extensively and on various occasions on the question of the possibility of socialism in Russia and the world revolution, Stalin thought purely utilitarian and for the time being preferred to remain silent. Trying to retrospectively reconstruct the process of formation of his ideas about the construction of socialism (on this account, of course, there is no direct evidence, let alone documents, but there is a history of Stalin's activity in putting his ideas into practice!), One cannot help but dwell on a plot that has a fundamental

meaning.

Stalin was one of the leaders of the Communist Party and made extensive use of Marxist phraseology to justify his actions. However, this is not enough to talk about the doctrinal foundations of his policy, and even more so that Stalin built socialism according to a theoretical model. As A. Tsipko, who substantiated this point of view during the period of perestroika, wrote, "he was a student in everything. But the student is conscientious. You can't take that away from him." [575]3 However, if we approach the assessment of Marxism with [an](#)

open mind and without blaming Marx for everything that happened to Russia in the 20th century, then it should be recognized that Marx was primarily a philosopher and scientist, and throughout his life he was engaged in understanding and studying capitalism and the patterns of maturation in its bowels of the foundations of a new society. In his theory, socialism was seen as a product of natural-historical development. "Communism is not a state for us," wrote K. Marx and F. Engels in the "German Ideology,"

which must be established, not an ideal to which reality must conform. We call communism the real movement that destroys the present state. Therefore, Marx did not create and, in principle, could not create a plan for the organization of the future society. "The working class," he wrote, "has not to realize any ideals, but only to give scope to the elements of the new society that have already developed in the bowels of the old, collapsing bourgeois society"[577]5. Only in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, confronted by the very task of the work with the necessity of expressing his point of view, did he give a general characterization of the principles and features of communist society. Along with a scientific understanding of socialism as a result of socio-economic development, he has

arguments about socialism as a consequence of the labor movement. These ideas are most clearly expressed in the Communist Manifesto. It was precisely this active foundation of Marxism that Lenin seized upon when he developed his theory of the socialist revolution in Russia and the transition to socialism through the seizure of state power. Although, formulating the April Theses, he pointed out that the first priority was "not the 'introduction' of socialism, as our immediate task, but the transition immediately only to control by the S.R.D. behind the social production and distribution of products"[578]6. Lenin spoke in more detail about socialism in his work "State and Revolution", pointing out that the party must "...take power and lead the entire people to socialism, direct and organize a new system, be a teacher, leader, leader of all working and exploited in the cause organization of their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie"[579]7.

After power was in the hands of the Bolshevik Party (especially in the conditions of the civil war, when a whole series of measures similar to "war socialism" was implemented in Germany), Lenin repeatedly talked about the future structure of society [580]8: "to start building a completely new socialist society", "Russia's transition to socialism", "to create and strengthen socialism", "the cause of building socialism", etc. He also has a number of specific statements about the destruction of classes when

socialism, "cleansing the Russian land of all harmful insects, of fleas - crooks, of bedbugs - the rich, etc., etc.", that "under the dictatorship of the proletariat, millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of employees, officials, bourgeois intellectuals will have to be re-educated to subordinate them all to the proletarian state", as well as "increasing state intervention in 'private law relations', in civil affairs", etc. [581]9 At the same time, if we analyze the whole context of Lenin's ideas about the formation reveals not so much the formational, but the concrete political, party, state meaning of the measures proposed by him, the result of which should be "a new, higher mode of social production, the replacement of capitalist and petty-bourgeois production with large-scale socialist production"[582]10. Even during the period of "war communism", Lenin did not consider the "building of socialism" as a matter of artificially creating a new socio-economic formation. In the last years of his life, he generally abandoned his previous

attempts to introduce socialism in Russia. "By the spring of 1921," Lenin wrote, "it turned out that

we had been defeated in an attempt by an "assault" method, i.e. the fastest, shortest, most direct, socialist foundations of production and distribution. go

To

The political situation in the spring of 1921 showed us that in a number of economic issues it was inevitable to retreat to the positions of state capitalism, to move from an "assault" to a [siege](#)"[583]11. Lenin spoke about the same, but in a harsher form, in a conversation with his secretaries, which became known from the book of memoirs of Stalin's former secretary B. Bazhanov: "Of course, we failed. We thought of bringing about a new communist society at the behest of a pike. Meanwhile, this is a matter of decades and generations. In order for the Party not to lose its soul, faith and will to fight, we must portray before it the return to the exchange economy, to capitalism, as some kind of temporary retreat. But for ourselves, we must clearly see that the attempt failed, that it is impossible to suddenly change the psychology of people, the habits of

population into a new system by force, but the question is whether we would have retained power in this all-Russian meat grinder"[584]12.

This excerpt from the memoirs of B. Bazhanov was published for the first time in the USSR by V. Sirotkin in his article "Lessons of NEP" in the newspaper Izvestia on March 10, 1989. More than ten years have passed since that time, and many secrets have been revealed in our history. Therefore, it no longer seems surprising that not all of Lenin's statements were recorded, and not all recorded were published. Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU G.L. Smirnov, in a note to the Central Committee dated December 14, 1991, indicated that 3,724 Leninist documents had not been published [585]13. A few years later, in his book, he named the figure already 10 times smaller[586]14. This institute was the heir

to the Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the RCP(b), the decision to organize which was made in the autumn of 1923. It was assumed that all the manuscripts of Lenin and memories of him would be concentrated in the archives of the Institute[587]15. The collection and sorting of all these materials was carried out by Stalin's first assistant I.P. Tovstukha, who, on the instructions of Stalin, destroyed the "unnecessary", hid something, prepared something for publication. The memoir of the artist Yu. Annenkov, who in 1924 happened to be at the Lenin Institute and, while waiting, came across unpublished Lenin's notes marked 1921, has been preserved. Some of them he copied into a notebook and subsequently reproduced in his essay about V.I. Lenin. One of these notes, in my opinion, was carefully read by Stalin and considered: "Based on the same observations and taking into account the duration

of the growth of the world socialist revolution," wrote Lenin, "it is necessary to resort to special maneuvers that can hasten our victory over the capitalist countries .

a) To proclaim, in order to calm the deaf and dumb, the separation (fictitious!) of our government and government institutions (the Council of People's Commissars, etc.) from the Party and the Politburo and, in particular, from the Comintern, declaring these latter bodies as independent

political groupings tolerated in the territory Soviet Socialist Republics. The deaf will believe.

b) Express the wish for the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations with the capitalist countries on the basis of complete non-interference in their internal affairs. The deaf and dumb will believe again. They will even be delighted and will open their doors wide, through which the emissaries of the Comintern and the organs of party information will hastily seep into these countries under the guise of our diplomatic, cultural and commercial representatives.

To tell the truth is a petty-bourgeois prejudice. Lies, on the other hand, are often justified by the goal.

The capitalists of the whole world and their governments, in their pursuit of conquering the Soviet market, will turn a blind eye to the reality indicated above and thus turn into deaf-and-dumb blind men. They will open up credits that will serve us to support the Communist Party in their countries and, by supplying us with the materials and techniques we lack, will restore our military industry, necessary for our future victorious attacks against our suppliers. In other words, they will work to prepare their own suicide.”[588]16 Thus, what is clear from all of Stalin's subsequent activities, these two —

statements by Lenin - one about the impossibility of quickly building a new, socialist society in Russia, and the other about the attitude towards the capitalist West and the use of its capital in their own interests, as well as about lies in politics in the name of achieving the set goal - they could have a fundamental influence on Stalin. True, he did not agree with the first, and adopted the second without objection. He has many statements that echo Lenin's and confirm just such a tactic of action in relation to the West. So, in an oral retelling, the following words of Stalin to Kaganovich have come down to us: “Let these foreign donkeys not see the forest itself for the trees. - Our real numbers and achievements will be kept secret, and the little things - we have a lot of them, of course - let them hurt your eyes ... And why not? In our position, a fine policy is needed. If you don't cheat, you won't win”[589]17. Here is another example told by E.S. Varga: “In 1923, the world press was full of indignation at the fact that the Soviet Union was supplying weapons to the German Wehrmacht. The Soviet Union is officially in vigorous

expressions refuted this. But when I asked Stalin, he frankly said: "Of course, we have fulfilled [orders](#)" [\[590\]](#)¹⁸. This feature of Stalin's political actions, which actually became the essence of his policy, was noticed by some far-sighted Western politicians who dealt with Stalin. US President F. Roosevelt owns a statement made by him in one of his private conversations shortly before his death: "It is impossible to deal with Stalin. He broke all the promises made at Yalta (in particular, the agreement to hold free elections in Eastern [Europe](#)).[\[591\]](#)¹⁹ In the first months after Lenin's death, Stalin preferred to remain faithful to his teacher in—

words. In the first edition of his work "On the Foundations of Leninism", which presents his "Lectures delivered at Sverdlovsk University" in early April 1924 and which he devoted to the Leninist call, one can read the following lines: "But to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and put the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet guarantee the complete victory of socialism. The main task of socialism—the organization of socialist production—remains yet to come. Is it possible to solve this problem, is it possible to achieve the final victory of socialism in one country without the joint efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries? To overthrow the bourgeoisie, the efforts of one country are enough - the history of our revolution tells us about this. For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, especially such a peasant country as Russia, are no longer enough; for this, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are needed .

In the course of the so-called literary discussion that unfolded in the autumn of 1924 in connection with the publication of Trotsky's book *The Lessons of October*, Stalin abruptly changed his point of view on this issue. He himself told this story in detail in the work "On Questions of Leninism", dated January 25, 1926. In the pamphlet "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists" (December 1924), he dissected, in his words, the question of the victory of socialism in one country for two: "to the question of a complete guarantee against the restoration of the bourgeois order and the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society in one country ... This new

the formulation of the question formed the basis of the well-known resolution of the XIV Party Conference "On the Tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(b)", considering the question of the victory of socialism in one country in connection with the stabilization of capitalism (April 1925) and considering the building of

socialism by the forces of our country possible and necessary. She, - wrote Stalin further, - served as the basis of my pamphlet "On the results of the work of the XIV Party Conference", published immediately after the XIV Party Conference, in May 1925 ... On the question of the victory of socialism in our country, the pamphlet says: "We can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry, under the leadership of the working class" ... for "under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we have ... all the data necessary to build a complete socialist society, overcoming any-and

all internal difficulties, because we can and we must overcome them with our own [strength](#)." [593] 21 On the question of the final victory of socialism, Stalin expressed himself as follows: "The final victory of socialism is a complete guarantee against attempts at Restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and even more so the victory of these workers in at least a few countries, is a necessary condition for the victorious country to be completely guaranteed against attempts at intervention and —

restoration. , a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism" [594] 22 At the same time, Stalin constantly referred to the works of Lenin, and precisely to those from which Lenin himself had departed far, having gone through the period of "war communism" and having gone through a painful evolution in the last two years of his life. In the same work "Questions of Leninism," Stalin quoted Lenin in August 1915, who, in Stalin's interpretation, spoke of the victory of socialism in one country even before the October Revolution: "The uneven economic and political development is the unconditional law of capitalism. It follows from the

(Note that Russia is not called here at all. - I.P.). The victorious proletariat of this country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production in itself (emphasized by Stalin), would stand up against the rest, the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries to itself, raising an uprising in them against the capitalists, and, if necessary, even with military force against exploiting classes and their states"[595]23. Having singled out Lenin's phrase "having organized socialist production at home," Stalin gives it his own interpretation. In his understanding, this means that "the proletariat of the victorious country can and must organize in itself, after taking power, socialist production. What does it mean to "organize socialist production"? It means, says Stalin, to build a socialist society. It scarcely needs proof that this clear and definite proposition of Lenin needs no further comment. Otherwise, Lenin's calls for the seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 would have been

incomprehensible .[596]24 After reading and thinking about this Stalinist passage, you clearly understand the meaning of Yu.M. Steklov that Stalin had a "gangster understanding of Marxism"[597]25. It was impossible even in those years to convict Stalin of an arbitrary interpretation of Lenin. In his report "On the Results of the Works of the XIV Conference of the RCP(b)", which he delivered to the activists of the Moscow party organization on May 9, 1925, Stalin called the letter of an inquisitive party member who shared his doubts "a model of confusion": "You say, that Lenin's theory... is that socialism can win in one country. Unfortunately, I did not find any indications in the appropriate places in Lenin about the victory of socialism in one country. And then Stalin concluded: "The time will come when he will read and finally find such instructions"[598]26. Regarding the arguments of K. Radek, who called the theory of building socialism in one country the theory of building socialism "in one district" or even "in one street", Stalin spoke more ominously: "Can one call this vulgar and liberal giggle of Radek about the idea of building socialism in one country otherwise than b

Radek? Certainly yes. Why doesn't he distance himself from her? Because the opposition bloc does not think of abandoning its position of retreat from Leninism"[599]27.

Thus, Stalin attributed to Lenin exactly what he refused, declaring "a radical change in our whole point of view on socialism"[600]28. In modern literature there is a lot of evidence of how freely the publishers treated the works of Lenin. A. Latyshev, author of the book "Declassified Lenin" (M., 1996), gave several interesting facts about the "adjustment" of Lenin's ideas about socialism. Speaking at the ceremonial meeting of the plenum of the Moscow City Council, the Moscow Committee of the RCP (b) and the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions on November 6, 1920, Lenin once again repeated: "... we have always emphasized that it is impossible to accomplish such a thing as a socialist revolution in one country ... »

This phrase was then published in Verbatim Reports of the Moscow Soviet of Workers and Red Army Deputies (No. 15), and then entered the 2nd and 3rd editions of Lenin's collected works. And already in the fourth edition in 1955, it was removed from the text without any outliers. The corresponding bill was also made in the 5th, so-called complete collected works ... The fate of a paragraph

from Lenin's report on the foreign and domestic policy of the Council of People's Commissars at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on March 12, 1919 is similar: "The construction business entirely depends on how soon revolution in the most important countries of Europe. Only after such a victory can we seriously take up the construction business. Or

such an example: in the 2nd and 3rd editions - Lenin's speech at the meeting of the secretaries of the cells of the Moscow organization of the RCP (b) on November 26, 1920 is given according to the archival transcript, and in the subsequent 4th and 5th editions - already according to newspaper report. And the whole idea of the Bolshevik censors is in order to hide the paragraph: "... but as soon as we are strong enough to defeat the whole of capitalism, we will immediately grab it by the collar "[601]29.

Speaking about the Stalinist vision of the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country, the historian B. Nikolaevsky came to the insightful conclusion that "Stalin never even made an attempt to analyze the situation in order to show which elements of it allow him to consider the building of socialism in

Russia possible, never and nowhere indicated which social forces could be relied upon in this case. He does not substantiate his conclusion at all, he does not prove it, but decrees ... he never heard either peasantophile or generally humanistic notes in his statements on this subject. He always poses the question in a different plane, he always concentrates the attention of his audience on other sides of the problem"[602]30. Stalin-left

the analysis of the situation, the question of social forces, peasant-philic notes and similar subtleties to such party theorists as N. Bukharin, L. Trotsky, Evg. Preobrazhensky and others, although he used their theoretical reasoning in his actions, which in his interpretation acquired a purely utilitarian meaning. As N. Valentinov (N. Volsky) figuratively noted: "Preobrazhensky's idea of building socialism on the basis of "initial accumulation" enters the brain of Stalin and Co. in an extreme, then it will be revealed - in a monstrous form. It is from all these elements that "Stalinism" will begin to take shape.[603]31

Be that as it may, Stalin had already found a solution for himself and determined the direction of activity. Therefore, in the pamphlet "On Questions of Leninism," he returns several times to the question of the possibility of building socialism in the USSR and, in his manner, as if driving in nails, repeatedly repeats that "the proletariat of a victorious country can and must organize in itself, after taking power, a socialist production", which means "to build a socialist society". And further: "We can and must build a complete socialist society, because we have at our disposal everything necessary and sufficient for this construction"[604]32. Thus, Stalin's vision of the construction of socialism assumed precisely the formational nature of this process, but not essentially, not conceptually, but mechanistically, organizationally, technically.

But if Stalin said with such conviction that "we can and must ..." - and "we" in this case is he, Stalin, since he did not ask anyone else about this - it means that he has an answer to the question "How". And in response to this question, he answers without hesitation - "from above", through the authorities, which actually means "to drive the population into a new system by force." Statements on this subject from Stalin

enough: "...Power is used as a lever for restructuring the old economy and organizing a new one", "using the power of the proletariat to organize socialism", "why did we take power in October 1917 if we did not expect to build socialism?"[605]33. Stalin knew that

he had such a force, through which it was possible to drive the population into a new system. No wonder he was so stubbornly and purposefully engaged in carrying out a secret party state reform, as a result of which the phenomenon of a party state was born with its hierarchy of party committees headed by secretaries appointed "from above" and all-encompassing secrecy. It turned out to be an extremely simple and archaic system of power, bound neither by laws, nor by legal norms, nor by the control of society. In the traditions of Russia there was another, archaic regulator of relations between the state and society - "order - submission." Under certain conditions, this regulator could be transferred to the regime of direct violence. The

main thing that distinguished Stalin from his political opponents already in the 1920s. - this is, firstly, the absolute lack of principle not only in relation to other people's texts and statements, but also in the choice of means to achieve the goal, among which lies and falsification were his true friends, and secondly, the absolute absence of feelings of pity and compassion. B. Nikolaevsky cites an episode very characteristic of Stalin's personality. In the autumn of 1921, at a meeting of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, headed by Stalin at that time, a representative of the Bashkir Republic who had just arrived made a report on the horrors of the famine. Everyone listened to the terrible story with deep emotion. In one place, one of the listeners burst out a remark: "But it's one horror what's going on!" Stalin, who led the meeting, cut short: "Horror, this is when it comes to an individual person. If we are talking about millions, this is not horror, but statistics... Comrade, continue your report!"[606]34. These qualities were accompanied by the lack of confidence in his political position among his political opponents. "You cannot build socialism without being sure that it can be built, without being sure that the technical backwardness of our country is not an insurmountable obstacle to building a c

possibility is disbelief in the cause of building socialism, a departure from Leninism"[607]35.

Stalin's confidence had its own attraction for the broad masses who entered politics after 1917, seeking to achieve a good life and social revenge as quickly as possible [608]36. Indeed, such confidence was infectious, especially since Stalin skillfully used populist slogans. Here are the lines from his letter to A.M. Gorky in December 1930: "Things are going well with us. Both in the field of industry and in the field of agriculture, successes are undeniable. Let meow there, in Europe, to all voices, all sorts of fossils of the medieval period about the "collapse" of the USSR. This will not change one iota either our plans or our work. The USSR will be a first-class country with the largest, technically equipped agricultural production. Socialism is invincible. There will be no more "wretched" Russia. It's over. There will be a powerful and abundant and progressive Russia"[609]37.

However, confidence and populist slogans alone would not be enough. Another important factor was needed, comparable in strength to the lever of power. They became the idea of great power. However, in Russian history, great power has not only a mental character, but objectively acts as an integral socio-cultural system, the bearer of which is the state. The system of great-power domination is realized through violence directed within the country to the political, social and economic expropriation of subjects and to territorial expansion outward. Stalin skillfully used the factor of great power in 1922, creating his Soviet Union as a unitary state. He played on the feelings of great power both during the period of building socialism, and during the Great Patriotic War, and the subsequent restoration of the destroyed economy. During Stalin's rule, the great-power consciousness of the people increased many times over. The price of human life has also dropped many times over. He very subtly felt this contradiction and reflected in his diary on June 25, 1945, the remarkable Soviet director A.P. Dovzhenko. This entry should be quoted in full: "Yesterday I was at the Victory Parade on Red Square. Troops and people stood in front of the great mausoleum. My beloved Marshal Zhukov read a solemn and formidable speech

Victory. When he remembered those who fell in battle, in huge numbers unknown in history, I took off the headdress. It was raining. Looking around, I noticed that no one else took off their hats (as in the text. - I.P.). There was no pause, no mourning march, no silence. Two or one phrase seemed to have been said by the way. 30, if not 40 million victims and heroes seemed to have sunk into the ground or did not live at all, they were not remembered as a concept ... it became sad, and I was no longer interested in anything ... Before their great memory, before the blood and the square did not kneel in agony, did not think, did not sigh, did not take off its hat. Probably it should be. Or maybe not? For why did nature weep all day long? Why did tears fall from the sky? Were they giving a sign [to the living?](#)"[610]38. In the late 1920s such a policy

of great power only gained momentum. I.P. Tovstukha, Stalin's assistant, recorded his speech at the Stalin workshops of the October Railway on March 1, 1927. "We," Stalin said, "are making the transition from a peasant country to an industrial, industrial one, doing without outside help. How did other countries go along this path? England created her industry by plundering the colonies for a whole

200 years. There can be no question that we could take this path. Germany took 5 billion from defeated France. But even this path - the path of robbery through victorious wars - does not suit us. Our business is the politics of peace. There is also a third path followed by the tsarist government of Russia. This is the path of external loans

and enslaving deals at the expense of the workers and peasants. We cannot take this path. We have our own path - the path of our own savings. We cannot do without mistakes here, we will

have shortcomings. But the building we are building is so grandiose that these mistakes, these

ultimately irrelevant...

The newspaper Rabochaya Moskva absolutely accurately conveyed the spirit of Stalin's speech and the atmosphere of this meeting: "Machine-gun shot of applause. A man in soldier's khakis, with a pipe in his hand, in worn boots, stopped at the wings. "Long live Stalin! Long live the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of ~~Bolsheviks~~!"

At the same time, Stalin spoke about the very process of building socialism: "For this, it is necessary to strengthen the proletarian

dictatorships, the strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the development of our commanding heights at the angle of the industrialization of the country, the rapid pace of development of industry, the electrification of the country, the transfer of the entire national economy to a new technical base, the mass cooperation of the peasantry and the increase in the productivity of its economy, the gradual unification of individual peasant farms into public farms, the development of state farms, the limitation and overcoming of the capitalist elements in town and countryside, and so on [etc.](#)”[612]40. But the main thing in this process for Stalin was precisely “overcoming”. In December 1926, speaking with a report “Once again about the social-democratic deviation in our party” at the 7th expanded plenum of the executive committee of the Comintern, he quite unequivocally stated: “... if this question (about building the economic basis of socialism. - I. P.) translated into class language, it will take the following form: do we have the possibility of overcoming our own, Soviet, bourgeoisie by our own efforts? And this meant “to create, in the end, such conditions of production and distribution that lead directly and directly to the destruction of [classes](#)”[613]41. Then he spoke about the timing. In his opinion, “it is ~~not~~ possible to realize this condition for building socialism in one or two years. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialize the country, to build a powerful industry, to cooperate with the vast masses of the peasantry, to provide a new technical basis for agriculture, to unite individual peasant farms into large collectives, to develop state farms, to limit and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. For this, years and years of intensified construction work of the proletarian dictatorship are needed ”(emphasis mine. - I.P.). These words were spoken by him on October 19, 1928, in a speech at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and the IWC [of the CPSU\(b\)](#)[614]42. However, these were only words. Stalin's actions were already different. By this time, he had already traveled to Siberia and made additional adjustments to his ideas about building socialism in the USSR.

2. TRIP TO SIBERIA AS THE FIRST TEST OF FORCE

For the first time in the years that have passed since the end of the civil war, Stalin left Moscow not on vacation, but on state business, and chose for this purpose a region very remote from the center. He spent more than three weeks in Siberia - from January 14 to February 6, 1928, and visited Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Rubtsovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk. The trip took place in the strictest secrecy, and only in 1949 information about it came to light on the occasion of the publication of the 11th volume of Stalin's works, where the texts of his speeches in Siberia were published. At present, this trip has ceased to be a secret of Soviet history. The main documents stored in the General Department of the Central Committee and the party archive of the Novosibirsk Regional Committee of the CPSU were published in 1991 by the journal *Izvestia* of the Central Committee of the CPSU (No. 5–7). They, in turn, became the basis of a number of publications not only by Russian but also by foreign historians[615]1.

Nevertheless, questions remained. It is still unclear why Stalin concealed his stay in Krasnoyarsk and participation on January 31, 1928 in the work of the so-called Eastern Conference of Party and Soviet workers from the Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Achinsk, Minusinsk, Kansk, Tulun and Irkutsk districts on the issue of grain procurements. The minutes of this meeting indicate that the chairman of the Siberian Regional Executive Committee R.I. Eikhe. Stalin was not mentioned. There was no mention of Stalin's participation in the work of this meeting in the information published about him in the newspaper *Krasnoyarsky Rabochiy* on February 2, 1928. However, not only a number of notes and telegrams were preserved, testifying to the preparation of Stalin's trip to Krasnoyarsk[616]2. Brief notes of his assistant K. Sergeev, notes by Stalin himself made at a meeting on January 31, 1928, and notes submitted to him during the meeting[617]3 have been preserved. It is also impossible to ignore the speech of Potapov, a member of the Presidium of the Tulun Okrug Executive Committee, at the district grain procurement meeting in Tulun on February 5, 1928, at

which was attended by R.I. Eikhe and a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Trade of the USSR I.I. Pankratov. Potapov, in particular, said the following: "Keep in mind that we have been made dependent on the procurement and any other ongoing campaign. Take, for example, such a fact as the departure of the General Secretary of the Central Committee to Siberia - to Krasnoyarsk, which this speaks of. This indicates that the grain procurement campaign is at an angle of impact. ...when the internal party fever imposed by the opposition passed, when the party, if you like, experienced an internal party crisis, and yet the general secretary of the Central Committee did not leave, and now he left, he went downstairs. This circumstance should stir us up and force all responsible and irresponsible workers to increase the pace of work in all types of campaigns, and especially in grain procurements.

It is also known that on February 1, 1928, in Krasnoyarsk, Stalin was approached by a shop party cell of railway workshops with a request to make a report at a working meeting. Stalin refused, referring to the fact that "he came unofficially to instruct his comrades in internal order. To speak now openly at a mass meeting means to exceed one's authority and deceive the Central Committee of the Party.[619]5 This fact is extremely characteristic of Stalin's manner and his mechanism of power. That is why the strategic plan of

Stalin's trip is still not entirely clear, in addition to solving the purely utilitarian task of overcoming the grain procurement crisis that arose in late 1927 - early 1928. The fact that there was a plan is also evidenced in his book by A.G. Avtorkhanov, whose acquaintance Sorokin then traveled to Siberia with Stalin[620]6. But is it only a plan "continuous

collectivization" and "liquidation of the kulaks as a class based on it" was Stalin taken out of Siberia? And why did he go to Siberia?

We must pay tribute to the researchers I.P. Ikonnikova and A.P. Ugrovatov - they put the last question before themselves and answered it as follows: "Even in a telegram dated January 14, he (Stalin. - I.P.) called the Urals and Siberia the last reserve (grain procurement. - I.P.). With regard to Siberia, Stalin emphasized that "it is necessary to press desperately here." Apparently, he wanted not only to organize pressure in order to get the peasants to hand over their grain, but also to see how he would react to emergency measures in

the majority of the Siberian party organization is peasant in composition, what will be the response in the village as a whole. It can be assumed that the General Secretary did not accidentally seek to exercise administrative pressure, being away from the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky and, not without reason, believing that these measures—

would not meet with their sympathy. This answer can hardly be called convincing. To see how the countryside would react to emergency measures, Stalin could have been closer to Moscow, in any other region of the country. Most of the Party organizations were peasant organizations not only in Siberia, but throughout Russia. This is common knowledge. As for the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, there was no reason for Stalin to hide from them. And not only because by that time he already owned all the levers of power, but also because in January 1928 the entire Politburo of the Central Committee approved the decision to apply emergency measures to overcome the grain procurement crisis, however, as an exception.

In the course of getting acquainted with the literature about Stalin's trip to Siberia, one gets the conviction that the answer to the question - why to Siberia? - taken for granted. Because there was a lot of bread in Siberia. Isn't this another stereotype formed under the influence of Stalin's speeches that grain surpluses this year in Siberia were "more than ever", because "the harvest ... is a leap year, one might say, unprecedented"[622]8.

In the report of the head of the Siberian Trade Department A.N. Zlobin to the authorized representative of the Council of Labor and Defense A.I. Dogadov dated January 9, 1928, the harvest of 1927 in Siberia was estimated as [average](#)[623]9. And according to the data given in the article by M. Basovich, a member of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, by the beginning of 1928, there were 12 pounds per capita in the Middle Volga, 13.3 in the Lower Volga, 14 in the North Caucasus, and 13 in the Crimea .9, in Ukraine - 7.5, in the Urals - 7, in Siberia - 6.9, in the Central Black Earth Region - 4.5. The largest stocks of grain, according to M. Basovich, were concentrated in areas where the memory of the famine of 1921 was [strong](#) . ."[624]10.

Perhaps one more Stalinist explanation should be accepted, that "nowhere are we so far behind in procurement as in [Siberia](#)"[625]11. However, the grain procurement crisis took place not only in Siberia. Difficulties were ubiquitous. Instead of the planned annual 500 million poods, by January 1928, grain procurements throughout Russia amounted to only 300 million . last [campaign](#)[627]13. In addition, Stalin's personal presence was not required at all. In order to "unwind" the local party leadership to collect the 60 million poods necessary for the Center, it turned out to be enough formidable Stalinist directives sent from Moscow on December 14 and 24, 1927, then on January 6 and 16, 1928. In addition, the Siberian leadership during the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attended a special meeting on the issue of grain procurements with the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Rykov. And "already then," as S.I. Syrtsov at the plenum of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 3-7, 1928 - the center began to tighten up in terms of the seriousness of the situation "[628]14. R.I. also spoke about the same meeting. Eikhe, and also that the directive of December 24, 1927 was received at [the congress](#)[629]15.

After such a "pumping" the Siberian leaders sharply stepped up and tightened their actions. By the decision of the bureau of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 10, 1928, a bread "troika" was created, consisting of the chairman of the Siberian Regional Executive Committee R.I. Eikhe, secretary of the Sibkraikom of the CPSU (b) S.I. Syrtsov and the head of the ~~Siberian~~ Trade Department A.N. [Zlobina](#)[630]16. To resolve the current issues of the grain procurement campaign, it would be quite enough for A.I., authorized representatives of the Council of Labor and Defense, who were already in Siberia. Dogadov and I.I. Pankratov. On January 6 and 9, 1928, they held special meetings with Syrtsov and Eikhe, after which the decision on the grain ~~"troika"~~[631]17 followed .

A direct answer to the question: why did Stalin go specifically to Siberia in January 1928 and what was the plan of his trip? - in the surviving documents, of course, not to be found. The established system of power, as a rule, did not reveal the motives for its political decisions. Therefore, it is so important when working with official documents on Soviet history to find the appropriate "key" that allowed

to reveal the true meaning of events. However paradoxical it may sound, in this case the "key" to the answer to the question posed was found in the speeches of Stalin himself. Speaking at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow organization of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 13, 1928, with a report on the work of the April joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Stalin named two circumstances that, in his opinion, facilitated "preparatory successes and the struggle against the offensive of the capitalist elements of the countryside." Firstly, "it is necessary to have an absolutely united party, an absolutely strong rear and a completely strong government...", and — secondly, "the readiness of the masses to support certain steps of the leadership"[632]18. Further, Stalin revealed his decision-making methodology: "The art of Bolshevik politics consists in being able to choose the time and place and take into account all the circumstances of the case in order to concentrate fire on the front where it is most likely to achieve maximum results."

If Stalin chose Siberia for his trip, then it means that it was in Siberia, if we follow his logic, that circumstances developed in such a way that it turned out to be easier to launch an offensive against the peasantry, it was easier to start using emergency measures as the main means of resolving the grain procurement crisis, it was easier to hit the fist. The article of the Criminal Code, not for speculation, but for not delivering bread[634]20. True, while already in Siberia, Stalin argued that "... the application of Article 107 in other territories and regions gave excellent results, rallied the working peasantry around Soviet power and improved the situation in the countryside, and in you, in Siberia, it should give allegedly bad results and worsen the situation? Why, on what basis? You say that your prosecutorial and judicial authorities are not ready for this case. But why in other territories and regions..."[635]21. Reference to non-existent examples was one of Stalin's favorite demagogic

tricks: Article 107 was applied to the kulak, first in Siberia, and then in other regions and regions. The results obtained immediately upon his return to Moscow were summarized by him in a circular of the Central Committee dated February 13, 1928 "The first results of the procurement campaign and the further tasks of the party." This circular, sent to the localities, has already become law for all Party organizations.

And now let us consider in more detail the circumstances that determined Stalin's decision to go to Siberia and from there to begin a radical change in the policy of the communist authorities in relation to the peasantry.

The Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the highest body of communist power in Siberia, was headed by S.I. Syrtsov, appointed in January 1926 instead of S.V. Kosior[636]22. Syrtsov was known at the top of the party for his cruelty in decossacking on the Don in 1919. Stalin knew him personally from his work in the apparatus of the Central Committee - Syrtsov was in charge of the Accounting and Distribution Department of the Central Committee in 1922-1923, i.e. precisely at the time when, under the leadership of Stalin, a secret party-state reform was being carried out, as a result of which the hierarchy of party committees, headed by appointed secretaries, became the backbone of Soviet statehood. However, Syrtsov was known not only for his toughness, but also for his ability to maneuver along with Stalin in his politics. At the III Siberian Regional Party Conference (March 25–30, 1927), he spoke quite frankly on this subject: in the month of December, such a formulation of the question is tantamount to a demand to turn the secretary of the regional committee into a parrot. I will

not become that parrot" [637]23. The statements available in the literature about the pro-NEP sentiments of the Siberian leadership in general and S.I. Syrtsov, in particular, are nothing more than the result of the absolutization of individual statements such as Syrtsov's slogan "Save, good luck!". In real politics, practically none of the party leadership, either in the Center or in the localities, was distinguished by consistency in carrying out the ideas of the NEP. More characteristic of Syrtsov were just anti-NEP sentiments, and Stalin was well aware of this. Thus, in a letter to district committees and regional committees dated June 25, 1926, Syrtsov, explaining the new in the preparation and implementation of the tax campaign of 1926–1927, drew attention to the class nature of the agricultural tax and demanded "to strengthen the work of organizing and rallying the poor and middle peasants around the correct implementation tax work, rebuffing the kulak part of the cou

use the self-activity of the poor and middle peasants in identifying the objects of taxation, combating the concealment of objects and distributing benefits provided by law"[638]24. Only a fragmentary knowledge of the documents can explain the statement of S.A. Kislitsyn that "Syrtsov was put in a difficult position" when Stalin arrived in Siberia, "because such a policy contradicted his attitudes", only a misunderstanding of the real situation in Siberia underlies the statement of the English historian J. Hughes that the relatively rich agriculture of Siberia and the pronounced pro-NEP mood of the local party organizations made a certain impression on Stalin, who, in his opinion, already at the beginning of 1928 decided to carry out a "revolutionary program" for the transformation of agriculture [639]25.

The Siberian Regional Executive Committee at that

time was headed by R.I. Eikhe, who was also known to Stalin for his devotion and initiative in pursuing the policy of the Center[640]26. This confirmed his behavior during the grain procurement crisis of 1925, as already mentioned in the first chapter.

The Plenipotentiary Representative Office (PP) of the OGPU in Siberia was headed by L.M. Zakovsky. He was assigned to Siberia at the same time as S.I. Syrtsov, also in January 1926 (Before that, chief OGPU)[641]27 of Odessa. There was no department fundamental disagreements in the "troika" of Syrtsov - Eikhe -

Zakovsky. As you can see, the "head" of the communist government in Siberia consisted entirely of appointees who had nothing to do with this region, who had not grown up on this land. The Siberian party organization was basically peasant in its social composition, and it was headed by party officials who were dependent only on the Center, who were subordinate only to it and carried out only its instructions.

It has already been said above that the Siberian leaders learned about the demand of the central party leadership to tighten grain procurements during the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) at a special meeting with Rykov, convened in connection with the emerging sharp reduction in grain procurements in October-November 1927. text of the directive of the Central Committee of December 24. With the directive of December 14, they were familiar before. Both of these directives required

local authorities "to organize a decisive change in grain procurement"[642]28.

On December 29, 1927, the bureau of the Sibkraikom adopted the first in a subsequent series of resolutions on grain procurements, drawn up in the spirit of the directives received. There are no calls for open violence in it yet [643]29. But Eikhe's reaction is indicative - one of the points of the resolution on the collection of agricultural tax, which was adopted in the "Soviet order" by the Presidium of the Siberian Regional Executive Committee on January 4, 1928, read: "... to propose to the regional executive committees to take

measures of repression against the tax arrears"[644]30. However, the real fright of the local authorities came after Stalin's directive of January 6, 1928, which began with a sharp reprimand: "Despite the two-fold, firm directives of the Central Committee to strengthen grain procurements, there is still no turning point ..." and ended with a stern warning: "...delay in the implementation of this directive and the failure to achieve real success within a week in the sense of a decisive change in grain procurements may put the Central Committee before the need to replace the current leaders of party organizations"[645]31. Stalin's directive contained not only threats, but also carte blanche for repression: "When collecting arrears on all kinds of payments, immediately apply harsh punishments, primarily against the kulaks, special repressive measures are necessary against kulaks and speculators who disrupt agricultural prices " [646]32.

Stalin's attitudes coincided with Syrtsov's readiness: "The correct formulation of the question is," he said more than once in 1927, "to isolate the kulaks in the village, so that every peasant knows the kulaks by name and consciously sees class enemies in them, organize the poor and middle peasants so that most of the village is with us"[647]33

Having received Stalin's directive of January 6, 1928, the next day, the Siberian leadership took decisive action, recalling, in all likelihood, Eikhe's methods during the grain procurement campaign three years earlier. On January 9, 1928, the bureau of the Sibkraikom sent a telegram asking the Center to sanction its proposal: "To recognize the need to prosecute the holders of large stocks of grain and its buyers

from among the more prosperous strata of the countryside. To speed things up, let these cases go through the organs of the OGPU" [648]34. And the next day, January 10, it created a bread "troika".

It was at this moment that the question of a trip to Siberia was being decided in Moscow. After Stalin's directives, party leaders, moreover from the highest echelon of power, left for the main grain regions of the country in order to "knock out" bread. Ordzhonikidze was supposed to go to Siberia. On January 9, 1928, the Politburo took a special decision on this matter. However, on January 12, Ordzhonikidze's business trip was canceled, officially due to his illness[649]35. Stalin went. And his bet on Siberia justified itself. While Stalin was getting ready and on his way, the Siberian leaders made one decision after another, consistently tightening the grain procurement policy. The decisions of the grain "troika" were

transferred to the district committees as decisions of the Sibkraikom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and entered into force automatically[650]36. That is what the Troika was created for. Not only for efficiency, but also in order to get around the members of the Sibkraikom, workers from the field, representing local, mostly peasant in composition, party organizations. On January 13, 1928, the "troika" instructed the regional prosecutor's office, the authorized representative of the OGPU, Zlobin and Basovich to determine specific measures to combat the holders of large stocks of grain and give instructions to their subordinates in the field. On the same day, such a circular was sent to all district prosecutors

and heads of district departments of the GPU of Sibkrai with the signatures of Zakovsky, the authorized representative of the OGPU for Siberia, and Leonidov, acting regional prosecutor. It already allowed the application of Article 107 of the Criminal Code "when establishing cases of malicious, i.e. systematic, broad, etc. buying up bread in grain or flour, in significant quantities with the aim of hiding it or not releasing it to the market

private persons millers, merchants, buyers..."[651]37. The ellipsis in the text of the circular suggested expanding the circle of persons whose actions could be qualified under Article 107 of the Criminal Code.

The continuation of the circular dated January 13, 1928, was prompted to the Siberian leadership by Stalin's telegram sent from Moscow on January 14, the day he left for Siberia. If in a circular

Zakovsky and Leonidov, the kulaks had not yet been named among those in relation to whom the application of Article 107 was allowed, then in Stalin's telegram, on the contrary, the speculator and the kulak were placed side by side as disorganizers of the market and price policy, and both were called enemies of Soviet power. "... Many of the Communists think," the telegram said, "that it is impossible to touch the buyer and the kulak, as this can scare away the middle peasant from us. This is the most rotten idea of all the rotten thoughts that exist in the minds of some Communists... In order to restore our price policy and achieve a serious change, we must immediately hit the buyer and the kulak, we must arrest the speculators, kulaks and other disruptors of the market and price policy.. The speculator and kulak is the enemy of Soviet [power](#)"[652]38. —

Stalin's telegram was received at the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on January 15, and a meeting of the grain "troika" and the bureau of the regional committee was immediately called. On the day of Stalin's arrival, on January 17, the bureau of the Sibkraikom adopted a new resolution, which already dealt with "the allocation in the main grain-procurement regions of several (4-10) obviously obviously kulak farms, malicious, hostile to the Soviet authorities, having large stocks of grain, compiled to a certain extent by buying up, operating machines, hiding objects of taxation, etc., to bring to justice as malicious speculators in meat, bread and other items [with] confiscation of bread. And then followed a purely demagogic trick of the authorities that "the choice of farms should be made with great care, taking into account all the moments, so that the middle peasants would not take this measure into account as directed against the entire peasantry or a significant part of it, or the revision of the NEP." Even having strangled the NEP, the communist authorities continued to swear by his name. The actions of the authorities against the kulak at the beginning of 1928 were nothing but a direct offensive against the NEP. "The list (of kulaks. - I.P.), - the resolution said, - must be compiled by the leadership of the authorized district and the secretary of the district committee under their responsibility. The event is being carried out by the GPU on the basis of the directives of the OGPU. At the end of the text there was an addition, quite characteristic of the communist government: "Instructions to the districts [on] the implementation of the measure are given exclusively through responsible reliable persons with the strictest ~~obs~~servance of the conditions of secrecy ..." [653]39.

This decision of the bureau of the Sibkraikom actually preceded Stalin's actions in Siberia. All he had to do was give the go-ahead. Speaking at the plenum of the Sibkraikom (March 3–7, 1928), Syrtsov left a very important testimony for history on this matter. Here it is: "We, at our own peril and risk, issued a directive on repressions against the kulaks in every grain-procurement region. My trip to Barnaul, Rubtsovka showed that a number of local workers are inclined to this. And we gave a directive to the OK (district committees. - I.P.), believing that she should not be detained, although we already knew that Comrade was coming. Stalin. ... I believe that the decisive favorable condition for the Siberian Organization was that in the leading center - in the bureau of the Regional Committee - we ensured complete unity of action based on unity of views. This ensured that inevitable biases and errors were kept to a minimum. There was no confusion, inevitable if our center were less ideologically and organizationally

united.

Such an event as the need to hit the fist was clear to us from the very beginning. Having figures and taking into account a number of facts of sabotage by the kulaks, we considered it necessary to raise the question of how we can move this matter forward. ... Stalin's attitude towards this directive showed that the essence of our line coincided with the line of [the Central Committee](#). On January 18,

1928, Stalin spoke at a meeting of the bureau of the Sibkraikom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He didn't have to "break" anyone. The only person who dared to object was the chairman of the board of Sibkrayselbank S. Zagumenny. In fact, he, too, was not against repression against the kulak, but supported repression only against kulaks who speculated in bread. Stalin, on the other hand, demanded that Article 107 of the Criminal Code be applied to the kulak much more widely - not for speculation, but for not releasing grain to the market, for not delivering bread.

The decision of the bureau of the Siberian Regional Committee dated January 18 was based on the previous one, dated January 17, to which there is a direct reference in the text. Stalin belongs to the addition that the repressions are carried out on behalf of the prosecutor's office, and then the instruction directly followed - "to instruct the regional prosecutor's office in newspapers and special leaflets to publish on its own behalf (emphasis mine. - I.P.) a notice of Art. Art. 107 and 105 and on the procedure and conditions for their application"[655]41. This

the addition is a concrete example of the operation of the mechanism of Stalinist power that had been formed by that time. Hidden within party structures, this power, as a rule, acted not on its own behalf, but through its executors.

Resolutions followed one after another, escalating and exacerbating the already explosive situation in the countryside. On January 20, 1928, another circular signed by Zakovsky, Leonidov and the Chairman of the Sibkraysud Kozhevnikov was sent to the localities with the instruction "to initiate criminal prosecution also against the holders of especially large stocks of grain, exclusively from among the kulaks, both buying up bread and not releasing the available they have grain surpluses for the market." It was ordered to hold show trials, "mainly in those areas where there are large stocks of grain or where grain speculation is observed. Specifically, cases subject to judicial review are determined by a special troika for grain procurements with the participation of the commissioner for grain procurements, and where there are no such troikas, in agreement with the secretary of the district committee of the CPSU (b). ... As

a general rule, to hear cases without the participation of the prosecution and defense, allowing such cases only if necessary, by the decision of the trio of a broad show trial.

... Under no circumstances should acquittals or suspended sentences be allowed. The arrest must necessarily be accompanied by the confiscation of all surpluses of bread, meat and

manufactured goods..."[656]42. The decree on criminal prosecution "in each of the main grain-procurement regions of several kulaks (4-10) who have large stocks of grain ..." is already the beginning of mass terror, terror by order, which in the 1930s. will become an "operation" organized on an all-Union scale with mandatory limits on repression. Only a few years separated this resolution of the Sibkraikom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from the resolution of the Politburo "On anti-Soviet elements" of July 2, 1937, on the basis of which local secretaries and heads of departments of the NKVD were instructed to "register all those who returned (from places of special settlements. - I. P.) to the homeland of kulaks and criminals, so that the most hostile of them would be immediately arrested and shot in the course of administrative proceedings through

troikas, and the rest, less active, but still hostile elements, would be rewritten and sent to the regions at the direction of the NKVD ... "[657]43. One must think that Stalin was satisfied

with the meeting of the Bureau of the Siberian Regional Committee on January 18, 1928, and the subsequent actions of the Siberian authorities. "The workers are ready to break into a cake in order to rectify the situation," Stalin reported in a cipher telegram from Novosibirsk to the Central Committee to S. Kosior. And in another cipher telegram: "...the local party workers set to work with great zeal and work in good conscience, like true Bolsheviks..."[658]44. So, according to Stalin, the first condition - "... strong power" ~~for~~ an attack on the peasantry - was available in Siberia. It was also necessary to have a second condition - "the readiness of the masses to support ..."

"Operation against the kulaks," as the campaign against the peasantry was called in official documents, meant nothing more than the unleashing of a civil war in the countryside. As you know, in May 1918, also "from above", by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars on food dictatorship (decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 9, decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of May 13), a merciless terrorist war was unleashed against the peasant and other bourgeoisie, ~~who~~ were holding surplus grain[659]45. At the end of 1928, Syrtsov, speaking of the increased resistance of the peasantry to the policy of power, admitted that "this is the reaction of the kulaks offensive"[660]46. ~~But~~ in order to undertake such a provocation "from above", it was necessary to be sure that the ground for a civil war had already been prepared in the countryside, and in Siberia in particular.

In recent years, the literature has repeatedly expressed the idea that without the support "from below" of the policy of dispossession, no collectivization would be possible. As a matter of fact, Stalin himself was the first to confirm this, who admitted that the "revolution from above", as he called collectivization, took place "with direct support" from below "from the millions of peasants who fought against kulak bondage, for a free collective farm life" [661] 47.

If the peasantry, which constituted the vast majority of the population of Russia, had been socially united in resisting the policy of communist power, then no collectivization would have been possible. Separate peasant

speeches, even very numerous ones, are still not a "peasant war". According to the "Memorandum on the Forms and Dynamics of the Class Struggle in the Countryside in 1930", prepared by the Secret Political Department of the OGPU, during the reporting year there were 13,754 peasant uprisings[662]48. Undoubtedly, this is a large figure, but given that by the end of the 1930s. 242.5 thousand collective farms and about 4 thousand state farms[663]49 were created, then she turns out in the country. From the very beginning, the Stalinist authorities managed to translate the struggle of the peasants against an external force - the state into a struggle within the village itself. Where they could not manage on their own, the Red Army stepped in[664]50. The reason for the victory was not only the extreme dispersion of Russian villages over a vast territory, but also the foundations of the life of the Russian peasantry, which took shape over the centuries. It is important to note here, first of all, the traditions of his relations with the authorities. The specificity of these relations was the subordination of power. Traditionally, the authorities in Russia acted through administrative coercion.

Despite the rapid development of capitalism that began after 1861, the countryside was captured by this movement to the least extent. The reform of 1861, which was traditionally carried out "from above" for Russia, freed the peasants only personally and formally. The abolition of serfdom did not entail the establishment of the economic independence of the Russian peasants. The right of private land ownership was not recognized. On the contrary, the role of the community was strengthened, which became an intermediary in relations between the state and the peasantry. Community traditions thus preserved the patriarchal way of life in the countryside. The process of forming a layer of peasant proprietors, which began as a result of the Stolypin agrarian reform, was not brought to an end by 1917.

For the most part, the Russian peasant treated the land not as property. The earth for him was something originally given, a gift from God. The consciousness of private property and the sense of justice inseparable from it was unfamiliar and alien to him. The lack of legal consciousness inevitably entailed a lack of respect for the alien and the consciousness of its inviolability. In the traditions of Russia there was a general violation of the law - not only "from above", but also "from below", and, consequently, the consciousness of universal guilt. These

the components of the mentality of the Russian peasantry played their negative role in the subsequent history of Russia. S.Yu. Witte once prophetically predicted: "Woe to that country that did not instill in the population a sense of legality and property, but, on the contrary, planted all sorts of collective possessions"[665]51. For his part, Stalin, beginning the nationalization of agriculture, was aware of the advantage of this circumstance. One of the "reasons for the comparative ease and speed" of the "collectivization" process, in his opinion, was the absence of "private ownership of land, chaining the individual economy" [666]52. In this regard, as noted by A.S. Akhiezer, in Russian society there was a powerful leveling foundation of morality, which constantly broke up another alternative, i.e. attempts by peasantry to take the path of militarism and stratification. This alternative was

defeated in the process of implementing the Stolypin reform, when the peasantry put up mass resistance to the destruction of the community. This alternative arose again as a result of the October Revolution and was directed against the landowners[667]53. It must be added that they are not only against the landowners, but also against the state and against the prosperous part of the countryside. In 1917, the Russian peasantry as a whole supported the Bolsheviks, not only because of the Decree on Land, but also because Lenin's slogan "Rob the loot!" found a response among the peasant masses. Leveling sentiments were expressed primarily in the seizure and pogrom movement of the peasants against the landowners' estates, which in the autumn of 1917 "becomes overwhelming"[668]54.

Equalizing sentiments sharply increased in the chaos of the civil war, when the foundations of life that had been developing for centuries were crumbling before our eyes. During the NEP period, there was some reconciliation, but the process of social stratification that had begun again led to an increase in leveling sentiments. These patriarchal

sentiments were exploited by the communist government by launching its offensive against the NEP. In this case, the hatred of the communist authorities for capitalism and the hostility of the poor towards the prosperous peasantry coincided. The process of social stratification in the Siberian countryside during the NEP

period was more intense than in the European part of Russia. Such

opinion existed at the top of the party even before the results of the nested census of 1927, the purpose of which was precisely to determine the belonging of peasant farms to one social group or another. This circumstance was noted at a special meeting of the bureau of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on November 30, 1926, devoted to the question of the differentiation of the village[669]55.

According to the results of the nesting census, which Syrtsov cited at one of the so-called village meetings, the class composition of the Siberian peasantry was characterized approximately as follows: in Southern Siberia there were 5.5 kulaks, 56 middle peasants, 38.5% poor peasants; in Eastern Siberia, respectively - 4.5; 57.3; 38.2 % [670]56. According to the updated and supplemented data of Siberian agrarian historians (these data, I think, were subjected to ideologized distortions to a lesser extent[671]57), the average number of kulaks in Russia in 1927 was 3.9%, and in Siberia - 6.7% (In the South West - 7.7%, in the Northeast - 5.1%). The poor in Russia accounted for 23%, and in Siberia - 20.4%. They were joined by farm laborers, who accounted for 10 and 9.8%, respectively, in Russia and Siberia. The rest fell on the middle peasants[672]58. The communist government has always pandered to the poor, but since the end of 1925, the entire socio-economic policy in the countryside has

been aimed at this, which was named by the famous economist N.D. Kondratiev's policy of "favoritization" of the poor. Every year the percentage of poor farms exempted from paying taxes increased, and, conversely, the taxation of kulak farms increased. In the 1926/27 business year, 26.8% of the poor farms of Siberia were exempted from tax, in 1927/28 - 29.2% completely and 5.7% - partially, and for 1928/29 the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR established an exemption from tax for 32% of poor households[673]59. The credit policy was also aimed at this - loans in the first place and on favorable terms (low credit interest, interest-free and long-term loans, etc.) were provided to the poor. The class line was also maintained in the supply of equipment - for the poor there was a special preferential "machine fund". The land management policy was carried out according to the same principle - the poor, as a rule, received the nearest and best lands, which were easier to cultivate, the middle peasants got second-class land, and the kulaks

the most inconvenient and remote lands were assigned. This was usually explained by the fact that the kulak could work such lands better and faster, since he had more funds and

inventory. The policy of "favoritization" of the poor was carried out not only in the socio-economic, but also in the socio-political field. In 1924 purposeful work began on party building in the countryside. And although in 1924 and the first half of 1925 there was still no authorized attack on the kulak, but on the contrary, there was a certain liberalization in relation to the countryside, expressed, in particular, in the policy of revitalizing the Soviets by expanding the participation of wealthy peasants in elections, then from the end 1925 it changes to the exact opposite. There is a growing number of kulaks disenfranchised for using hired labor on their farms or for leasing livestock and equipment to other peasants. If in 1926 there were 14,500 so-called dispossessed peasants in Siberia, then in 1927 their number increased by 5.5 times and amounted to 77 thousand [people](#). to the party of the poor. "The line on accepting poor peasants into the party,"[—](#)

complained the secretary of the Irkutsk provincial committee of the RCP (b) in one of his closed letters to higher authorities at the end of 1924, "was understood quite straightforwardly. A decent middle peasant was often not accepted. At the same time, a poor man or a laborer, sometimes even with a semi-criminal past, or even a real one, is accepted. Poverty atones for everything – this is how many village communists see it."[675]61

In addition, the so-called groups of the poor were created under the rural Soviets, cooperatives, committees of peasant mutual assistance, which acted under the leadership of party cells. The groups made decisions on the most topical issues of economic and political life in the countryside and dictated their will to the village assemblies. This process was especially intensified in 1927, when a massive attack on the community began. In Soviet historiography, this was called "the process of transferring the traditional rights of the community to the rural organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat." By the decrees of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of March 14 and July 23, 1927, which finally assigned power functions in the village to the village councils, the community [was actually liquidated](#)[676]62. In Sib